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Following market-oriented reforms including the open door policy in 1978, 
China witnessed rapid economic growth, radical changes in economic structures, 
impressive improvements in people’s livelihood, and accelerated urbanization on the 
one hand, and widening income disparities both between social groups and between 
regions on the other. What is the dynamic linkage between the policy reforms and 
China’s rapid but uneven development in the period?
The question is first examined from a development perspective, and is located 
in the intense debates in development studies. It is found that underlying all policy 
reforms was a fundamental shift from de-linking to re-linking with market systems, or 
from passive to active participation in the global market economy. The policy reforms 
led China to open up to market systems both domestically and internationally, and the 
key dynamics of development in post-1978 China should be found in market forces 
released in the opening process.
Then a two-way net-increase model is developed to capture the role of market 
orientations in economic growth, uneven sectoral growth, and uneven regional 
growth. Meanwhile, improvements in people’s livelihood, accelerated urbanization, 
and widening disparities in income distribution are also explained in the light of the 
functioning of market orientations in the opening process. The model and derivative 
hypotheses are tested with empirical data, and gain substantial support. Challenges 
that China faces are analysed, policies to meet the challenges are suggested, and 
implications of the study for developing countries are illustrated.
i i i
CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES VI
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS IX
GLOSSARY XII
1 INTRODUCTION 1
China: opening up to what? 1
Outline of the study 6
2 PARTICIPATION IN THE GLOBAL MARKET ECONOMY 12
International trade debate 12
International trade as an ‘engine of growth’ 13
Unequal distribution: ISI versus EOD 24
Modernisation debate 41
Open up to forces of modernisation 42
Polarised development: de-linking versus diffusion 55
3 FROM PASSIVE TO ACTIVE PARTICIPATION 77
Radical strategic change in China 77
Socialist de-linking in retrospect 78
Socialist re-linking strategy 87
Domestic impetus to the strategic change 98
‘Communist wind’ and resistance to it 99
‘Revolution wind’ and resistance to it 109
International impetus to the strategic change 118
Increasing global integration 118
Increasing uneven development 124
Implications for China 127
4 ACTIVE PARTICIPATION AND RAPID ECONOMIC GROWTH 133
China’s growth miracle: a challenge to growth theory 134
Extraordinary growth performance 134
Conventional wisdom challenged 141
What created the miracle: a model and its application to China 151
Model specification 151
Empirical test 159
Interpretations and remarks 165
iv
Growth determinants 166
Improvements in people’s livelihood 171
5 ACTIVE PARTICIPATION AND UNEVEN SECTORAL GROWTH 182
Winners and losers 182
Uneven growth between industry sectors 183
Uneven growth between forms of ownership 188
Determinants of uneven sectoral growth 198
Two explanations 198
Hypothesis test 204
Significance of uneven sectoral growth 218
Contribution to economic growth and improvements in people’s livelihood 219
Impact upon urbanisation and polarisation 223
6 ACTIVE PARTICIPATION AND UNEVEN REGIONAL
DEVELOPMENT 227
Convergence or divergence? 227
Regional disparities: summary measures 228
Regional disparities: grouping measures 236
Sources of uneven regional development 240
An answer to the puzzle 241
Hypothesis test 246
Significance of uneven regional development 266
Contribution to economic growth and improvement in people’s life 266
Impact upon realignment of regional economies 272
7 CONCLUSION 278
Main findings 278
Main challenges and policy suggestions 288
Implications of the study for developing countries 297
REFERENCES 303
List of Figures and Tables
Figures
1 Share of assets of international banks in world GDP, 1970-1989 (%) 121
2 Widening absolute gap between developed and developing countries
grouped by region, 1962-1990 (US$ at 1980 constant prices) 125
3 Uneven growth between individual developing economies, 1962-1990
(per capita GNP growth rate %) 127
4 China’s national income and total output value of society, 1952-1992
(yuan at current prices) 139
5 China’s total output value of society, 1952-1978 (yuan at current prices) 140
6 China’s total output value of society, 1978-1992 (yuan at current prices) 140
7 Two-way net-increase effect model 152
8 Shift in market demand curve: consequences 154
9 Reallocation of inputs: consequence 155
10 The production possibility frontier 156
11 Increase in per capita real income in China, 1952-1993 (yuan at current prices) 175
12 Increase in per capita real consumption in China, 1952-1993 (yuan at current prices) 176
13 Average annual GDP growth rate of main industry sectors in China, 1978-1993 (%) 184
14 Average annual growth rate of labourers employed in China’s main industry
sectors, 1978-1993 (%) 184
15 Average annual growth rate of the output value of China’s rural non-primary
industry as compared with the national average, 1978-1993 (%) 185
16 Average annual growth rate of labourers employed in China’s rural non-primary
industry as compared with the national average, 1978-1993 (%) 186
17 Changing shares of main industry sectors in China’s GDP, 1978-1993 (%) 187
18 Changing shares of main industry sectors in China’s employment, 1978-1993 (%) 187
19 Rapid growth of international tourism in China, 1980—1993
(average annual growth rate %) 188
20 Average annual growth rate of the output value of main forms of ownership
in China’s industry, 1978-1993 (%) 190
21 Average annual growth rate of the output value of main forms of ownership
in China’s construction industry, 1980-1993 (%) 190
22 Average annual growth rate of retail sales of main forms of ownership
in China, 1978-1993 (%) 191
23 Average annual growth rate of labourers employed in main forms
of ownership in China’s non-primary industry, 1978-1993 (%) 191
24 Changing shares of main forms of ownership in the output value
of China’s industry, 1978-1993 (%) 193
25 Changing shares of main forms of ownership in the output value
of China’s construction industry, 1980-1993 (%) 193
26 Changing shares of main forms of ownership in China’s retail sales, 1978-1993 (%) 194
27 Changing shares of main forms of ownership in the total employment
of China’s non-primary industry, 1978-1993 (%) 194
28 Rapid growth of the foreign direct investment sector in China, 1983-1993
(average annual growth rate %) 195
29 Share of foreign direct investment in China’s total investment
in fixed assets, 1985-1993 (%) 196
30 Growth of the fulfilled value of China’s international services, 1979-1993
(average annual growth rate %) 197
31 Opportunity cost in country A 200
32 Opportunity cost in country B 201
33 Engel curve for grain in China, 1978-1993 207
34 Decreasing share of agricultural goods in the total value of world exports
vi
and imports, 1978-1993 (%) 208
35 Increasing share of labour-intensive goods in China’s total exports
and imports, 1978-1993 (%) 209
36 Average annual growth rate of rural residents’ per capita real income
from industry sectors in China, 1978-1993 (%) 221
37 Changing composition of rural residents’ per capita real income
in China, 1978-1993 (%) 221
38 Average annual growth rate of real wages of staff and workers
in main forms of ownership of China’s urban non-primary industry, 1984-1993 (%) 222
39 Absolute inter-provincial output disparity in China, 1978-1993
(measured by standard deviation) 229
40 Absolute inter-provincial livelihood disparity in China, 1978-1993
(measured by standard deviation) 230
41 Relative inter-provincial output disparity in China, 1978-1993
(measured by coefficient of variation) 231
42 Relative inter-provincial livelihood disparity in China, 1978-1993
(measured by coefficient of variation) 232
43 Relative inter-provincial output disparity in China, 1978-1993
(measured by Gini coefficient) 234
44 Relative inter-provincial livelihood disparity in China, 1978-1993
(measured by Gini coefficient) 235
45 Absolute output disparity between coastal and interior provinces
in China, 1978-1993 (yuan) 237
46 Relative output disparity between coastal and interior provinces
in China, 1978-1993 (%) 237
47 Absolute livelihood disparity between coastal and interior provinces
in China, 1978-1993 (yuan) 238
48 Relative livelihood disparity between coastal and interior provinces
in China, 1978-1993 (%) 239
49 Inter-provincial convergence in post-1978 China as compared with inter-provincial 
divergence in pre-1978 China (measured by relative summary
disparity: coefficient of variation) 242
50 Inter-provincial convergence in China as compared with inter-state 
convergence in the USA (as measured by the negative correlation between
income growth rate and initial income level) 243
51 Changing share of Five Dragons in China’s investment in fixed assets, 1985-1993 (%) 256
52 Lorenz curves for provincial output and livelihood indicators in China in 1978 261
53 Contribution of Five Dragons to China’s main output indicators
of development, 1978-1993 (%) 267
54 Contribution of Four Tigers to China’s main output indicators
of development, 1980-1993 (%) 268
55 Increasing contribution of Five Dragons to China’s regional income
redistribution program in the post-1978 period (%) 271
Tables
1 China’s foreign economic relations and trade since 1978 (US$ million) 2
2 Comparative cost in terms of labour in the production of 1000 dollar’s worth
of wine and cloth in Portugal and England (number of workers) 17
3 Growth of per capita GDP in developing economies classified by analytical
groups, 1965-1986 (%) 126
4 Average annual growth of GDP in China and the Four Small Dragons, 1965-1980 (%) 130
5 The 40 fastest-growing economies in the world, 1960-1993
(average annual growth rate %) 135
6 Per capita income in China and in other countries, 1960-1993
(US$ at current prices) 137
vii
7 China’s national income and total output value of society, 1952-1992
(value and indices) 138
8 Estimates of average annual TFP growth rate for Singapore 148
9 Regression results on Equation 7 (dependent variable: In net increase in GDP) 163
10 Decomposition of contributions to China’s GDP growth from 1978 to 1993 165
11 Per capita consumption of selected basic consumer goods in China, 1957-1978 173
12 Increase in per capita real wages and real income in China, 1978-1993
(yuan at 1978 constant prices) 174
13 Per Capita real consumption in China, 1978-1993 (yuan at 1978 constant prices) 175
14 Per capita consumption of selected basic consumer goods in China, 1978-1992 177
15 Possession of selected durable consumer goods in China, 1978-1992 (per 100 persons) 178
16 Urban household possession of selected durable consumer goods
in China, 1981-1993 (per 100 households) 178
17 Rural household possession of selected durable consumer goods
in China, 1978-1993 (per 100 households) 179
18 Increase in urban and rural residents’ per capita living space
in China, 1978-1993 (square meters) 180
19 Some indicators of improving quality of people’s life in China, 1978-1993 181
20 China’s international investment up to 1991 197
21 Uneven growth and the productivity gap between primary and non-primary
industry in China, 1978-1993 205
22 Uneven growth and the productivity gap between state-owned
and non-state owned enterprises in China’s industry, 1978-1993 206
23 Coefficients of income elasticity of demand for selected commodities
in China, 1978-1992 206
24 Regression results on Equation 14 for industry sectoral-pair
(dependent variable: In net increase in output) 212
25 Regression results on Equation 14 for ownership sectoral-pair
(dependent variable: In net increase in output) 213
26 Regression results on Equation 15 for non-primary industry
(dependent variable: share of non-primary industry in GDP) 216
27 Regression results on Equation 16 for non-state owned enterprises (dependent
variable: share of non-state owned enterprises in total industry output value) 217
28 Increase in wealth of private enterprise owners in China, 1988-1993 225
29 Regression results on Equation 24 (dependent variable: Ln net increase in GDP) 248
30 Uneven growth and initial national income level of China’s provinces, 1952-1978 250
31 Uneven growth and initial GDP level of China’s provinces, 1978-1993 251
32 Average annual growth rate of per capita GDP in industry sectors
in China’s provinces, 1978-1993 (%) 253
33 Average annual growth rate of state-owned and non-state owned enterprises
in industry in China’s provinces, 1978-1993 (%) 254
34 Uneven sectoral growth in the Four Tigers, 1980-1993 (%) 255
35 Uneven growth of investment in fixed assets between China’s main
regional groups, 1985-1993 (%) 256
36 Redistribution of regional income in China, 1952-1978 (100 million yuan) 260
37 Redistribution of regional income in China, 1978-1992 (100 million yuan) 262
38 Main development indicators for China’s provinces in 1978 and 1994 (Shanghai=100) 265
39 Share of 30 provinces and the Four Tigers in China’s main output
indicators of development in 1993 (%) 269
40 Main output and livelihood indicators of development in China’s provinces
in 1978 (yuan at current prices) 274
41 Main output and livelihood indicators of development in China’s provinces
in 1993 (yuan at 1978 constant prices) 275
vi i i
Preface and acknowledgements
Like most Chinese who were bom in the 1950s, I witnessed both the poverty 
and political turmoil during the Great Leap Forward and People’s Commune 
movements, the ‘three years of natural calamity’, and the Cultural Revolution, and the 
tremendous development performance since the adoption of reform and open-door 
policies in 1978.* A question lingers in my mind as to what has underlain the reform 
and open-door policies, and made the striking difference between the pre-and post- 
1978 periods. In search for an answer, I shifted my research focus to Development 
Studies in the early 1990s. Professor Zhuoheng Pang, former Dean of the Department 
of History and currently Director of the Institute of Development Studies, Tianjin 
Normal University, PRC, gave me important support by appointing me an associate 
professor in a postgraduate course on development theories.
In 1993, I was granted a scholarship to undertake a PhD by the Australian 
Agency for International Development. The study for the PhD has provided me with 
an opportunity to address that puzzling question with help from international experts 
in the field. I originally started the inquiry at the Centre for Development Studies, the 
Flinders University of South Australia, and my supervisors Dr John Browett, Director 
of the Centre, and Dr Bill Brugger, Professor of the Department of Politics, helped me 
greatly with development theories and China political economy. My research in that 
period resulted in an article ‘China’s Open-door Policy in Development Perspective’, 
which appeared in the Canadian Journal of Development Studies XVII (1), 1996.
‘Three years of natural calamity’ refers to the period from 1960 to 1962 when a famine prevailed. 
The Great Leap and People’s Commune movements were mainly responsible for the famine, but it was 
attributed to ‘natural calamity’ in the pre-1978 period.
ix
That article drew attention from a few publishers in the USA and the UK, and one of 
them was Nova Science Publishers, Inc., New York. Mr Frank Columbus, president 
and editor-in-chief of NSP, kindly invited me to contribute to his publication 
programs, and sent me a book contract for my PhD thesis.
By that time, I had transferred to the National Centre for Development 
Studies, the Australian National University, for my research needed supervision on 
development economics and development administration which could be better met at 
ANU. My supervisors Professor Ron Duncan, Director of NCDS, and Dr Peter 
Larmour, Director of Graduate Studies in Development Administration, gave me 
substantial help in the transfer process, and played a vital role in my research in the 
remaining years of my PhD candidature. With their help, support, and encouragement, 
the main body of my PhD thesis was written up, and a few articles based upon the 
thesis were published over that period. Comments from anonymous referees from 
international journals were also very helpful in improving my work.
My greatest indebtedness for this thesis is, therefore, to the above-mentioned, 
particularly my supervisors Professor Ron Duncan, Dr Peter Larmour, Dr John 
Browett, and Professor Bill Brugger. I also wish to thank Professor Gale Johnson, Dr 
Bill Yang, Dr Xiaowei Zang, and Mr Xinpeng Xu for comments and suggestions, Dr 
Yiping Huang and Dr Dimitris Hatzinikolaou for technical advice, Ms Maurette 
Macleod and Ms Penelope Gregory for kind help, Ms Maree Tait and Ms Alison 
Cumming Thom for editorial assistance, AusAID for sponsoring my PhD study, and 
Mr Hong Qiao for assistance in collecting data. Meanwhile, I would like to take the 
opportunity to show my indebtedness to my family who have been patiently 
supporting my research for years, especially my parents, my wife, my daughter, and 
my sisters and brothers. Moreover, I would like to thank the following:
The University of Ottawa, for permission to use portion of my article ‘China’s 
Open-door Policy in Development Perspective’, which appeared in the Canadian 
Journal of Development Studies XVII (1), 1996.
Carfax Publishing Limited, for permission to use portion of my article ‘The 
Rise of Non-state Owned Enterprises in China’, which appeared in Communist 
Economies & Economic Transformation 9 (2), 1997.
Department of Economics, the University of Queensland, and Nova Science 
Publishers Inc, for permission to use portion of my article ‘An Endogenous Model for 
China’s Growth Since 1978’, which appeared in C.A. Tisdell and Joseph C.H. Chai 
(eds.), China’s Economic Growth and Transition.
Nova Science Publishers Inc., for permission to use portion of my article 
‘Industry Structural Change in Rural China’, which appeared in Current Politics and 
Economics of China 1(2/3), 1997.
I hope that the study provides answers to the questions that have puzzled me 
for years, and can also be a help to those who wish to understand the dynamics of 







A P C s A g r ic u ltu ra l  P ro d u c e rs  C o o p e ra tiv e s
A P E C A A s ia  P a c if ic  E c o n o m ic  C o o p e ra tio n  A s so c ia tio n
A S E A N A s s o c ia t io n  o f  S o u th -E a s t A s ia n  N a tio n s
C V C o e ff ic ie n t  o f  v a r ia tio n
D F A T D e p a r tm e n t o f  F o re ig n  A ffa irs  a n d  T ra d e
E C E u ro p e a n  C o m m u n ity
E C L A E c o n o m ic  C o m m is s io n  fo r  L a tin  A m e ric a
E O D E x p o r t-o r ie n te d  d e v e lo p m e n t
E F T  A E u ro p e a n  F re e  T ra d e  A ss o c ia tio n
E P E x p o r t  p ro m o tio n
E T D D s E c o n o m ic  an d  T e c h n o lo g ic a l  D e v e lo p m e n t D is tr ic ts
E U E u ro p e a n  U n io n
F D I F o re ig n  d ire c t in v e s tm e n t
G A T T G e n e ra l A g re e m e n t o n  T a r if fs  a n d  T ra d e
G D P G ro ss  D o m e s tic  P ro d u c t
G N P G ro ss  o f  N a tio n a l P ro d u c t
G P C R G re a t P ro le ta r ia n  C u ltu ra l R e v o lu tio n
IM F In te rn a tio n a l  M o n e ta ry  F u n d
IS I Im p o r t s u b s ti tu t io n  in d u s tr ia lis a tio n
M N C s M u ltin a tio n a l c o rp o ra tio n s
M P C M a rg in a l  p ro d u c t o f  c a p ita l
M P L M a rg in a l  p ro d u c t  o f  la b o u r
N A F T A N o rth e rn  A m e ric a n  F re e  T ra d e  A re a
N G O N o n -g o v e rn m e n t o rg a n is a tio n s
N I N a tio n a l  in c o m e
N IC s N e w ly  in d u s tr ia lis e d  c o u n tr ie s
O E C D O rg a n is a t io n  fo r  E c o n o m ic  C o o p e ra tio n  a n d  D e v e lo p m e n t
O L S O rd in a ry  le a s t  sq u a re
O P E C O rg a n is a t io n  o f  P e tro le u m  E x p o r tin g  C o u n tr ie s
P R C P e o p le ’s R e p u b lic  o f  C h in a
S D S ta n d a rd  d e v ia tio n
S E Z s S p e c ia l  E c o n o m ic  Z o n e s
T F P T o ta l fa c to r  p ro d u c tiv ity
T O V S T o ta l o u tp u t  v a lu e  o f  so c ie ty
T V E s T o w n sh ip  a n d  v illa g e  e n te rp r is e s
U N U n ite d  N a tio n s
W T O W o rld  T ra d e  O rg a n isa tio n
xii
Introduction
The study’s original aim was to examine China’s open-door policy and its impact on 
China’s extraordinary development performance since 1978.1 As the study went on, 
however, it was found, from a development perspective, that the open-door policy 
could not be isolated from other policies that China carried out in the period. In other 
words, all the changes in China’s foreign and domestic policies should be taken as 
parts of an emerging new development strategy. We had to, therefore, reconsider the 
open-door policy, redefine opening up in the context of China’s special case, and 
widen the scope of the study—to examine how China’s extraordinary development 
performance occurred in the process of China’s radical change in development 
strategy. In the end, the study was completed in its present form. As changes in both 
domestic and foreign policy were involved, the study became increasingly 
challenging, and increasingly interesting as well. In this chapter, we first explain how 
to define ‘opening up’ and ‘an opening economy’ in the context of China’s special 
case, and then provide a broad outline of the thesis.
China: opening up to what?
China adopted its open-door policy in 1978 and has witnessed significant progress in 
its foreign economic relations and trade ever since. As shown in Table 1, from 1978 
to 1995, the value of imports and exports, the value of foreign capital inflow, the
1 The open-door policy means ‘economic opening up to the outside world’ (Deng Xiaoping 1985:19). 
This is different from the concept of ‘opening up’ used in the study, which means opening up to market 
systems, both domestically and internationally.
1
fulfilled value of contracted projects and labour services, and the value of total foreign 
exchange income from international tourism increased remarkably. It was, therefore, 
argued that China had suddenly opened up to the outside world, or ‘underwent a sharp 
turn toward participation in the world market’, after closing its door for decades 
(Riskin 1987:366; Gittings 1989:227).
Table 1 China’s foreign economic relations and trade since 1978 (US$ million)
Year Total value of Total value Fulfilled value of Total foreign
exports and of foreign contracted projects exchange income 
imports capital used and labour services from tourism
1978 206.40 .. ..
1979 293.30 .. 4.49
1980 381.40 1.70 6.17
1981 440.30 .. 7.85
1982 416.10 3.48 8.43
1983 436.20 19.81 4.52 9.41
1984 535.50 27.05 6.23 11.31
1985 696.00 46.47 8.35 12.50
1986 738.50 72.58 9.73 15.31
1987 826.50 84.52 12.60 18.62
1988 1027.90 102.26 14.30 22.47
1989 1116.80 100.59 16.86 18.60
1990 1154.40 102.89 18.67 22.18
1991 1356.30 115.54 23.63 28.45
1992 1655.30 192.02 30.49 39.47
1993 1957.10 389.60 45.38 46.83
1994 2366.20 432.13 59.78 73.23
1995 2808.50 481.33 65.88 87.33
Note: .. denotes that data are not available.
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1985-1996, Beijing.
The argument is, however, not correct since China had considerable economic 
contact with the outside world in the pre-1978 period. This is especially true of the 
1950s, the early 1960s, and the early 1970s, when China’s economic contacts with the 
outside world involved not only trade but also capital, technology, and services. 
Although detailed data have not been released by the Chinese government, it is known
2
that the value of imports and exports increased 3.6 times in the period from 1950 to 
1959, and increased 3.1 times in the period from 1970 to 1978.2 How then to 
understand China’s opening up since 1978? In other words, how does it differ from 
the previous approach? From a development perspective, China’s opening up does not 
simply mean opening up to the outside world but implies that China moved away 
from socialist de-linking toward socialist re-linking with market systems both 
domestically and internationally, and from passive toward active participation in the 
global market economy. In fact, China opened up to market systems both 
domestically and internationally, not simply to the outside world. To legitimise the 
argument, we have to briefly review the history of the People’s Republic of China.
After the Communist Party took national power in 1949, the protracted turmoil 
caused by the imperialist invasions and domestic wars was put to an end, and China 
began to strive for development along the orthodox Marxist-Leninist line as 
exemplified by the experience of the former Soviet Union. According to orthodox 
Marxist-Leninist doctrine, all the miseries suffered by people in the modem world 
result from free markets and private ownership and the ensuing exploitation and 
oppression of the poor by the rich. The only way out of these miseries is to replace 
free markets and private ownership with socialist planning and public ownership and, 
therefore, to eliminate the whole system of exploitation and oppression. Apparently, 
the doctrine was not only against the rich people within a nation but also against the 
dominant world market system as exemplified by advanced Western countries. 
Therefore, China had to pursue ‘revolutionary’ domestic and foreign policies to 
overcome the resistance to the Chinese Communist movements. To that end, the
2 Statistical Yearbook of China 1991. As shown in Chapter 3, China’s economic contacts with the 
outside world in the pre-1978 period were subject to political considerations (anti-imperialism, anti- 
Russia, and Third World revolutions). Due to tight control of information, data on the true volume of
3
Chinese Communist Party launched one political campaign after another, and China 
was in confrontation with market economies, especially with Western countries. 
Although China maintained economic contacts with foreign countries, including 
market economies, for practical purposes, these contacts were determined by de­
linking from the global market system and were an expression of passive participation 
in the global market economy.
Following this line, China seemed to do quite well in the first few years after 
1949, and people were very enthusiastic about the utopian Communist society that 
was believed to soon become a reality. Both the Party leaders and ordinary people 
thought that Communism would soon spread across the world, and wipe out the world 
market system dominated by Western capitalist countries. A decade or two later, 
however, it became increasingly apparent that things were not going as had been 
expected. Not only had rigid planning and political campaigns led to economic 
inefficiency and political instability, but also confrontation with advanced Western 
market economies led to stagnation in the progress of science and technology. By 
contrast, market-oriented Western economies were showing great vitality and, most 
significantly, China’s neighbours like Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan 
were growing very rapidly thanks to the adoption of market economic systems.
At the famous Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in 1978, the 
realist Party leaders headed by Deng Xiaoping formally adopted a series of important 
measures to save China from crisis; these measures were later known as reform 
(internal revitalisation) and open-door (external opening up) policies. At that time, 
even the top Party leaders could not provide a theoretical explanation about the nature
China’s foreign economic relations over that period, especially data on the international flow of capital, 
technology, constructed projects, and labor services, are not available.
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of the changes in domestic and foreign policies and the relationship between them. As 
White (1993: 49) noted:
When it began in 1978, many of these ideas were still embryonic and provided 
an initially easy basis of consensus among Party leaders who wanted to get rid 
of Maoism. There was no ‘plan’ of reform in the sense of a clear idea of some 
ultimate end-state and a series of steps or phases to reach it... Inevitably, 
therefore, when the CCP took the strategic decision to launch reform at its 
Third Plenum in 1978, they were venturing into uncharted territory and, as 
medieval maps used to tell the traveller, ‘here lie dragons’.3
Owing to the theoretical vacuum, the realist Party leaders had to ‘grope for stones to 
cross the river’, and carried out their policies through trial and error.
In fact, underlying the changes in China’s domestic and foreign policies was a 
radical change in development strategy: from socialist ‘de-linking’ toward socialist 
‘re-linking’ with market systems. That is, market mechanisms were no longer 
considered as incompatible with socialism. The reform policies were to ‘re-link’ 
socialism with market systems domestically while the open-door policy was to ‘re­
link’ socialism with market systems internationally. To re-link with market systems 
internationally, China had to reform its domestic economic system which had so far 
been alien to the dominant world market system. China’s opening up involved, 
therefore, domestic changes as well. In this sense, we should consider China’s 
opening up as opening up to market systems both domestically and internationally, 
not only as opening up to the outside world. From then onwards, China’s economic 
contacts with other countries began to be determined by re-linking with market 
systems, and China began to change from passive to active participation in the global 
market economy. In China’s special case, therefore, an opening economy means an 
economy re-linking with, or opening up to, market systems both domestically and 
internationally, or an economy participating actively in the global market economy, or
3 Also see Deng Xiaoping (1985:49).
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an economy undergoing a process of accelerated marketisation at both the national 
and the international level, or an economy undergoing a transition to market systems 
both domestically and internationally. The argument enables us to consider changes in 
domestic and foreign policies as an integrated policy reform package, and examine 
the dynamic linkage between market forces released by the policy reform package and 
China’s development performance.
In the study, therefore, we use ‘opening up’, ‘active participation’, ‘re­
linking’, ‘opening economies’, and ‘transition economies’ as synonyms in the sense 
that they all denote opening up to market systems both domestically and 
internationally. Such a conceptualisation of an opening economy in the study is 
different from others which define an opening economy only in the light of the 
orientation in foreign policy, especially the orientation in foreign trade policy. That 
practice is not appropriate for socialist economies undergoing a re-linking or 
transition process, although it might be appropriate in other contexts. In consideration 
of the difference, we focus on China’s opening up to the whole market system, not 
simply on China’s opening up to the outside world. You shall be disappointed, 
therefore, if you expect to find in the study a detailed description of the changing 
orientation in China’s foreign economic relations and trade, or an exclusive analysis 
of the impact of the changing orientation in China’s foreign economic relations and 
trade on China’s development performance.
Outline of the study
As indicated by the title of the thesis, the dynamics of development in an opening 
economy are the focus of the study. Since opening up to market systems in 1978, 
China has experienced rapid economic growth, and people’s livelihood has improved
6
remarkably. China’s development performance in the period has also been 
characterised by uneven sectoral growth and the ensuing structural changes, uneven 
regional development and the ensuing realignment of regional economies, and 
accelerated urbanisation and polarisation. How did market forces released in the 
opening process influence the development performance in post-1978 China? This 
curiosity runs through the whole study.
In Chapter 2, various theories and perspectives on participation in the global 
market system in the field of development studies are examined to see whether they 
can shed light on the nature of China’s opening up since 1978. Attention is given to 
two debates: the international trade debate and the modernisation debate. To simplify 
the question, two broad approaches can be identified in the debates. One approach 
advocated, in view of advantages of participation in the global market economy, an 
outward-looking, export-oriented trade and development pattern (the neoclassical 
economics position as represented mainly by Meier, Bauer, Little, and Balassa) or a 
comprehensive modemisation/westemisation program (the diffusion/modemisation 
paradigm represented chiefly by Levy, Lemer, and Nash). The other approach 
favoured, in view of disadvantages of participation in the global market economy, an 
inward-looking, import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) trade and development 
pattern (the structuralist school represented mainly by Prebisch, Singer, and 
Emmanuel) or a comprehensive socialist de-linking development strategy (the 
dependency/world-system paradigm represented primarily by Amin, Frank, and 
Wallerstein). It will be seen from the debates that the comprehensive socialist de­
linking development strategy advocated by the dependency/world-system school is 
extremely crucial for us to understand China’s development strategy in the pre-1978 
period, and the radical strategic change afterwards.
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In Chapter 3 it is shown, from a development perspective, how China’s 
opening up triggered by policy reforms since 1978 implies that China changed from a 
socialist de-linking to a socialist re-linking development strategy or from passive to 
active participation in the global market economy and, therefore, should be 
considered as opening up to market systems both domestically and internationally. 
Before 1978, China actually pursued a typical comprehensive socialist de-linking 
development strategy elucidated by the dependency/world-system school for almost 
three decades. Although there were diverging and changing interpretations and 
opinions within the school, the original meaning of the de-linking strategy was to 
establish an ‘autarky’ socialist system so as to ‘break with the world market’ (Amin 
1974:35). That socialist de-linking strategy found expressions in both China’s 
domestic and foreign policies. In domestic policy, the de-linking strategy necessitated 
the replacement of market mechanisms by socialist planning, the replacement of 
private ownership by public ownership of means of production, and the so-called 
‘continuous revolution’ against domestic and international capitalist forces. In foreign 
policy, it necessitated an overwhelming devotion to a worldwide socialist revolution 
and an extremely restrictive attitude towards foreign economic relations. Over that 
period, therefore, China’s participation in the global market economy could only be 
passive, and China did not in any sense ‘emerge’ in the global market economy. From 
1978 onwards, the socialist de-linking development strategy was challenged and 
abandoned. China began to re-link with, or open up to, market systems both 
domestically and internationally, and became an active participant in the global 
market economy.
From Chapter 4 to Chapter 6, an effort is made to evaluate the impact of the 
strategic change from de-linking to re-linking with market systems triggered by policy
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reforms on China’s development performance. This is the most challenging task of 
the thesis. It is challenging in the sense that we cannot draw much on the development 
theories illustrated in Chapter 2 since they either focus on the international aspect of 
opening up or overlook the opening up in socialist societies like China where market 
forces are released by radical policy reforms and, therefore, by strong government 
intervention. It is challenging also in the sense that the evaluation has to be carried out 
within the context of an intensive debate on sources of development, especially 
sources of economic growth, where little consensus has been reached about what are 
appropriate models for the evaluation and, surprisingly, even the most pro-market 
school of neoclassical economics ignores market mechanisms in growth modeling. A 
new theoretical framework has to be developed and related hypotheses have to be 
derived to evaluate the dynamic linkage between opening up triggered by policy 
reforms and China’s development performance. This is an adventurous endeavour, a 
risk that we have to take to fulfill the task. The evaluation focuses on three aspects of 
China’s development performance, that is, rapid economic growth, uneven sectoral 
growth, and uneven regional development, although it also touches upon other 
aspects.
In Chapter 4, attention is focused upon the impact of the strategic change on 
economic growth. A growth framework for transition or opening economies is 
developed to capture the key mechanisms of economic growth in post-1978 China: 
the interaction between the increase in various inputs on the one hand and the increase 
in efficiency in input allocation and utilisation through market orientations on the 
other. The two-way net-increase effect growth model is tested against China’s 
experience. The empirical test shows that the increase in efficiency in input allocation 
and utilisation through market orientations contributed significantly to China’s rapid
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economic growth in the post-1978 period. The finding highlights the role of re-linking 
with market systems in China’s growth performance, and also suggests that there was 
an increasingly strengthened interaction between demand and supply in the process of 
China’s economic growth. Given that the increase in market demand is different from 
quantity demanded, and is influenced by non-price determinants such as increases in 
people’s real income, the close correlation between rapid GDP growth and remarkable 
improvements in people’s livelihood over the period is to be expected.
In Chapter 5, attention is focused upon the impact of the strategic change on 
uneven sectoral growth, especially on the rise of non-primary industry and non-state 
owned enterprises. Based upon the two-way net-increase model, two explanations are 
proposed for the determinants of uneven sectoral growth: demand-led uneven sectoral 
growth and productivity-related uneven sectoral growth. It is hypothesised that 
uneven sectoral growth and the ensuing structural changes in transition or opening 
economies are a function of the uneven resource allocation introduced by market 
orientations to increase efficiency, and market forces released in the re-linking or 
opening process must be the main determinant of uneven sectoral growth and the 
ensuing structural changes in post-1978 China. Three approaches are applied to 
testing the hypothesis, and they all support the argument. Discussed here also are the 
contribution of uneven sectoral growth to China’s economic ‘miracle’, urbanisation, 
improvements in people’s livelihood, and polarisation.
In Chapter 6, attention is focused upon the impact of the strategic change on 
uneven regional development. There are three most marked phenomena in uneven 
regional development in post-1978 China: a narrowing of inter-provincial output 
disparity, a widening of inter-provincial livelihood disparity, and a widening of 
coastal-interior disparity in both output and livelihood indicators of development.
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Three sources are identified to explain uneven regional development: backwardness 
advantage, location advantage, and the functioning of market orientations. Given that 
China has been in a process of re-linking with market systems both domestically and 
internationally since 1978, it is hypothesised that the functioning of market 
orientations in the opening process influenced the play of both backwardness 
advantage and location advantage and, therefore, was the most important source of 
uneven regional development. Three approaches are applied to testing the hypothesis, 
and they all support the argument. Discussed here also are the contributions of uneven 
regional development to China’s economic ‘miracle’ and the impact of uneven 
regional development on the realignment of regional economies.
In Chapter 7, some concluding remarks are made. First, the most important 
findings of the study are summarised. Then, in the light of the findings, the main 
challenges that China faces are analysed, such as ideological conflicts, growth 
constraints, structural adjustment, and development administration. Appropriate 
policies are suggested. Lastly, implications of the study for other developing countries 
are discussed. It should be noted that the dynamics of development in an opening 
economy are rather involved and the study only highlights the most important. You 
would be disappointed, therefore, if you expect to find in the study an exhaustive 
explanation for all the determinants of rapid and uneven development in opening 
China.
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2 Participation in the global market economy
In search of an understanding of China’s opening up, the study begins with a review 
of various theories on participation in the global market economy in the field of 
development studies. In so doing, attention is concentrated on two most important 
debates over the issue: the international trade debate and the modernisation debate. 
An attempt will be made to identify in them the underlying questions: advantage and 
disadvantage, desirability and undesirability, and necessity and evitability of 
participation in the global market economy. The schools that took part in these 
debates will be evaluated and assessed in the light of how they approach and answer 
the questions.
International trade debate
The international trade debate is mainly related to the question of the advantages and 
disadvantages of participation in the global market economy. Although its origins 
may be traced back at least to the last century, international trade issues have 
intensified since the 1940s and 1950s in the debate between the proponents of 
classical and neoclassical economics and the proponents of structuralism. The debate 
has focused on the gains and losses of international trade, the positive and negative 
role of international trade in economic development, and the development strategy 
related to international trade. Classical and neoclassical economists’ doctrine of 
international trade as an ‘engine of growth’ has dominated the mainstream 
international trade theory since the late eighteenth century and become more and
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more popular in recent years, thus deserving close examination at the outset. 
Subsequently, we will turn to the challenges to it from the structuralists.
International trade as an ‘engine of growth’
Classical economics originated in England in the eighteenth century. The causes of 
rapid economic development in England and other European countries over that 
period attracted close scrutiny from classical economists. They believed, among other 
things, that international trade is a great, if not the greatest, propelling force in the 
economic development of European countries. It is above all, as Sir Dennis Robertson 
(1940:14) put it later, an ‘engine of growth’. This belief has become, since the late 
nineteenth century, one of the key characteristics of neoclassical economists who 
further extended, modified, and strengthened the theoretical foundations of the 
classical international trade doctrine.
In the postwar period, when there arose increasingly intensified challenges 
from structuralists, neoclassical economists defended the universal validity of this 
international trade doctrine, and applied it to the analysis of the dynamics of 
economic development in developing countries. The most prominent proponents of 
the classical and neoclassical economists’ international trade doctrine over that period 
were Meier (1963; 1984), Bauer (1957; 1971), Haberler (1959), Salvatore (1983), 
Kraiv (1970), Little (1970; 1978; 1979; 1982), Lai (1983), Balassa (1971; 1978; 
1982), and Krugman (1991). Although there were differences within this group, most 
argued that all countries, no matter whether they are developed or developing 
countries, can gain from international trade according to comparative advantage, that 
international trade can promote economic development in all trading countries and 
therefore generate a tendency towards equalisation, and that developing countries
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should adopt outward-looking development strategies, participate in the global market 
economy, and accelerate economic development through free international trade.
According to the classical and neoclassical economists, the most important 
and direct role of international trade as an ‘engine of growth’, and the most direct 
advantage of participation in the global market economy, is that international trade, 
according to comparative advantage, leads to a ‘more efficient employment of the 
productive forces of the world’ ( Mill 1848:576; also see Haberler 1959:104; Meier 
1984:490). In the first place, it results in the more efficient utilisation of the human 
and natural resources of all trading nations, thus increasing the world total output 
from given resources. Two nations, for example, can produce a much greater quantity 
of commodities and therefore receive greater economic benefits when they trade 
together and apply themselves to the production and export of the commodities in 
which they have comparative (not to mention absolute ) advantage. In the second 
place, it results in the full utilisation of otherwise underemployed domestic human 
and natural resources in each of the trading nations, thus serving as a vent for surplus 
factors of production in the nation. To a developing nation, in particular, it serves as 
an ‘outlet of its potential surplus of agricultural commodities and raw materials’, as 
shown by the experiences of some developing countries in Southeast Asia and West 
Africa (Salvatore 1983:255). In the third place, by allowing the trading nations to 
specialise in producing a narrower range of goods, it enables them to gain greater 
efficiencies of large scale production (Krugman and Obstfeld 1991:4).
For classical and neoclassical economists, in addition to direct advantages, 
international trade has some indirect advantages and beneficial effects on economic 
development. First of all, it leads, through the enlargement of the market, to the 
extension of the division of labour, thus allowing a country to overcome the
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diseconomies of being a small economic unit. This has occurred in the production of 
light manufactures in some developing economies, especially in such small economic 
units as Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore (Mill 1848:581; Meier 1984:490; 
Salvatore 1983:255). Secondly, it enables the trading countries to receive from the 
outside world the material means (such as machinery, and raw and semifinished 
materials) indispensable for their economic development. This has been demonstrated 
by the tremendous effects of the import of advanced material means on the economic 
growth of developing countries (Haberler 1959:108-9; Salvatore 1983:225). Thirdly, 
it serves as a vehicle for the transmission of new ideas, skills, technological know­
how, managerial talents and entrepreneurship from developed to developing 
countries, something which is even more important than the transmission of material 
goods. This has been confirmed by the fact that ‘the late-comers and successors in the 
process of development and industrialisation have always had the great advantage 
that they could learn from the experiences, from the successes as well as from the 
failures and mistakes, of the pioneers and forerunners’ (Haberler 1959:109; also see 
Mill 1848:581; Salvatore 1983:255; Meier 1984:490). Fourthly, it also serves as the 
transmission belt for the international movement of capital, stimulating and 
facilitating the flow of capital from developed to developing countries. In principle, 
the more the developing countries engage in international trade, the more they can 
expect to receive in foreign capital (Haberler 1959:110-111; Salvatore 1983: 55). 
Fifthly, trade is the best enhancer of free competition and, therefore, the best anti- 
monopoly weapon. This is due to the fact that, to meet foreign competition, domestic 
producers have to increase efficiencies in production, and keep low the costs and 
prices of those ‘intermediate or semifinished products used as inputs in the domestic 
production of other commodities’ (Haberler 1959:111; also see Salvatore 1983:255).
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Finally, trade can promote the economic development of trading countries through 
international migration (a trade of labour), international borrowing and lending (a 
trade of current goods for the promise of future goods), and international exchanges 
of risky assets such as stocks and bonds (which allow the trading countries to 
diversify their wealth and reduce the variability of their income) (Krugman and 
Obstfeld 1991:4).
Although the classical and neoclassical economists’ interpretations of the 
roles of international trade as an ‘engine of growth’ and the advantages of 
participation in the global economy were diverse and manifold, they have been all, 
directly or indirectly, based upon the theoretical assumption of comparative 
advantage (or comparative cost) originally put forward by Ricardo (1817). The 
tremendous significance of this assumption lies in that it shows why international 
trade occurs and how gains from international trade come about. That is, it not only 
illustrates the main cause of international trade, but also its main advantages or 
benefits. Thus, without analysing the assumption of comparative advantage, we 
cannot evaluate and assess the classical and neoclassical economists’ interpretations 
of the roles of international trade as an ‘engine of growth’ and the advantages of 
participation in the global market economy.
It is not an exaggeration to say that not only the classical and neoclassical 
economists’ international trade doctrine but also mainstream international trade 
theory has been based on Ricardo’s assumption of comparative advantage. As Findlay 
(1984:186) noted:
It is at least as true that all of the pure theory of international trade has 
emerged from chapter 7 of Ricardo’s Principle} The incredibly simple 
example of the exchange of cloth and wine between England and Portugal 
went right to the core of the concept of comparative advantage and the
1 Ricardo, D. 1817. On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, in P. Sraffa (ed.), 1962. The 
Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
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subsequent development of the subject has remained within the bounds set by 
Ricardo...
The ‘incredibly simple example’ of Ricardo’s comparative advantage is illustrated in 
Table 2. England has absolute disadvantage and Portugal has absolute advantage both 
in the production of wine and in the production of cloth. But, since England has 
comparatively less disadvantage in the production of cloth than in the production of 
wine and Portugal has comparatively greater advantage in the production of wine than 
in the production of cloth, both of them can gain from specialising in the production 
and export of the commodities which are comparatively more advantageous to them 
(that is, Portugal the wine, England the cloth).
Table 2 Comparative cost in terms of labour in the production of 1000 dollar’s 




Source: Ricardo, D. 1817. On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, in 
P. Sraffa (ed.), 1962. The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. ______ _________________ ________
The most important implication of Ricardo’s assumption of comparative 
advantage is that international trade can benefit participant countries not only under 
the circumstance of absolute advantage, but also under the circumstance of
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comparative advantage. In other words, even if a country has no absolute advantage 
in any branch of production compared with another country, it can still gain from 
trade with that country by specialising in the production and export of their most 
comparatively advantageous goods. This is very important in analysing the 
international trade of developing countries.
Simplification is one of the strong points of Ricardo’s assumption, but it is 
also one of its weak points. It assumes only one factor of production (labour), thus 
overlooking other factors of production and their roles both in the formation of 
comparative advantage and in the international division of labour and international 
trade. It is here that the neoclassical economists extended and modified Ricardo’s 
simple assumption of comparative advantage. The greatest contribution was made by 
Hecksher, Ohlin, and Samuelson. They consider the different factor endowments 
between countries (such as land, capital, and labour) as the basis for comparative 
advantage, for specialisation, and for international trade. According to the Hecksher- 
Ohin-Samuelson theorem, countries should find their comparative advantage in their 
relatively abundant factor endowments, and specialise in the production and export of 
the goods comparatively to their advantage (such as land-intensive, labour-intensive, 
and capital-intensive goods). The capital-poor developing countries, for instance, 
should specialise in the production of labour-intensive or land-intensive goods and 
export them in return for the capital-intensive products of developed countries. In so 
doing, international trade between countries with different factor endowments will 
generate a tendency towards equalisation of factor prices, and, therefore, can not only
2 The assumption of absolute advantage was first expressed by A. Smith. It was assumed that a country 
can gain from international trade when it has an absolute advantage in the goods it produces and 
exports as compared with its trading partner. In the case of England and Portugal in Table 1, only if 
England has an absolute advantage in either cloth or wine, can it gain from trade with Portugal. That is, 
to gain from trade with Portugal, England must either produce the wine with the labour of fewer than 
80 workers or produce the cloth with the labour of fewer than 90 workers.
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make all the trading countries better off but also narrow the economic discrepancy 
between them (Gemmell 1987:14; Grimwade 1989:10—14).
From the 1950s onwards, the Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson theorem met 
criticism even from within mainstream international economics. From empirical 
studies, economists found: (1) contrary to the theorem, the exports and imports of 
some countries were not in keeping with their comparative advantages in terms of 
factor endowments (the Leontieff Paradox); (2) contrary to the theorem, international 
trade grew much faster between countries with similar factor endowments than 
between countries with different factor endowments (the intraindustry trade 
argument). Faced with these critiques, neoclassical economists tried to introduce 
additional factors (natural resources, human capital, technology, demand, and 
economies of scale) into the hypothesis of comparative advantage in order to explain 
the two empirical phenomena seemingly contradictory to it (Pomfret 1991:75).
To explain the Leontieff Paradox, neoclassical economists argued, among 
other things, that natural resources and human capital play an important role in 
production and trade. On the one hand, different natural resources are explored by 
different factors. Minerals and petroleum, for example, can only be efficiently 
obtained with capital-intensive techniques, but others not. This might explain why 
some capital-abundant countries with rich mineral or oil resources still need to import 
capital-intensive goods (Vanek 1959; Pomfret 1991). On the other hand, there are 
differences between countries in the amounts of human capital which are available. 
Skilled labour, for instance, embodies a larger amount of human capital than 
unskilled labour. This might help to explain why some labour-scarce but capital- 
abundant countries still export labour-intensive goods (Keesing 1966; Kenen 1965; 
Pomfret 1991).
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To explain the intraindustry trade argument, neoclassical economists argued, 
among other things, that technology, demand, and economies of scale play an 
important role in production and trade. Technological innovations are usually 
generated in, and initially diffused among, skill-abundant and high wage countries. 
Trade between countries with similar factor endowments therefore grows faster 
(Hufbauer 1966; Vernon 1966; Hirsch 1967; Grimwade 1989; Pomfret 1991). 
Furthermore, unlike the trade of primary goods (which is determined mainly by factor 
endowments), the trade of manufactured goods is determined mainly by the structure 
of demand. Given that the structure of demand for manufactured goods is determined 
mainly by the level of per capita income of a country, countries with similar levels of 
per capita income are likely to have similar structures of demand. Thus, the trade of 
manufactured goods goes initially between countries with similar levels of per capita 
income and factor endowments (Linder 1961; Grimwade 1989). Finally, economies 
of scale may lead a country to produce and export very limited varieties of a certain 
product, and to import other varieties of this product from countries with similar 
factor endowments so as to satisfy domestic minority interests (Grubel and Lloyd 
1975; Grimwade 1989; Pomfret 1991).
In explaining these phenomena, neoclassical economists argued that empirical 
evidence did not prove erroneous Ricardo’s assumption of comparative advantage 
and the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theorem. Rather, it showed that they needed 
modification and extension. The modification and extension further demonstrated and 
explained the validity of the classical and neoclassical economists’ doctrine of 
international trade as an ‘engine of growth’, the advantages and benefits of 
participation in the global market economy, and the desirability of an outward­
looking development and trade strategy (Pomfret 1991:65). Even if the neoclassical
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economists’ explanations for the two empirical phenomena and, therefore, their 
modification to, and extension of, the comparative advantage assumption are 
sustained, however, their international trade doctrine, their interpretations of 
advantages of participation in the global market economy, their favoured outward­
looking strategy, and, most important of all, their key hypothesis of comparative 
advantage, are still vulnerable to criticism in at least four aspects.
To begin with, the assumption of comparative advantage explains only the 
gains from trade, but not the distribution of the gains between different trading 
countries. Even if the assumption of comparative advantage holds, one question still 
remains unanswered: under comparative advantage, how are gains from trade 
distributed between the trading countries? Given the growing difference in 
technology progress and in the terms of trade between developed and developing 
countries, it is very likely that international trade may benefit developed countries 
more than developing ones. Some neoclassical economists simply avoided addressing 
the question by saying that ‘some trade is better than no trade’. The answer is 
unsatisfactory since it remains silent on the uneven gains from international trade and 
the accumulated impact of the unevenness on the economic development of different 
countries.
Secondly, even though neoclassical economists might have explained the 
causes of intraindustry trade, they still have not satisfactorily explained its 
consequences. Some contemporary neoclassical economists have documented the 
increasing share of intraindustry trade accounted for by developed countries in the 
total volume of world trade, and pointed to its negative effects. Krugman and 
Obstfeld (1991:139^1), for instance, stated:
Intraindustry trade plays a particularly large role in the trade in manufactured
goods among advanced industrial nations, which accounts for most of world
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trade. Over time, the industrial countries have become increasingly similar in 
their levels of technology and in the availability of capital and skilled 
labour...There is both a good side and a bad side to this favourable view of 
intraindustry trade. The good side is that under some circumstances trade is 
relatively easy to live with and therefore relatively easy to support politically. 
The bad side is that trade between very different countries or where scale 
economies and product differentiation are not important remains politically 
problematic. In fact, the progressive liberalisation of trade that characterised 
the 30-year period from 1950 to 1980 was primarily concentrated on trade in 
manufactures among the advanced nations... If progress on other kinds of 
trade is important, the past record does not give us much encouragement.
The most important element of the ‘bad side’ lies not in ‘political’ but in ‘economic’ 
aspects. There is no doubt that if the classical and neoclassical economists’ doctrine 
of international trade as an ‘engine of growth’ holds true, then the increasing share of 
intraindustry trade within developed countries in the total volume of world trade 
simply means that the ‘engine’ has worked and will still work more efficiently for 
developed countries than for developing countries. It follows that the economic 
discrepancy between the South and the North will not narrow, but will widen!
Thirdly, due to the different effects of the distribution of gains from trade and 
the intraindustry trade on developed and developing countries analysed above, the 
neoclassical economists’ equalisation argument cannot be sustained without 
qualifications. Considerable evidence showed that, contrary to this argument, the 
disparities between developed and developing countries were growing (see next 
chapter). The rise of the newly industrialised countries (NICs) did not, as some 
neoclassical economists expected, change the overall picture of a polarised world. 
The development gap has already attracted increasing attention on the international 
arena in the past few decades, but has inspired little interest from the neoclassical 
economists. A key question needs to be addressed: does market economy have a 
inherent tendency towards equalisation or a tendency toward divergence? If it is the 
former, how is the widening economic gap between the North and the South to be
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explained? If it is the latter, how are the political and economic tensions in a world 
increasingly polarised between have-lots and have-nots to be addressed? Neoclassical 
economics alone, I am afraid, is unable to undertake this inquiry. It is here that 
classical and neoclassical economics has met the strongest challenge from 
structuralists.
Fourthly, the classical and neoclassical economists’ assumption of 
comparative advantage, and the international trade doctrine derived from it, are based 
on a hypothesised situation of free markets and free competition. In the real world, 
however, rarely are either to be found. Government intervention in the market 
economy has long been acknowledged by most scholars, even neoclassical 
economists. On the one hand, even the success of the NICs, oft- mentioned by 
neoclassical economists in support of their doctrine, suggests the important role of 
government intervention in promoting economic development (Enos 1984; Michell 
1984; Browett 1986; Bradford 1986; Todaro 1989; Tan 1992). On the other hand, 
some oppressive regimes were ‘conductive to the maintenance and extraction of high 
rates of profits by multinational corporations (MNCs)’, and, therefore, strengthened 
the MNCs’ monopoly position in the market and hindered trade and economic 
development in developing countries (Clapp and Massey 1983; also see Browett 
1986). How, therefore, do classical and neoclassical economists manage in a real 
world full of government interventions in the market economy? The classical and 
neoclassical economists’ theories themselves, again, are insufficient to (at least 
satisfactorily) incorporate the interplay between government forces and free market 
forces in economic development.
In spite of these weaknesses, however, the classical and neoclassical 
economists’ international trade doctrine and their assumption of comparative
23
advantage have proven quite successful in explaining many phenomena of 
international trade and economic development and, therefore, can be considered as 
very powerful tools in analysing trade and growth patterns. This has been shown, in 
different degrees, both by the rise of the NICs owing to their successful outward­
looking development strategies, and by the reorientation of China’s development 
strategy in the late 1970s and its tremendous successes in the past two decades or so. 
Before providing empirical evidence for this argument, however, we had better first 
consider the arguments about the disadvantages of participation in the global market 
economy.
Unequal distribution: ISI versus EOD
Arguments about the disadvantages of participation in the global market economy 
were initially raised by the proponents of structuralism from the point of view of the 
experience of underdeveloped countries. Although structuralism is a well-established 
approach in the field of development studies, its origins, its basic views, and even its 
exponents have been a matter of dispute for a long time (Chenery 1965; Little 1982; 
Arndt 1985). As far as international aspects are concerned, however, structuralism 
originated in Latin America with the establishment of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America (ECLA) in Santiago, Chile, in 1947. This United Nations agency 
published, under the leadership of its executive secretary, Raul Prebisch, a number of 
books and articles from the late 1940s onwards which laid down the theoretical 
foundations of the structuralist school. Besides the ECLA members, some scholars
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(including non-Latin American scholars ) such as H. Singer, A. Emmanuel, G. 
Myrdal, and W.A. Lewis also contributed to the structuralist approach.3
Notwithstanding the wide differences between them, structuralists are clearly 
characterised by their profound dissatisfaction with the classical and neoclassical 
economists’ doctrine of international trade as an ‘engine of growth’ and the 
assumption of comparative advantage. Structuralists argued that international trade 
based upon comparative advantage leads some countries (advanced, industrial, high 
income, or high wage countries) to specialise in the production and export of 
manufactured goods or high labour cost goods, and leads other countries (backward, 
underdeveloped, low wage, or low income countries) to specialise in the production 
and export of primary goods and low labour cost goods. Due to the secular 
deterioration of the terms of trade of primary and low labour cost goods, the gains 
from trade are unequally distributed between the two kinds of countries. Contrary to 
the classical and neoclassical economists’ international trade doctrine, international 
trade has not led to the equalisation of factor prices and income between these trading 
partners, but to the enlargement of economic disparity between them. International 
trade may be an ‘engine of growth’ for advanced, industrialised, high income or high 
wage countries, but it is a ‘mechanism of international inequality’ for backward, 
underdeveloped, low income, or low wage countries (Myrdal 1956; also see Prebisch 
1950; 1959; 1963; Singer 1950; 1971; Emmanuel 1972). In this way, participation in 
the global market economy through international trade has brought about many 
disadvantages for underdeveloped countries.
3 Among these the most controversial may be Emmanuel who was considered not as a structuralist but 
as a neo-Marxist by many writers (for instance, Hunt 1989; Brewer 1980). I would argue that his 
argument about unequal distribution, his assumption of a deterioration of the terms of trade, and his 
policy suggestion of import substitution industrialisation were basically in line with structuralist 
school, though he examined and interpreted these issues from a distinctive angle.
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According to structuralists, the principal and direct disadvantage of 
international trade is that it leads to inequitable resource allocation at both 
international and national levels. At the international level, resources for the 
production of manufactured goods or high labour cost goods have been increasingly 
accumulated in developed countries, whilst resources for the production of primary 
goods or low labour cost goods have been increasingly accumulated in 
underdeveloped countries through trade and the international division of labour. At 
the national level, international trade and the international division of labour have 
biased resource allocation in underdeveloped countries towards the export sector and 
against the domestic sector, and, therefore, resulted in a dual economy in these 
countries. The export sector has developed, with substantial foreign assistance, into 
the most advanced part of the economy whilst the domestic sector remains traditional, 
unable to absorb a rapidly growing population. The surplus labour resulting from this 
dual economy keeps wages and prices in these countries at a very low level. As a 
result, international and national resource allocation has generated inequitable 
international and national economic structures which have, through the deterioration 
of the terms of trade, led to unequal gains and income distribution, and made the rich 
richer, the poor poorer. (Prebisch 1950: chapters 1 and 2; Lewis 1954:442-3; Myrdal 
1956:225; Emmanual 1972:269-70; Singer 1984:275).
In addition, international trade has some indirect or secondary disadvantages 
for underdeveloped countries. First of all, it makes the economic development of 
these countries subject to that of developed countries. The vital importance of the 
production and export of primary goods for developing countries leads them to 
depend on the demand of developed countries for their primary products. (ECLA 
1951:chapter 2; Prebisch 1950:chapters 1 and 3; 1959:266-7; Hunt 1989:30).
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Secondly, international trade worsens the financial situation of developing countries. 
As the economic development of developing countries requires increasing imports of 
capital-intensive goods such as power plant, machinery, transportation and 
communication equipment, these countries have to expand exports to ensure 
increasing amounts of foreign currency. Due to the deterioration of the terms of trade 
of developing countries, these countries cannot obtain enough foreign currency from 
international trade, thus encountering serious financial problems such as balance of 
payments and inflation (Prebisch 1950:chapters 1 and 4). Finally, but not 
exhaustively, in terms of opportunity costs, international trade based upon 
comparative advantage and the international division of labour diverts the efforts of 
developing countries from manufacture to primary production, thus withholding 
‘from the course of their economic history a central factor of dynamic radiation which 
has revolutionised society in the industrialised countries’ (Singer 1950:48). If 
developing countries had not become as specialised as they are now in the production 
and export of food and raw materials and, therefore, had ‘provided the means of 
producing manufactured goods elsewhere with superior efficiency’, they might have 
obtained their own dynamics of growth which would have not only promoted their 
economic development to a much higher level, but also greatly enhanced their 
‘general level of education, skill, way of life, inventiveness, habit, store of 
technology, creation of new demand’ (Singer 1950:46-7). In other words, 
international trade is ‘positively harmful’ to developing countries to the point that it 
has deprived them of all the economic, social, and cultural benefits of 
industrialisation (Singer 1950:46).
Faced with these disadvantages, developing countries should abandon their 
long-pursued ‘primary-export model’ or ‘outward-oriented development model’ to
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adopt a ‘inward-directed’ development strategy, especially the import substitution 
industrialisation strategy (ISI). By IS I, structuralists basically meant the promotion of 
industrialisation through substitution of domestic production for imports of industrial 
goods (Prebisch 1959:253; Kay 1989:27). By diverting resources from the production 
of primary goods to that of manufactured goods and thus changing the inequitable 
international and national economic structures, the ISI strategy can help developing 
countries to stop the adverse trend of a deterioration in the terms of trade and, 
therefore, destroy the mechanism of maldistribution of gains suffered by them. This is 
achieved, as Emmanuel (1972:268) noted, in two ways: ‘On the one hand, the 
traditional exports diminish, while the world’s needs continue unchanged for a certain 
period of time, which results in an upward pressure on prices; on the other, the 
traditional imports also diminish, and the partner who stays geared to an expansion of 
trade sees his sales fall off sharply, which compels him to reduce his price’. As a 
result, developing countries can eradicate, through ISI, the root cause and mechanism 
of all the disadvantages of international trade based upon the conventional 
international division of labour (Prebisch 1950:1; 1959:253-4; Singer 1950:56-7; 
Emmanual 1972:267-8).4
It was well acknowledged that structuralists’ arguments about the 
disadvantages of participation in the global market economy and their policy 
suggestions are based upon the assumption of a deterioration in the terms of trade of 
developing countries (Kay 1989:31; ECLA 1949; Prebisch 1950; 1959; 1963; Singer 
1950; 1972; Emmanuel 1972). As for the causes of the deterioration, structuralists 
provided various interpretations, of which the following are best known.
4 Some structuralists, such as Prebisch and Singer, later realised the shortcomings in the ISI strategy, 
and changed their opinions about this strategy accordingly (Prebisch 1964; Singer 1971).
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The first interpretation dealt with the different impacts of productivity growth 
on developed and developing countries. The progress of technology and productivity 
was much faster in manufacturing production in developed countries than in primary 
production in developing countries, and the change in income and prices responded to 
the uneven productivity growth differently in the two kinds of countries. In developed 
countries, the income increased more than productivity in the upswing of the trade 
cycle and did not decrease in the downswing of that cycle owing to the effort of 
workers’ unions to maintain the wage level. The prices of manufactured goods in 
these countries therefore did not fall with the progress in technology and productivity. 
In developing countries, by contrast, income increased less than productivity in the 
upswing of the trade cycle and fell steadily in the downswing of that cycle due to the 
lack or weakness of workers organisations. The prices of primary products in these 
countries therefore fell with the progress in technology and productivity (Prebisch 
1950:chapter 2; Singer 1950:section 4; Hunt 1989:131-2).
The second interpretation dealt with the differential demand for primary goods 
of developing countries and manufactured goods of developed countries. The demand 
for primary products of developing countries fell for a long period of time for three 
reasons. First, the income elasticity of demand for primary goods was much lower 
than that for manufactured goods. With progress in technology and productivity, 
developing countries’ demand for manufactured goods increased faster than their 
income while developed countries’ demand for primary goods increased slower than 
their income. This was because, as technology progressed and income increased, an 
increasingly smaller proportion of income was spent on food (the Engel’s law) and 
raw materials (due to the substitution of synthetic for such materials), whilst an 
increasingly larger proportion of income was spent on manufactured goods (Singer
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1950:section 4; Prebisch 1963:291; Kay 1989:32-3). Secondly, the shift of the 
world’s economic centre from the UK to the USA in the beginning of this century 
further reduced the demand of developed countries for primary goods of developing 
countries. Almost throughout the entire nineteenth century, Britain (due to its 
relatively scarce resources) exported substantial proportions of manufactured goods 
in return for imports of primary goods, thus ‘offsetting in the peripheral countries the 
effects of the lower income-demand elasticity for their primary commodities’ 
(Prebisch 1959:266). In the twentieth century, the USA (due to its relatively rich 
resources) did not import many of primary goods, and peripheral countries suffered a 
worsening effect of the lower income-demand elasticity for their primary goods 
(Prebisch 1950:chapters 1 and 3; 1959:266; Hunt 1989:132). Thirdly, protectionist 
policies in developed countries also deeply affected the demand for the primary goods 
of developing countries. In fear that ‘the competition from increased peripheral 
exports at lower prices’ might threaten the primary producers in their own countries, 
developed countries often adopted protectionist policies to subsidise domestic 
primary production and limited primary imports from developing countries (Prebisch 
1959:263; also see Hunt 1989:133). The decreased demand for the primary goods of 
developing countries and the increased demand for the manufactured goods of 
developed countries led the prices of the former to fall and the prices of the latter to 
rise, and, therefore, resulted in a deterioration in the terms of trade.
The third interpretation dealt with the differential mobility of productive 
factors. It was argued that capital was internationally mobile whilst labour was not. 
The international mobility of capital equalised the rate of profit in all countries while 
the international immobility of labour widened the disparity of wage costs between 
countries. The prices of goods exchanged between developed and developing
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countries primarily depended, therefore, on the relative wage costs between these 
countries. The high wages and high living standards enjoyed by labourers in 
developed countries drove the prices of goods produced in, and exported from, these 
countries upwards, while the low wages and low living standards suffered by 
labourers in developing countries pressed the prices of goods produced in, and 
exported from, these countries downwards. It followed that the deterioration in the 
terms of trade was not related to a particular kind of product (primary goods) but to a 
particular kind of country. No matter what goods low income or low wage countries 
produced and exported, their prices showed a downward trend as compared with the 
prices of goods produced in, and exported from, high income or high wage countries. 
The products containing a certain unit of labour in developed countries were 
exchanged for products containing many more units of labour in developing 
countries. It was upon this understanding that Emmanuel developed the theorem of 
unequal exchange (Emmanuel 1972; also see Brewer 1980:chapter 9; Hunt 
1989:chapter 6).
Although structuralists differed on the causes of the deterioration in the terms 
of trade, most of them agreed upon its disastrous consequences and its remedy (ISI). 
Structuralists’ argument for ISI had a considerable influence on developing countries 
and some international agencies in the early postwar period. Adopting the ISI 
strategy, some developing countries did make considerable progress in their 
economic development for a time. The structuralist approach met, however, with 
critiques from neoclassical economists from the very beginning. As the ISI strategy 
later revealed obvious shortcomings and side-effects in developing countries, the 
critiques became more and more fierce. In defending their international trade doctrine
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and the assumption of comparative advantage, neoclassical economists focused their 
critiques of structuralism on two aspects.
First, the critiques focused on the assertion of a deterioration in the terms of 
trade. It was argued that the structuralists’ estimates of trends in the terms of trade 
were not valid because they used base periods of time and base groups of countries 
that the structuralists had chosen for their own purposes. Even if there were a 
deterioration in the terms of trade against primary products over the periods examined 
by structuralists, this could not be generalised for other periods, especially for the 
postwar period. Even if some countries did experience such a deterioration, this could 
not be generalised for all developing countries. In fact, evidence showed that the 
terms of trade of developing countries as a whole not only did not deteriorate in the 
long run, but were more favourable in recent years than at practically any time in 
recorded history (Bauer and Yamey 1957:242; Bauer 1971:240-1; Spraos 1980:119- 
26; Michaely 1982:28; Krueger 1984:559-60).
In addition, the accuracy of the concepts used by structuralists was 
questioned. In particular, it was noted that the concept ‘terms of trade’ has different 
meanings: the commodity terms of trade, the single- factorial terms of trade, and the 
income terms of trade. While discussing the terms of trade, structuralists only referred 
to the first, leaving out of consideration the last two which, however, are very 
important in determining whether a country can benefit from international trade or 
not. By single-factorial terms of trade, neoclassical economists meant the ‘commodity 
terms of trade corrected for changes in productivity in producing exports’ (Meier 
1984:505). By taking into consideration changes in the costs of production and the 
productivity in the export sectors, this concept indicates ‘the volume of imports which 
can be bought with the output of a unit of resources of the exporting country’ (Bauer
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1971:246). According to this concept, a fall in export prices as compared with import 
prices (that is, a deterioration in the commodity terms of trade) may happen at the 
same time that the single-factorial terms of trade improve. This means that the costs 
of production of exports drop to a greater degree than the export prices. In this case, a 
country can benefit from international trade even if its commodity terms of trade 
deteriorate, for the productivity in its export industries rises. By income terms of 
trade, neoclassical economists meant the ‘commodity terms multiplied by quantity of 
exports’ (Meier 1984:505). By taking into consideration changes in the absolute 
volume of exports, this concept indicates the volume of imports which can be bought 
with total exports. According to this concept, a deterioration in commodity terms of 
trade may happen at the same time that the income terms of trade improve, that is, the 
volume of exports increases more rapidly than import prices fall. In this case, too, a 
country can benefit from international trade even if its commodity terms of trade 
deteriorate, for ‘the country’s capacity to import is then greater, and this will ease 
development’ (Meier 1984:505). According to the neoclassical economists, both the 
single-factorial terms of trade and the income terms of trade have, due to increases in 
productivity and volume of exports, actually improved for many underdeveloped 
countries. Therefore, even if underdeveloped countries had suffered from a 
deterioration in their commodity terms of trade, that would not mean that 
international trade could not promote their economic development.
Neoclassical economists asserted, therefore, that the assumption of a 
deterioration in the terms of trade was both theoretically and empirically wrong, and 
that structuralists’ arguments about the unequal and unjust distribution of income and 
the growing gap between the North and the South could be sustained neither
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theoretically nor empirically (Bauer 1971; Little 1978; Sen 1981; Findlay 1981, 
1984).
Neoclassical economists’ second set of critiques was leveled at the ISI 
strategy favoured by structuralists. Neoclassical economists argued that this strategy 
entailed economic policies of government intervention and protection (such as 
selected tariffs, import quotas, cheap credit, foreign exchange and investment 
licensing, tax remission on capital investment, and overvalued exchange-rates). These 
policies ignored price mechanisms and comparative advantage, and led to many 
undesirable economic distortions. Among these the following were considered as the 
most notorious.
• These policies promoted industrialisation at the expense of agriculture and 
infrastructure. As a result, agricultural production was characterised by 
‘backward agriculture techniques’, ‘a large illiterate peasantry’, and 
‘primitive or non-existent agricultural extension services’, and the 
underdeveloped agricultural sector was unable to meet the domestic 
demand for foodstuffs (Baer and Samuelson 1977:1). The infrastructure in 
transport, power, and communication received inadequate investment and, 
therefore, failed to provide essential services to other economic sectors. 
Manufacturing industries, by contrast, suffered from excess capacity due to 
overinvestment (Little 1970:9; Meier 1984:393).
• These policies promoted industrialisation at the expense of exports and, 
therefore, resulted in serious financial problems. Import restrictions 
entailed the overvaluation of the exchange rate and, therefore, had the 
effect of discouraging export industries (exporters then received less 
domestic currency for a given quantity of exports). The reduction in
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exports led to a shortage of foreign exchange and a worsening of the 
balance of payments (Little 1970:chapters 1, 2, 3, and 5; Balassa 1981:11; 
Meier 1984:393).
• These policies worsened the problems of unemployment and the unequal 
distribution of income. They encouraged new industries to adopt capital- 
intensive rather than labour-intensive technologies, thus ‘resulting in a 
relatively low rate of growth of industrial employment’ (Baer and 
Samuelson 1977:2). Combined with other factors such as ‘taxing 
agriculture’ (Little 1970:6), this increased the inequality in the distribution 
of income (Meier 1984: 393).
• These policies increased, paradoxically enough, an economy’s external 
dependence. They encouraged the import of some crucial capital goods and 
raw materials needed in ISI from industrialised countries, thus decreasing 
the economy’s self-sufficiency (Little 1970.59-63; Baer and Samuelson 
1977:1).
• By preventing competition and therefore generating a seller’s market, these 
policies resulted in high production costs, bad product quality, low 
economic efficiency, and little incentive for technological improvement. At 
the same time, by whetting the appetite for corruption in government 
agencies and increasing government expenditure, they led to large 
inflationary budget deficits (Baer and Samuelson 1977:2; Balassa 1981:9; 
Meier 1984:393).
• These policies impeded the development of external markets by restricting 
imports and discouraging exports. At the same time, they also could not 
provide ‘the possibility of a strong expansion of the domestic market’
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owing to the worsening of the maldistribution of income (Baer and 
Samuelson 1977:2). Furthermore, the limited markets did not allow for 
economies of scale, thus providing little chance for further growth.
All these economic distortions have led to relatively low rates of economic 
growth in countries which adopted the ISI strategy. What, then, should be a more 
appropriate strategy for developing countries? Most neoclassical economists argued 
that these countries should adopt outward-looking strategies, especially the strategy 
of export-oriented development (EOD) or export-promotion (EP). By EOD or EP, 
neoclassical economists meant the promotion of economic development through 
exports. Based upon free market principles and the comparative advantage 
hypothesis, the EOD strategy can lead to a better use of the price mechanism, a more 
open approach to international trade, a more efficient allocation of resources, a more 
favourable balance of payments, a higher rate of employment, a more equal 
distribution of income, a greater amount of domestic savings and foreign investments, 
a smaller amount of government expenditure and inflationary budget deficits, a lower 
rate of unit production costs, a better product quality, a greater incentive for 
improvement in technology, a better exploitation of economies of scale, a larger 
market, and an enhanced ability to compete in markets than can be achieved under the 
ISI strategy. In a word, the EOD strategy can overcome almost all the shortcomings 
of the ISI strategy, and can lead to a much more rapid rate of economic growth.
A case in support for the argument was said to be the NICs, especially the 
‘Four Small Dragons’ in Southeast Asia—Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and 
Singapore (Little 1970; 1979; Balassa 1971; 1978; 1981; 1982; Bhagwati 1978; 
Krueger 1978; 1983; Tyler 1981; Lai 1983; Meier 1984; World Bank 1983; 1987; 
1991). According to neoclassical economists, the success of the EOD strategy in these
36
developing countries suggests the universal validity of free trade doctrine, and the
failure of the structuralist approach. As Lai (1983:47-8) concluded:
None of these more recent attempts to demolish the case for a liberal trading 
regime in the Third World is convincing. In the 1950s and 1960s, empirical 
evidence about the relative merits of import substitution and virtual free trade 
was absent...Since then, the evidence from a large number of countries in 
different parts of the Third World, covering virtually the whole of the post- 
Second World War period, strongly suggests that the old classical 
presumption in favour of free trade...is valid for both developing and 
developed countries... Though free trade is not a sufficient condition for 
growth, it may in many instances be a necessary one. Though it may not be 
the ‘engine’, international trade remains, in Kravis’s splendid phrase, the 
‘handmaiden of growth’.
Notwithstanding the fierce critiques from neoclassical economists, the 
structuralist approaches can still shed light on some crucial issues with regard to 
international trade in particular, and development processes in general. One of the 
most important contributions is that they pointed out the disadvantages of 
participation in the global market economy from the viewpoint of developing 
countries, and that they tried to find a way to fundamentally change the situation. 
Structuralists’ analyses of the inequality in the distribution of gains from trade, of the 
causes of the deterioration in the terms of trade, and, especially, of the development 
strategy appropriate for developing countries might be incorrect for one reason or 
another, but the alarming fact of the widening gap between the North and the South 
does cast some doubts upon the classical and neoclassical economists’ trade theory, 
provides some justifications for the structuralist approaches, and asks for further 
investigation of development and underdevelopment (Haq 1979:116-7; Todaro 
1989:598-9).5 In this respect, the structuralist school can be said to be the first to 
represent the ‘voice from the South’. Nonetheless, structuralists’ positions still suffer 
from obvious biases.
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One of the structuralists’ biases relates to the assumption of a deterioration in 
the terms of trade. Structuralists’ biases with regard to the evidence have been pointed 
out by neoclassical economists. Their interpretations of the causes of it have revealed 
enormous inconsistency and wide disagreements within the structuralist school itself. 
Neither are the main concern here.5 6 What should be highlighted here is that even if 
the deterioration were proved true, what would still remain to be explained is its 
effects. Is it the single key mechanism which has caused the unequal distribution of 
gains from trade in particular and the unequal distribution of income in general, and, 
therefore, the single key mechanism which has widened the gap between the North 
and the South? Even if it does contribute to the maldistribution of gains and income, 
does that mean that international trade can only be a ‘mechanism of international 
inequality’, and cannot be an ‘engine of growth’ for developing countries? 
Structuralists’ answers to these questions are not satisfactory.
Paradoxically enough, classical and neoclassical economists’ analyses of 
comparative advantage and intraindustry trade can in a degree help here. As analysed 
previously, the assumption of comparative advantage itself implies the possibility of 
unequal distribution of gains from international trade between trading countries, and 
intraindustry trade can widen the gap between the North and the South. International 
trade can benefit all trading countries while enlarging inequality between them owing 
to unequal distribution of gains. It is therefore an ‘engine of growth’ as well as a 
‘mechanism of international inequality’. They are two sides of the same coin or two 
edges of the same sword. This understanding can help to overcome one-sidedness. On
5 As for the widening gap, see Chapter 3.
6 As for structuralists’ arguments about the deterioration, there has been evidence both in support of 
them (Sapsford 1985) and against them (for instance, Spraos 1980; Michaely 1982). Recent evidence 
seems to suggest that the commodity terms of trade of non-oil developing countries have deteriorated 
(for instance, see Todaro 1989), but a lot of empirical as well as theoretical work still should be done 
before we can reach a convincing conclusion.
38
One of the structuralists’ biases relates to the assumption of a deterioration in 
the terms of trade. Structuralists’ biases with regard to the evidence have been pointed 
out by neoclassical economists. Their interpretations of the causes of it have revealed 
enormous inconsistency and wide disagreements within the structuralist school itself. 
Neither are the main concern here.5 6 What should be highlighted here is that even if 
the deterioration were proved true, what would still remain to be explained is its 
effects. Is it the single key mechanism which has caused the unequal distribution of 
gains from trade in particular and the unequal distribution of income in general, and, 
therefore, the single key mechanism which has widened the gap between the North 
and the South? Even if it does contribute to the maldistribution of gains and income, 
does that mean that international trade can only be a ‘mechanism of international 
inequality’, and cannot be an ‘engine of growth’ for developing countries? 
Structuralists’ answers to these questions are not satisfactory.
Paradoxically enough, classical and neoclassical economists’ analyses of 
comparative advantage and intraindustry trade can in a degree help here. As analysed 
previously, the assumption of comparative advantage itself implies the possibility of 
unequal distribution of gains from international trade between trading countries, and 
intraindustry trade can widen the gap between the North and the South. International 
trade can benefit all trading countries while enlarging inequality between them owing 
to unequal distribution of gains. It is therefore an ‘engine of growth’ as well as a 
‘mechanism of international inequality’. They are two sides of the same coin or two 
edges of the same sword. This understanding can help to overcome one-sidedness. On
5 As for the widening gap, see Chapter 3.
6 As for structuralists’ arguments about the deterioration, there has been evidence both in support of 
them (Sapsford 1985) and against them (for instance, Spraos 1980; Michaely 1982). Recent evidence 
seems to suggest that the commodity terms of trade of non-oil developing countries have deteriorated 
(for instance, see Todaro 1989), but a lot of empirical as well as theoretical work still should be done 
before we can reach a convincing conclusion.
38
As mentioned above, international trade can be both an ‘engine of growth’ 
and a ‘mechanism of international inequality’. Developing countries can, therefore, 
use IS I strategy and government intervention to change unfavourable trade conditions 
and, therefore, eradicate one of the root causes of international inequality on the one 
hand, while using EOD strategy and ‘free’ market forces to promote rapid economic 
growth on the other hand. In practice, many developing countries which adopted IS I 
strategy and government intervention policies at an early stage changed to adopt EOD 
strategy and market-oriented reforms later on. Even the NICs, oft-mentioned by 
neoclassical economists in support of their EOD strategy and free market arguments, 
applied a combination of ISI and EOD strategies, and a combination of government 
intervention and ‘free’ market forces in different degrees and at different stages to the 
point that the distinctions between EOD and ISI have been somehow blurred (Todaro 
1989:251-3; Tan 1992:40-4; Liang 1992:section 1). As Bradford (1986:122) noted: 
‘In the end, effective development relies on both market forces and public policies, 
and even on government intervention; it rests on both import substitution and export 
promotion!’
A third of the structuralists’ biases lies in their narrow academic interests. 
Structuralists confined, like neoclassical economists, their interests mainly to the 
economic field, and gave little attention to social, political, and cultural factors. The 
international trade debate, therefore, was mainly conducted within the field of 
development economics. International trade is, however, not only an economic 
phenomenon. The lack of interdisciplinary studies was partly responsible for the 
structuralists’, as well as the neoclassical economists’, failure to satisfactorily address
the international division of labour the dialectical role of international trade both as an ‘engine of 
growth’ and as a ‘mechanism of international inequality’.
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some crucial issues. As Prebisch (1984:184) noted in a summary of his development 
thinking:
These and other questions dominated my mind and prompted new efforts to 
find consistent answers. For this purpose I went over my previous ideas very 
critically. Although it is true that there were some valid elements in them, they 
were very far from constituting a theoretical system. I arrived at the 
conclusion that to start building a system it was necessary to enlarge the scope 
beyond purely economic theory. Indeed, economic factors could not be 
isolated from the social structure. This was of paramount importance. It would 
be hopeless to seek a proper answer to these and other important questions 
within the narrow framework of a purely economic theory.
This need for an interdisciplinary approach was also admitted by some
neoclassical economists and moderate economists (Bauer 1971: 104; Bradford
1986:123; Todaro 1989:13). As Todaro (1989:xxxv) noted:
One simply cannot talk about economics for development without placing 
economic variables squarely in the context of sociopolitical systems and 
institutional realities. To ignore ‘noneconomic’ factors in an analysis of so- 
called economic problems such as poverty, unemployment, and inequality, 
both within and between nations, would do students a great disservice.
This trend towards interdisciplinary studies later became one of the dominant
characteristics in another debate in the field of development studies: the
modernisation debate, to which attention now turns.
Modernisation debate
The modernisation debate mainly related to the question of the desirability and 
undesirability, and the necessity and evitability of participation in the global market 
economy. Its origins may be traced back far in the past, but it intensified only in the 
postwar period in the debate between proponents of the modemisation/diffusion 
paradigm and proponents of the dependency/world-system paradigm. The debate 
focused on whether developing countries should open up to the forces of 
modernisation and therefore take part in the global market economy, whether this
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benefits these countries and therefore is desirable, and whether this is necessitated by 
an irreversible process of progress and therefore is inevitable. The 
modernisation/diffusion paradigm gave affirmative answers to these questions, and 
dominated mainstream development thinking in the early period of the debate and in 
more recent years (Roxborough 1988:756; Hettne 1990:60). It thus deserves close 
scrutiny at the outset. Subsequently, we will turn to the radical challenge to it from 
proponents of the dependency/world-system paradigm.
Open up to forces of modernisation
The modemisation/diffusion paradigm emerged in the West in the 1950s as a result of 
a convergence of two theoretical trends: social evolutionism and social functionalism 
(Tipps 1973:200; So 1990:18). Social evolutionism, born in the early nineteenth 
century when European countries were experiencing rapid social change primarily as 
a result of the Industrial Revolution, tended to consider development as a 
unidirectional evolutionary process. Societies would move from a backward, 
irrational, and barbarian state to a progressive, rational, and civilised state as 
represented by contemporary capitalist Europe. Social functionalism, founded by 
Parsons in the middle of the twentieth century when development experiences of 
individual countries demonstrated huge complexities in the process of increased 
globalisation, examined systematic changes and used universal ‘pattem variables’ to 
interpret them (Eisenstadt 1973:5-11). Unidirectional evolution and universal pattem 
variables were two of the prominent characteristics of the early 
modemisation/diffusion paradigm.
From the 1950s onward, a number of social scientists from various disciplines 
(economics, sociology, politics, psychology, history) began to analyse social
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development in general, and the development of developing countries in particular, in 
terms of social evolutionism and social functionalism. Social development in general 
was regarded as a process which involves, according to Dore (1977:9), ‘the 
movement of a society from Stage A to Stage B when Stage B is judged to be better 
than Stage A by some criterion of value which the speaker accepts.’ Stage B (modem 
society), represented in the modem world by more developed areas, exhibited some 
pattern variables or characteristics which were quite different from, and opposite to, 
those of Stage A (traditional society) represented by underdeveloped areas. The 
development of developing countries in particular was to be achieved ‘through the 
elimination of “underdevelopment” characteristics (some of which are listed in De 
Souza and Porter 1974:15-60) and the acquisition of the characteristics of more 
developed areas’ (Browett 1980:58-60). These social scientists thus initiated the 
modernisation/diffusion paradigm. The most prominent proponents of this paradigm 
were, among others, Hoselitz (1953; 1964), Levy (1966), Lemer (1958), McClelland 
(1961; 1964), Rostow (1964), Inkeless (1964), Lipset (1963), and Moore and 
Feldman (1960). There certainly were some theoretical and methodological 
differences within this group, and these differences were even conceptualised as 
distinctive models within the paradigm (Nash 1963:5; Browett 1980:60), but 
fundamentally they shared the following tenets.
They all believed that the transition from tradition to modernity is a desirable 
process because it involves the replacement of traditional social characteristics by 
modem ones, and the latter are superior to the former. The dichotomy between 
modem and traditional societies was characterised in terms of industrial/agrarian, 
urban/rural, commercialisation/self-sufficiency, differentiated structure/rigid
structure, democracy/dictatorship, rapid development of science and
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technology/ignorance and benightedness, literacy/illiteracy, legal/arbitrary, 
secular/sacred, affective-neutral/affective, universalistic/particularistic, self­
orientation/collective-orientation, achievement/ascription, functionally
specific/functionally diffused, and rational/irrational (Hoselitz 1953,1964; Parsons 
1951; Black 1966; Eisenstadt 1973; So 1990). Thus, modernity represents ‘the very 
embodiment of virtue and progress’, and therefore is desirable, whilst tradition 
represents ‘merely a barrier to its realisation’, and therefore is undesirable. 
Modernisation is the process by which the former triumphs over the latter (Tipps 
1973:208). Although modernisation may have some undesirable side-effects in the 
short run, its overall results are desirable in the long run.
They also believed that modernisation is an inevitable process. On the one 
hand, according to social evolutionism, the movement from a relatively backward to a 
relatively progressive society is an historical tendency which no society (no matter 
how backward and closed-up) can resist. The forces of modernisation are bound to 
overcome all barriers and eventually diffuse from ‘relatively modernised’ to 
‘relatively nonmodemised’ areas (Levy 1966:741-8). On the other hand, according to 
social functionalism, modernisation is a systematic transformation process which, 
once started in one sphere of social life, will inevitably produce comparable changes 
in other spheres (Hermassi 1978:239-57; So 1990:34-5). Although there may be 
resistance to this process in some periods of time, in some spheres of human activity, 
and in some places, it will eventually be overcome by the forces of modernisation.
On the basis of these beliefs, it was suggested that it is both desirable and 
inevitable for developing countries to open up to the forces of modernisation 
represented by Western capitalism, and to participate in the global market economy 
characterised by capitalist free competition (Hoogvelt 1982:116-7). In order to
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facilitate this process, developing countries ‘must be organised, or be capable of 
being organised, along commercial, capitalist lines so that its structure is roughly 
isomorphic with that of more developed areas’ (Browett 1980:65). Traditional 
societies must prepare themselves ‘more effectively to receive, accept and creatively 
elaborate upon external injections of development, democracy and modernity’ (Soja 
1976:15). The development policies which follow include, among others, (1) the 
promotion of production according to comparative advantage; (2) the introduction of 
Western aid, planning, and capital; and (3) the establishment of bridge-heads as 
enclaves of modernisation (Sunkel 1977:10; Foster-Carter 1973:15-6; Browett 
1980:66). In these ways, developing countries can eradicate underdevelopment and 
catch up with developed countries.
The arguments of the proponents of the modemisation/diffusion paradigm 
were based upon the assumption of convergence. It was argued that modem societies 
are similar whilst traditional societies are differentiated. Traditional societies are 
extremely diverse, ranging from ‘tribal’ to highly ‘sophisticated’ organisational 
structures. In contrast, modem societies are similar and homogeneous, and they do 
not ‘share the diversity of the traditional, insofar as the particular functions 
characteristic of modernity tend to be common to all mankind’ (Black 1966:24). It 
follows that diversity in the early stages of the modernisation process should diminish 
or disappear over time as traditional societies are gradually integrated into the modem 
world, achieve the social functions characteristic of more developed areas, and 
become ‘progressively similar in their sociocultural correlates’ (Goldthorpe 
1971:263-8; Eisenstadt 1973:17). As Levy (1967:207) noted: ‘As time goes on, they 
and we will increasingly resemble one another...because the patterns of modernisation 
are such that the more highly modernised societies become, the more they resemble
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one another’. Thus, at the endstage of modernisation, all areas of the world will have
similar social structures and levels of development. This process of convergence is so
overwhelming that there will emerge a ‘world state’ (Black 1966:155—74).
It was also argued that modernisation is ‘a universal social solvent’ (Levy
1966:741). The members of relatively modernised societies will eventually come into
contact with members of relatively nonmodemised societies, and such contact is
bound to generate a ‘single general type of social change’, that is, the social structures
of relatively nonmodemised societies will dissolve and be transformed in the
direction of relatively modernised societies. This is because
Once modernisation has been developed to the level characteristic of 
relatively modernised societies, those structures will be disseminated. The 
people who have become accustomed to acting in terms of them will be 
motivated to disseminate them whether from good or bad motives. The 
members of societies in terms of which these structures have not yet 
developed will be motivated to accept some of these structures or some of 
their results once they are aware of them—whether wisely or unwisely (Levy 
1966:747).
No matter whether such diffusion is by force or not, it is both inevitable and
wholesale. By wholesale, it is meant that
The structures of modernisation are such that they can never simply be 
imported piecemeal. That is to say, the members of relatively nonmodemised 
societies—even assuming they are not subjected to any coercion by others— 
can never simply take over what they want or what fits in well with the rest of 
their social structures and leave the rest (Levy 1966:748).
Not only is imperialism somehow justified, but also modernisation is regarded as a
process of complete acculturation (Black 1966; Levy 1966; Frank 1967).
It was further argued that modernisation is a process of westernisation. Since
relatively modernised societies are mostly Western countries and relatively
nonmodemised societies are mostly non-Westem countries, modernisation is actually
the adoption of the structures of Western countries by non-Westem countries. In the
acculturation process, non-Westem countries become similar to Western countries in
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all aspects of human activity—intellectual, political, economic, social, and
psychological (Black 1966:25-36). The hypothesis of convergence in the
modemisation/diffusion paradigm implies, therefore, the superiority of
westernisation. As Tipps (1973:206) pointed out, ‘the assumption upon which much
of modernisation theory is based is that, in the words of one author (Shils 1965: 10),
“Modem means being Western without the onus of dependence on the West’” (also
see Browett 1980; Hettne 1990; So 1990).
The modemisation/diffusion paradigm and its key assumption of convergence
dominated mainstream development thinking until the mid 1960s when it came to a
crisis. The major factors responsible for the crisis were, as Browett (1980:67) noted:
the limited economic growth recorded by less developed areas, the failure of 
nations which apparently were not constrained by small market size or 
specialised economic bases to experience rapid economic growth, the 
persistence of extreme poverty and material deprivation even in these areas 
which did achieve some aggregate economic growth (Griffin 1977), and the 
widening of the development gap between more developed and less developed 
areas (Seers 1972:33-4). Such was the extent of the deterioration in economic 
and social conditions and in the potential opportunities for advancement of 
many of those living in less developed areas that the concept of triage came to 
be applied to a category of nations where the severity and magnitude of non­
development or underdevelopment was the most acute—the fourth world, 
those beyond help or hope (Knight and Wilcox 1976:1). At the same time, a 
number of other factors—the successful Chinese and Cuban revolutions, the 
Vietnam war, the ‘development disasters’ resulting from breakdowns in 
progress towards modernisation which occurred in Indonesia, Pakistan, 
Burma, Nigeria and the Sudan (Eisenstadt 1964), and the internal, especially 
racial, conflict in the United States (Foster-Carter 1973:17-8; Lall 
1976:726)—contributed to a further questioning of the diffusionist paradigm 
policies and to disenchantment with western development assistance 
(Commission on International Development: 1969; Holsti 1975; Balogh 
1977).
All these factors showed a trend toward divergence, not toward convergence, so the 
modemisation/diffusion paradigm and its hypothesis of convergence were challenged. 
The criticism came mainly from two sources: radical critics from dependency/world-
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system paradigm and moderate critics from within the modernisation/diffusion 
paradigm. The latter is discussed here, and the former is left to the next section.
Those who wanted to reform and revise early modernisation thinking first 
questioned the absolute dichotomy between tradition and modernity. It was argued 
that tradition and modernity are not mutually exclusive. Some pattem variables or 
characteristics of traditional society can still exist in modem society and some pattern 
variables or characteristics of modem society have been present in traditional society 
for a very long period of time. Furthermore, there is not a zero-sum relationship 
between the two. On the one hand, in the process of modernisation, modem variables 
may ‘supplement’ but not ‘supplant’ traditional ones. Some of them are ‘simply 
added to’, ‘give new life’ to, and therefore ‘strengthen’ tradition (Huntington 
1971:195-6). On the other hand, in the process of modernisation, traditional variables 
may help to promote rather than impede the development of modernity. Traditional 
family relationships and traditional religious beliefs, for instance, helped to promote 
the modernisation process in some countries (see, for instance, Wong 1988; Davis 
1987). Tradition and modernity do not, therefore, necessarily repel one another. Their 
relationship in the process of modernisation is one of ‘mutual interpenetration and 
transformation’ (Bendix 1967:316-26; Eisenstadt 1968:40-52; Huntington 1971:295- 
6; Lauer 1971:885-6; Tipps 1973:214).
Second, they questioned the systemic character of modernisation. It was 
argued that the pattern variables of modernity do not necessarily form a ‘package’, so 
that modernisation in one sphere does not necessarily bring about corresponding 
changes in other spheres. On the contrary, the pattern variables of modernity may be 
‘unbundled’ and absorbed selectively and piecemeal. For example, the adoption of 
modem medicine, modem means of communication (such as radio, TV, and film),
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and modern weapons in the process of modernisation do not necessarily lead a
country to the eventual acquisition of the entire ‘package’ of modernity. It is very
possible that, as Tipps (1973:215) noted,
The introduction of modem medicine may only compound poverty by 
increasing population pressures, the transistor radio may be employed merely 
to reinforce traditional values, and a technologically sophisticated military 
may be placed in the service of the most reactionary of regimes. Thus, such 
selective modernisation may only strengthen traditional institutions and 
values, and rapid social change in one sphere may serve only to inhibit change 
in others.
Modernisation is not, therefore, a simple process with only systemic transformation, 
but a very complex process with multidimensional aspects of change.
Third, they criticised the assertion of modernisation as westernisation. It was 
argued that this notion arose simply because the proponents of the 
modemisation/diffusion paradigm, mostly Westerners, simply believed that the 
Western society where they were bom and raised is the best in the world, and that the 
rest of the world should follow the same or a similar path to modernity (Tipps 
1973:207; So 1990:54). This ethnocentric notion is untenable for two main reasons. 
On the one hand, due to the huge difference in the social structures and values in 
traditional societies, in the timing of their adoption of modernisation, in the extent to 
which they come into contact with the outside world, and in the nature of this contact, 
traditional societies are unlikely to duplicate or reproduce Western institutional 
patterns in their modernisation processes. They are, therefore, bound to follow paths 
to modernity that are different from those of the West (Bendix 1967: 27-35; 
Huntington 1971:298; Lauer 1971:884-6; Tipps 1973:215). Thus, not only the 
starting points (traditional societies) are diverse, but also the end stages (modem 
societies) ‘comprise a variety of social structural types’, not just one Western type 
(Roxborough 1988:756). On the other hand, due to the lack of capability for self-
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sustaining development, and the rigid institutional structures which are unable to deal 
with the problems generated in rapid social transformations, the process of 
modernisation in traditional societies, even with the aid from the West, may be 
interrupted or reversed—the ‘breakdowns of modernisation’ (Spingler 1966:332; 
Eisenstadt 1973:49). The traditional societies which suffer from the modernisation 
breakdowns are certainly unlikely to be westernised.
These criticisms can be considered as a current of revisionism within the 
modemisation/diffusion paradigm, for they were ‘designed to retain the idea of 
modernisation in the context of some new, more empirically grounded framework’ 
(Tipps 1973:216). The overall superiority of modernity to tradition and the necessity 
for modernisation implied in the convergence assumption remained largely 
untouched. It was still believed that the various paths to modernity and the 
breakdowns in the modernisation process are only temporary deviations from the 
normal direction, and that transitional societies experiencing such deviations will 
eventually return to the ‘normal’ track of modernisation (Hettne 1990:64). Thus, 
although there might be an ‘impressive range of variation’ of social structures in the 
end stage of modernisation, the unique nature characteristic of this stage (modernity) 
still justifies the assumption of convergence (Roxborough 1988:756).
It was also believed that the ethnocentrism inherent in the assumption of 
convergence could be avoided by universalising the concept of modernisation even 
further so as to define it as ‘the process of rationalisation of social behaviour and 
social organisation’ (Moore 1977:33), or ‘the growth in capacity to apply tested 
knowledge to all branches of production’ (Nash 1984:6), or ‘the increase in the 
capacity for social transformation’ (Roxborough 1988:756). This effort is essentially, 
as Hettne (1990:73) noted, a move toward ‘modernisation without westernisation’, in
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which arguments for the desirability and inevitability of opening up to the forces of
modernisation (or participation in the global market economy) and associated policy
prescriptions were still regarded as tenable. The phenomenon of ‘modernisation
breakdowns’ does not invalidate them, it only indicates that the aid programmes and
development policies ‘have not been given enough time to prove themselves’ in the
countries concerned (Browett 1980:68). Nevertheless, a number of outstanding
problems remained unsolved by the revisionist criticism.
The first problem is to define the basic concepts related to modernisation
appropriately. As shown above, there were wide differences regarding the definition
of tradition, modernity, and modernisation. No matter whether one ‘key variable’ or
several ‘pattern variables’ were used to define these concepts, what remained
common was that, explicitly or implicitly, capitalism and its concomitant economic,
social, political, intellectual, and cultural phenomena were considered as the basic
characteristic of modem society. Even those who tried to use some ‘universal’ terms
in the definition of modernisation often could not help thinking along these lines. As
Desai (1971:99) pointed out, for modernisation theorists,
The modernisation concept is basically meant to describe the processes and 
system of transformation that are taking place in societies which have 
remained within the broad framework of the capitalist mode of production, 
sometimes described as ‘free enterprise economies’ or ‘free economies’. A 
variety of terms have now been coined to avoid the stigma attached to the 
words ‘capitalist societies’. ‘Open society’, ‘particularly society’, ‘free 
society’, ‘active society’, ‘achieving society’, ‘secular society’, etc. have 
(been) encouraged to describe these societies, highlighting one or the other 
process in them. Very few scholars acknowledge that the capitalist mode of 
production is the common substratum underlying these variously described 
societies.
This line of thinking survived the moderate revisionist criticism. As late as the late 
1980s, for instance, Roxborough (1988:756), while trying to ‘universalise’ 
modernisation concepts, still suggested to use of the notion of a move from
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precapitalist or premodern societies to capitalist or modern societies to ‘dispenses 
with many of the objections that have rightly been leveled at the tradition-modernity 
dichotomy’. The idea that modem equals capitalist, tradition equals precapitalist, and 
modernisation equals the transition from precapitalism to capitalism remained deeply 
rooted in the modemisation/diffusion paradigm. Caught in the same trap, as analysed 
below, were its radical opponents—the dependency/world-system theorists. It should, 
however, be kept in mind that the conception of capitalism as a social system 
different from all others originated in a historically specific period full of intensified 
class struggle between capitalists and proletarians. The rapid and radical worldwide 
changes in the late twentieth century challenge the basic conception of the 
modemisation/diffusion paradigm, and require a broader and less ideologically biased 
framework of analysis.
It seems that one of the approaches to be considered is one which looks at the 
entire process of global social development from the ancient until the present as a ‘big 
transition’ from societies based upon a self-sufficient economy to those based upon a 
market economy. ‘Modernity’ is defined in terms of the economic, social, political, 
intellectual and cultural characteristics associated with the market economy, 
‘tradition’ is defined in terms of those characteristics associated with a self-sufficient 
economy, and ‘modernisation’ is the transition from the latter to the former. That the 
market economy is the core of modernity has been admitted by some scholars, but 
most equated it with capitalist ‘free economy’. However, the market economy 
originated much earlier than capitalism. Although there are many overlaps, they are 
not the same. In addition, the market economy is increasingly covering all areas of the 
world, whether they are ‘capitalist’, ‘socialist’, ‘feudalist’, ‘tribal’, or whatever!
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The second outstanding problem relates to the assumed desirability and 
inevitability of modernisation, or, since it was equated with capitalism, the 
desirability and inevitability of worldwide capitalist development. Clearly, the 
question of desirability and inevitability of modernisation could be better addressed 
from the viewpoint of the full development and globalisation of market economy than 
from that of the full development and globalisation of capitalism. It seems to me, 
however, that at least two theoretical difficulties still remain to be overcome. On the 
one hand, even though the inevitability of the development of the market economy 
was discussed as early as the eighteenth century by Smith (1776) in the light of the 
inevitable expansion of the division of labour and the propensity in human nature for 
exchanging one thing for another, social scientists have not yet found satisfactory 
theories which can combine sophisticated interdisciplinary analyses with updated 
evidence of increasing integration into the global market economy. On the other hand, 
the assessment of the desirability of modernisation should be based upon an analysis 
of the characteristics of modem society. Since the analyses to date have mainly been 
undertaken with ideological biases, a huge amount of work needs to be done before 
social scientists can reach a clear understanding of theos characteristics and, 
therefore, make an appropriate evaluation of the desirability of modernisation. The 
work involves not only distinguishing characteristics of modem societies based upon 
a market economy from those of traditional societies based upon a self-sufficient 
economy, which was pioneered by some scholars (see, for instance, Tachau 1972:2- 
3), but also distinguishing characteristics of such modem societies from those of 
capitalism and those of socialism, which is still largely a plot of ‘virgin land’.
The third outstanding problem concerns the failure to address the widening 
gap between developed and developing countries in the modernisation process.
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Accumulating evidence of the widening gap is directly contradictory to the key 
assumption of convergence and, therefore, points to a vital weakness in the 
modernisation/diffusion paradigm. As a leading modernisation theorist (Nash 
1977:16) admitted:
The intellectual formulations of the processes of modernisation are drawing 
farther and farther away from the historical and processual facts in the 
transitional nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. There is not only a 
widening gap between ‘the rich and the poor’ in terms of share of the world’s 
product; there is a widening gap between the intellectual apprehension of the 
process and the way the process is unfolding in the contemporary world.
The gap between theory and reality cannot be narrowed and the gap between ‘the rich
and the poor’ cannot be explained as long as proponents of the
modemisation/diffusion paradigm insist on a narrow and ideologically biased notion
of modernisation, which equates modernity to capitalism, and which assumes an
equalisation tendency in the capitalist modernisation process. It seems to me that the
first gap can be narrowed and the second may be better explained if modernisation is
equated with the full development of the market economy, and if both development
and inequality are allowed for in the same modernisation process. As shown in the
analyses of the international trade debate, international trade and the globalisation of
the market economy can be both an ‘engine of growth’ and a ‘mechanism of
international inequality’. Modernisation as defined above can, therefore, lead to
‘convergence’ in the sense that all areas involved in the process develop in the
direction of market economy and are increasingly integrated into the global market
economy, not necessarily in the sense that all areas involved in the process equalise in
their economic, social, political, intellectual and cultural levels of development
according to criterion derived from the experience of already-developed areas. In this
way, the question of desirability and undesirability, and necessity and inevitability of
modernisation can be better addressed. That is, although some developing countries
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might modernise themselves along ways other than capitalism, all of them cannot 
avoid being integrated into the global market economy. This inevitable globalisation 
process can, due to the dual roles of international trade, bring about both desirable 
and undesirable results to individual countries. Accumulating evidence of the parallel 
developments of increased integration into the global market economy and a 
widening gap between developed and developing countries seems to confirm this 
argument. Before providing evidence, however, we should take into account the 
radical criticisms of the modemisation/diffusion paradigm by proponents of the 
dependency/world system paradigm.
Polarised development: de-linking versus diffusion
As radical critics of the modemisation/diffusion paradigm, proponents of the 
dependency/world-system paradigm argued against the desirability and inevitability 
of participation in the global market economy from the viewpoint of underdeveloped 
countries. The dependency/world-system paradigm, originating in Latin America in 
the late 1960s, became very influential in development studies from the 1970s 
onwards. It drew its inspirations from three major intellectual sources: stmcturalism, 
neo-Marxism, and the French Annale school. Specifically, it absorbed the idea of 
unequal exchange and distribution between the core and the peripheral countries from 
stmcturalism, the view of socialism as a timely substitute for capitalism from neo- 
Marxism, and the perspective of global history in the long-term from the French 
Annale school. Its proponents included not only the Latin American scholars, but also 
scholars from other parts of the world, especially from Africa and North America. 
Although there were diverging opinions within this group the works of the three most 
prominent scholars in this group—Frank, Wallerstein, and Amin—were so closely
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interconnected and similar that they could be said to constitute a distinct 
dependency/world-system paradigm (Browett 1982:145; 1985:790; Brewer
1990:162-3).
Proponents of this paradigm were clearly characterised by their overwhelming 
dissatisfaction with modemisation/diffusion theorists’ arguments about the 
modernisation process in developing countries and the development strategies that 
these countries should adopt (Wallerstein 1975:7-29; 1979:132-7; Amin 1990a:x-xi; 
1990b: 1; Frank 1969a:21-78). They argued that the modemisation/diffusion 
paradigm is empirically inaccurate, theoretically inadequate, and politically 
ineffective because it is based upon a dualism which ‘fails to adhere to the standards 
of holism, structuralism, and historicity’ (Frank 1969: 63). The world is divided into 
two parts—modem and traditional societies, and the lack of modem characteristics is 
supposed to have led traditional societies to lag behind the modem ones. This 
approach deals with each of the two parts separately and, therefore, neglects the 
whole world system which holds them together, its structure, and its historical 
development. The two parts should be, according to the dependency/world-system 
theorists, considered and analysed within a single capitalist world system. The 
underdevelopment in developing countries is not the result of the absence of certain 
pattem variables characteristic of developed countries, but rather the result of the 
presence of such pattern variables in the modern capitalist world system and their 
diffusion from the centre of the system (Western countries) to the periphery (non- 
Westem countries). In this process of capitalist globalisation or capitalist expansion, 
Western countries have developed or modernised at the expense of non-Westem 
countries. It is, therefore, the very functioning of the capitalist world system and the 
very process of its historical evolution that has led to development in Western
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countries on the one hand, and underdevelopment in non-Western countries on the 
other. As Frank (1969b:9) asserted:
Economic development and underdevelopment are not just relative and 
quantitative, in that one represents more economic development than the 
other; economic development and underdevelopment are relational and 
qualitative, in that each is structurally different from, yet caused by its relation 
with, the other. Yet development and underdevelopment are the same in that 
they are the product of a single, but dialectically contradictory, economic 
structure and process of capitalism. Thus they cannot be viewed as the 
products of supposedly different economic structures or systems, or of 
supposed differences in stages of economic growth achieved within the same 
system. One and the same historical process of the expansion and 
development of capitalism throughout the world has simultaneously 
generated—and continues to generate—both economic development and 
structural underdevelopment.
The integration of non-Western countries into the capitalist world system or non- 
Westem countries’ participation in the global market economy is, therefore, 
undesirable to these countries, and should be avoided (Hout 1993:47-8).
It is undesirable in the sense that this globalisation and integration process has 
not, as modemisation/diffusion theorists supposed, led to modernity, development, 
and wealth in non-Western countries through the diffusion of Western modem pattem 
variables. On the contrary, it built up many impediments to the progress of these 
countries through the diffusion. The diffusion of Western capital enabled, for 
instance, Western countries to control the production in non-Westem countries and, 
therefore, ‘interposed a whole series of obstacles to their development’ (Frank 
1969a:52). The diffusion of Western technology only served ‘as the basis of the 
capitalist metropolis’s monopoly control over its underdeveloped economic colonies’ 
(Frank 1969a:54). The diffusion of Western institutions, especially liberalism in its 
economic, political and social forms, only served the interests of the diffusing 
countries and the dominant groups in the diffused non-Westem countries to the point 
that it thereby provided ‘economic and political support not for changing but for
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maintaining and reinforcing the structure of the economic, political, and social status 
quo\ and restricted ‘the development of the economic, political, and social whole’ in 
non-Westem countries (Frank 1969a:60-l). In a word, integration into the capitalist 
world system or participation in the global market economy has brought about 
tremendously harmful and undesirable results for non-Westem countries. As 
Wallerstein (1991:101) noted, ‘the involvement of various parts of the world as 
peripheral zones of the capitalist world-economy has not been historically beneficial 
to their populations.’
Participation in the global market economy should be avoided in the sense that 
since the centuries-long integration into the capitalist world system has not led to 
development and prosperity but to underdevelopment and poverty in non-Westem 
countries, the only way left for these countries is to ‘de-link’ from and destroy the 
capitalist world system, rather than, as modemisation/diffusion theorists suggested, to 
engage in modernisation and transformation within the capitalist world system. As 
Wallerstein (1979:133) observed: ‘we do not live in a modernising world but in a 
capitalist world. What makes this world tick is not the need for achievement but the 
need for profit. The problem for oppressed strata is not how to communicate within 
this world but how to overthrow it.’ This de-linking strategy should be in the 
direction of socialism. Although there were different understandings and opinions 
among the proponents of the dependency/world-system paradigm about the ‘de­
linking’ strategy, and some of them even questioned its validity on some occasions, 
the differences were more in appearance than in substance and they have been 
overstated (Hettne 1990:147). Indeed, the differences existed only in the sense that 
some (Amin, for instance) believed that socialism can succeed in a single country 
and, therefore, can be a practical strategy for individual developing countries, whilst
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others (Wallerstein, for example) believed that socialism can only succeed in a 
worldwide scale to replace the worldwide capitalism and, therefore, cannot be a 
practical and effective strategy for individual developing countries (Amin, Arrighi, 
Frank, and Wallerstein 1982:10, 241-3). That is, some advocated ‘individual de­
linking’ whilst others argued for ‘systemic de-linking’. Despite the differences, they 
all agreed that developing countries cannot achieve development within the capitalist 
world system. Such development can only occur either when these countries sever 
their ties with the capitalist world system or when this system comes to an end in the 
future.
Many assumptions underlay the dependency/world system theorists’ 
arguments against the desirability and inevitability of integration into the capitalist 
world system and participation in the global market economy, but the key assumption 
is doubtless that of divergence. It was assumed that the general tendency in the 
modem capitalist world system has not been, as modemisation/diffusion theorists 
supposed, toward convergence, but toward divergence. The evolution of the modem 
capitalist world system polarised the world basically into two parts—highly 
developed areas (‘core’, ‘centre’, ‘metropolitan’) and extremely underdeveloped areas 
(‘periphery’, ‘satellite’), with a so-called ‘semiperiphery’ in between. The 
polarisation existed not only internationally but also domestically, domestically in the 
sense that there emerged a widening regional gap on the one hand and increasing 
inequalities in the distribution of income on the other. The rich regions and the rich 
classes in underdeveloped countries joined the group of metropoles, and exploited 
poor regions and poor classes (Frank 1969: 6, 61). As a result of this polarised 
development, the two parts of the world have not become similar to each other, but
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become increasingly differentiated in their levels of development, their social 
structures and characteristics.
This polarisation trend started right at the beginning of the integration process, 
and became more and more alarming as time went on. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, it had arrived at the stage that the difference between the developed and the 
underdeveloped areas was no longer quantitative, but qualitative in the sense that it 
became structurally ‘insurmountable’. That is, if there did exist possibilities for some 
underdeveloped countries to join the ranks of developed ones before the end of the 
nineteenth century, the ‘extent of world domination of core capital was already such 
that it precluded this possibility from then on’, or left only very ‘limited possibilities 
of transformation within the capitalist world-economy’ (Amin, Arrighi, Frank, and 
Wallerstein 1982:182; Wallerstein 1979:67). The tendency toward divergence and 
polarisation ‘is not an anomaly but a continuing basic mechanism of the operation of 
the world-economy’ (Wallerstein 1979:73; Hout 1993:115). In other words, it is the 
inevitable result of the development of the capitalist world system.
This is because the capitalist world system is characterised by the ceaseless 
accumulation of capital. The accumulation is achieved through capitalists’ efforts to 
maximise profits. The desire for profits drives capitalists to search for new markets 
and new investment sites so that they can gain increasing surplus through the 
exploitation of an increasing number of people. In this way, the world capitalist 
centre has incorporated other parts of the world into the exploitative surplus-transfer 
network. The function of the periphery of the capitalist world system is to provide 
surplus for the centre.
The surplus-transfer network experienced several phases in the centuries-long 
process of capitalist world system development, of which three are most important:
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mercantilist, industrial capitalist, and imperialist/neoimperialist. Accordingly, the 
exploitation of the periphery by the centre took different forms in these phases. In the 
mercantilist phase, the exploitation was trade-induced, though direct plunder was also 
an important means of surplus-transfer since the centre had little to offer in exchange 
with the periphery at that time (Amin 1974:40-1; Frank 1979:17; Hout 1993:85). In 
the industrial capitalist phase, the Industrial Revolution promoted ‘international 
specialisation between industrial and agricultural countries’ and enlarged the 
‘technological gap’ between these countries, so the centre exploited the periphery 
mainly through the export of manufactured goods in exchange for primary goods 
(Amin 1974:417; Frank 1983:36-8; Hout 1993:65-85). The imperialist/neoimperialist 
phase witnessed, besides the inherited forms, two new forms of exploitation— 
increased investments by the centre (mainly multinational firms) in the periphery and 
increased financial transactions between the centre and the periphery. These new 
forms of exploitation resulted in high rates of profit for the centre and tremendous 
economic and financial problems for the periphery (Amin 1972:518; 1980:134-7; 
Frank 1969b: 298-303; 1979a:194; 1983:41-4; 1984:77-81; Hout 1993:65-88).
Despite changes in the forms of exploitation, trade based upon unequal 
exchange and unequal specialisation has been, according to the dependency/world- 
system theorists, the key mechanism by which surplus has been transferred from the 
periphery to the centre, and therefore has played a crucial role in the polarisation 
process. It is here that the proponents of dependency/world-system paradigm 
essentially accepted Emmanuel’s unequal exchange theorem. They argued, following 
Emmanuel, that the different wage levels between the centre and the periphery and 
the international immobility of labour result in unequal exchange between the centre 
and the periphery and the exploitation of the latter by the former—products of high
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wage and high price in the former are exchanged with products of low wage and low 
price in the latter whilst the value of the products (in terms of labour cost) in the two 
areas remains the same. Unequal exchange and exploitation occur, therefore, no 
matter what kind of products these two areas produce and exchange with one another. 
As Wallerstein (1979:71) noted:
If we think of the exchange between the core and the periphery of a capitalist 
system being that between high-wage products and low-wage products, there 
then results an ‘unequal exchange’ in Emmanuel’s conception, in which a 
peripheral worker needs to work many hours, at a given level of productivity, 
to obtain a product produced by a worker in a core country in one hour. And 
vice versa. Such a system is necessaryt for the expansion of a world market if 
the primary consideration is profit. Without unequal exchange, it would not be 
profitable to expand the size of the division of labour. And without such an 
expansion, it would not be profitable to maintain a capitalist world- 
economy... The point is that we should not identify any particular product 
with a structural sector of the world-economy, but rather observe the wage 
patterns and margins of profit of particular products at particular moments of 
time to understand who does what in the system.
A similar line of argument can also be found in the writings of other 
dependency/world-system theorists (see, for instance, Frank 1979:101-10; Amin 
1976:138-54; 1974:chapters 1 and 2). They tended, however, to consider wage level 
not as an independent variable, as Emmanuel thought, but as a variable which is 
closely related to, and determined by, productive forces in the capitalist world system 
(Frank 1979,: 109-10; Amin 1976:151; Brewer 1990:184).
The centuries-long exploitation of the periphery by the centre had contrasting 
effects on the two zones of the capitalist world system. The centre accumulated 
capital through the global surplus-transfer, and, therefore, not only built up an 
autocentric economy with its own dynamic but also enjoyed an absolute domination 
over the periphery. By contrast, the periphery was deprived of its potential capital 
through the global surplus-transfer and, therefore, not only lost the dynamics of its 
autonomous development but also became dependent on the centre. As a result of the
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dependence, the periphery was trapped in a situation of underdevelopment whose 
basic structural features are, in the words of Amin (1976:201-2),
(1) the extreme unevenness that is typical of the distribution of productivity in 
the periphery, and in the system of prices transmitted to it from the centre, 
which results from the distinctive nature of the peripheral formations and 
largely dictates the structure of the distribution of income in these formations;
(2) the disarticulation due to the adjustment of the orientation of production in 
the periphery to the needs of the centre, which prevents the transmission of the 
benefits of economic progress from the poles of development to the economy 
as a whole; and (3) economic domination by the centre, which is expressed in 
the forms of international specialisation (the structures of world trade in which 
the centre shapes the periphery in accordance with its own needs) and in the 
dependence of the structures whereby growth in the periphery is financed (the 
dynamic of the accumulation of foreign capital).
Such a structurally ‘extroverted’, ‘dependent’, and ‘underdeveloped’ periphery is 
beyond any hope of development. Even if economic growth occurs in some 
peripheral countries (the NICs, for example) in some periods of capitalist world 
system expansion, it is only dependent development in the sense that it reproduces 
underdevelopment structures and, therefore, is bound to be blocked later on. As long 
as the capitalist world system exists, the periphery cannot break through this ‘vicious 
cycle’ of underdevelopment and, therefore, is doomed to lag further and further 
behind the centre as time goes on. Thus, spatial divergence and polarisation is a 
perpetual, everlasting, and increasingly alarming phenomenon in the capitalist world 
system (Amin 1976:9; 1990a:xi; Wallerstein 1975:19; Frank 1984:217-9; Amin, 
Arrighi, Frank, and Wallerstein 1982:25-6).
The dependency/world-system paradigm and its key assumption of divergence 
‘enjoyed wide support among critical social theorists and development planners in the 
1960s and 1970s, and in a sense still ‘remains a leading source of innovative ideas 
and historical research’ (Peet 1991:52). The power of this paradigm lay, it was said, 
in that it contained ‘devastating criticism of the Eurocentric modernisation paradigm’,
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provided ‘an alternative intellectual perspective’, functioned as ‘a catalyst in the 
subsequent development of development theory’, stimulated ‘the discussion on 
development strategies both on a national level and on an international one’, and 
solved ‘some important problems that were left unsolved by its main predecessors 
and competitors’ (Hettne 1990:82-97; Hout 1993:169; also see Addo 1984:4-11). 
The main contribution of the paradigm to development studies was, it seems to me, 
that it pointed to, from a holistic worldview, the tendency toward divergence in the 
modem world and some undesirable consequences of integration into the global 
market economy. The dependency/world-system paradigm suffers, however, from a 
number of crucial weaknesses and, therefore, is vulnerable to criticism.
From the 1970s onwards, the dependency/world-system paradigm has been 
the subject of a great deal of criticism. The criticism came, as Browett (1982:145) 
observed, ‘both from the right, which seeks to reformulate and refurbish the 
diffusionist paradigm in the light of the critiques which have been made against it, 
and from the left, which now regards the dependency paradigm as constituting an 
inadequate basis for the analysis of world capitalism’. In spite of the differences 
between the ‘right’ and ‘left’ critics or, in the words of Larrain (1989:175), between 
‘non-Marxist’ and ‘Marxist’ critics, the criticism has focused on the following 
problems.
First, it was argued that the dependency/world-system paradigm, due to ‘its 
origins as a critique of orthodox development theory’, fell into a ‘mirror-image’ 
pitfall (Browett 1981:16). As a result, the dependency/world-system paradigm 
replicated the errors of modemisation/diffusion paradigm in at least four aspects.
• It was trapped in the same conception of two opposite poles. As Leys 
(1977:95) noted, ‘it is not really an accident that these simplistic pairings,
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developed/underdeveloped, centre/periphery, dominant/dependent 
resemble those of bourgeois development theory (tradition/modern, 
rich/poor, advanced/backward, etc.); they are basically polemical 
inversions of them’.
• It simply put the arguments of modemisation/diffusion paradigm upside 
down and, therefore, went to extremes in the opposite direction (Larrain 
1989:189). As opposed to the modemisation/diffusion theorists’ argument 
that the diffusion of modem variables into traditional societies can lead to 
development in these societies, for example, the dependency/world-system 
theorists argued that such a diffusion can only lead to underdevelopment in 
these societies. Thus, as Villamil (1979:4) pointed out, ‘what had been 
considered pluses in the traditional approaches, became minuses when 
looked at through dependence “glasses”...’
• It relied, as the modemisation/diffusion paradigm did, upon ‘correlative 
and circular’ arguments rather than causative analyses and, therefore, was 
‘vitiated by tautological reasoning’ (Browett 1981:18; Larrain 1989:188- 
9). In the dependency/world-system paradigm, the logic of argument was 
that ‘dependent countries are those which lack the capacity for autonomous 
growth and they lack this because their structures are dependent ones’ 
(O’Brien 1975:24), or that ‘less developed countries...are poor because 
they are dependent, and any characteristics that they display signify 
dependence’ (Lall 1975:800). Thus, just as the modemisation/diffusion 
theorists associated underdevelopment with the absence of modem 
variables and then believed they had explained it, the dependency/world-
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system theorists associated underdevelopment with dependency and then 
thought they had found the explanation for its existence (Browett 1981:18).
• It concentrated, like the modernisation/diffusion paradigm, more on 
ideological debate than on theoretical discussion (Browett 1981:19). In 
blaming the modemisation/diffusion paradigm for ‘providing ideological 
justification for Western countries to exploit Third World countries’, it 
argued that dependency caused by Western exploitation is ‘the explanation 
for everything which seems to be wrong with Latin American’ as well as 
other developing countries (So 1990:131; O’Brien 1975:12). Thus, just as 
the modemisation/diffusion theorists believed in the desirability and 
inevitability of worldwide capitalist development and considered their 
arguments as ‘a non-communist manifesto’ (Rostow 1960), the 
dependency/world-system theorists believed in the desirability and 
inevitability of socialism and claimed that ‘we all remained committed to 
the historical objectives of world socialism’ (Amin, Arrighi, Frank, and 
Wallerstein 1982:10). In this way, it ‘gave up the battle for science after it 
lapsed into rhetoric’ (So 1990:131).
Second, it was argued that the key conceptions in the paradigm about 
autonomy and development in the centre and dependence and underdevelopment in 
the periphery were problematic in at least three respects.
• They were self-contradictory in the sense that they defined development as 
a process of autocentric, autodynamic, self-sustaining, and non-dependent 
accumulation and growth on the one hand, and underdevelopment of the 
periphery as a condition of the development of the centre on the other 
hand. Thus as Bernstein (1979:92) observed: ‘Underdevelopment theory
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cannot have it both ways. If the field of analysis is world economy, if the 
centre needs the periphery for modes of exploitation..., then there is no 
capitalist formation whose development can be regional autonomous, self­
generating or self-perpetuating’. Therefore, ‘development cannot be 
conceptualised by its self-centred nature and lack of dependence, nor 
“underdevelopment” by its dependence and lack of autonomy’.
• They did not conform to the reality of the developed world in the sense that 
dependency characteristics can also be found in developed countries—the 
‘Canada problem’ (Browett 1981:18; O’Brien 1975:24; Kay 1975:104; Lall 
1975:808). Increasing evidence showed, as Larrain (1989:178) stated, ‘how 
cultural and political penetration occurs in the developed world as well, 
how all countries including the developed ones are increasingly dominated 
by international capital..., how there is also marginalisation and inequality 
in non-dependent economies.’
• They were also not in keeping with the reality of the underdeveloped world 
in the sense that some underdeveloped countries have indeed achieved 
rapid development even though they remain dependent in different 
degrees—the NICs phenomenon (Browett 1986:409; Hettne 1990:94). 
Dependence did not necessarily lead to underdevelopment, and some 
underdeveloped countries even have ‘benefited from dependency and in 
economic terms successfully achieved capitalist development’ (Barone 
1983:45). Autonomy and development were not, as dependence/world- 
system theorists supposed, necessarily related to one another, nor were 
dependency and underdevelopment.
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Third, the dependency/world-system paradigm was criticised for its 
‘circulationist’ view on capitalist world system which overstressed the role of 
worldwide unequal exchange relations. This circulationist view was, it was said, 
wrong on two grounds. On the one hand, in order to show the drain of surplus as the 
main root of dependence and underdevelopment in the periphery, the 
dependency/world-system theorists tended to overemphasise ‘the preeminence and 
insidiousness of the deleterious impacts of external forces, especially international 
trade and investment’ and, therefore, overlooked the positive effects of these external
Q
forces on the economic development of the periphery (Browett 1986:409) . On the 
other hand, the dependency/world-system theorists tended to allow spatial structure to 
outweigh class structure, and exchange relations to outweigh production relations. 
Spatial structures, spatial relationships, spatial inequalities, and spatial conflicts were, 
as Browett (1981:19) pointed out, such an ‘overwhelming focus’ in their analyses that 
‘they were maintained in a position of pre-eminence over class structure—relations of 
exploitation among social classes’ (also see, Roxborough 1976:121; Brenner 1977:27, 
53-67). Thus the ‘exploitation of poor countries by rich countries is to conceal the 
true exploitation of workers or to relegate it to a position of secondary importance’ 
(Larrain 1989:191; also see Bettelheim 1972:301). By the same token, worldwide 
exchange relations attracted such great attention from the proponents of the paradigm 
that they tended to see ‘relations of production as being dominated and defined by 
exchange relations’ (Browett 1981:19; Laclau 1971:24-5; Brenner 1977:31-3).
8 As Warren (1980:142) argued, in order for such a drain of surplus to lead to underdevelopment, ‘it 
must be an absolute drain, not simply an unequal ‘transaction’ that nevertheless leaves both sides 
better off than before’. Since international trade is not a zero-sum game in which one country’s gain 
must be another country’s loss, and since foreign investment can bring about ‘new values, salaries and 
state revenues’, then ‘it is highly unlikely at first glance that either foreign investment or unequal 
exchange (supposing it to exist) causes an absolute drain of surplus compared to the situation that 
would pertain in the absence of the investment or trade’ (also see, Larrain 1989:191; Jenkins 1987:98).
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These critiques did point to some shortcomings in the dependency/world- 
system paradigm, and it was said that some of them were overcome by the proponents 
of the paradigm in their later writings in the light of these critiques. It seems to me, 
however, that three key weaknesses in the paradigm still need to be highlighted here 
which have been directly and profoundly responsible for leading the paradigm to a 
cul de sac.
The first key weakness lies in the overall theoretical framework of the 
paradigm which is actually based upon a misconception of a so-called ‘modem 
capitalist world system’. The dependency/world-system theorists all believed, as did 
modernisation/diffusion theorists, that the modem world is capitalist in nature. The 
problem in this misconception is that capitalism as a mode of production is extended 
to a worldwide economic system. The two different things are therefore conflated into 
one concept: ‘capitalist world economy’ or ‘capitalist world system’. It seems to me 
that many shortcomings in the paradigm are the result of this conflation. In order to 
come to terms with the fact of the coexistence of many different modes of production 
in their ‘capitalist world system’, for example, the proponents of the paradigm had to 
put exchange relations in a dominant position in their definition of capitalism, thus 
committing the so-called ‘circulationisf error. This was most obvious in 
Wallerstein’s definition of capitalism: ‘...a system of production for sale in a market 
for profit and the appropriation of this profit on the basis of individual or collective 
ownership’ (Wallerstein 1979:66). Thus the capitalist world system was actually 
equated to a global market economy in the dependency/world-system paradigm. This 
equation led the paradigm, in turn, into a dilemma in identifying the origins of this 
modem world system and distinguishing it from other historical systems. Keeping 
this in mind, it should not at all come as a surprise when it is found that the
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proponents of the paradigm ‘split up’ recently, with Wallerstein and Amin insisting 
that the capitalist world system has a history of 500 years and is substantially 
different from previous systems, and with Frank and others claiming that the 
capitalist world system has a history of at least 5000 years which covers the whole 
civilised history of humankind (Frank 1990; 1991; 1992; Wallerstein 1991b; 1992; 
1993; Gills and Frank 1992; Amin 1991b). This debate is still going on between the 
proponents of the paradigm and cannot lead them out of the dilemma as long as they 
continue to equate the mode of production to the economic system, and capitalism to 
the market economy.
The difference between a mode of production and an economic system has 
been pointed out by some of the critics of the dependency/world-system paradigm. 
Laclau (1977:34-5) noted, for instance, that a mode of production is ‘an integrated 
complex of social productive forces and relations linked to a determinate type of 
ownership of the means of production’, whereas an economic system consists of ‘the 
mutual relations between the different sectors of the economy, or between different 
production units, whether on a regional, national or world scale’. A detailed analysis 
of the difference is beyond the scope of the study, but suffice to say that a mode of 
production mainly concerns production relations in the production process. There 
have been, for instance, slavery, feudal, capitalist, and socialist modes of production. 
An economic system mainly concerns exchange relations in all economic activities. 
There have been, for example, the natural economy (production for self-sufficiency) 
and the market economy (production for markets). As society does not, as both 
modemisation/diffusion theorists and dependency/world-system theorists supposed, 
develop in a unilinear manner but in a multilinear manner, the relationship between 
capitalism and the market economy is that capitalism as a mode of production can
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only exist and develop in the market economic system, but the market economic 
system can cover many different modes of production.
Based upon this argument, it is clear that the coexistence of many different 
modes of production in the modem world and the overwhelming trend towards 
globalisation of the market economy in the modem world suggest that if there does 
exist a modem world system, it is a global market economic system rather than a 
capitalist world system. If so, then, the overall theoretical framework of the 
dependency/world-system paradigm must be abandoned before any significant 
progress can be made.
The second key weakness concerns the assumption of divergence. All 
proponents of the paradigm insisted, as shown above, that the overall tendency in the 
modem world has been towards divergence in the sense that the world has been 
increasingly polarised into developed and underdeveloped areas. As Wallerstein 
(1990:290) admitted later, however, the dependency/world-system paradigm ‘has 
never really elaborated’ this issue, and ‘until we tackle convincingly the question of 
polarisation, we cannot expect to become truly influential’. The difficulties in 
elaborating and tackling the polarisation problem are, according to Wallerstein 
(1990:291) entirely ‘technical (how to measure) and substantive (what to measure)’ in 
nature.
It seems to me, however, that whilst the ‘technical and substantive’ 
dimensions of the issue are no doubt very important, the theoretical dimension of the 
issue is more crucial as far as the dependency/world-system paradigm is concerned. 
This is because the dependency/world-system theorists defined this issue as 
‘polarisation within the capitalist world economy’ (Wallerstein 1990:290). But the 
‘capitalist world economy’ or ‘capitalist world system’ itself is, as analysed above, a
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misconception which conflates mode of production with economic system. On the 
basis of such a misconception, the dependency/world-system theorists can see only 
absolute exploitative relations and zero-sum gains in international economic activities 
such as trade, investment, and financial transactions and, therefore, only tendencies 
toward divergence in modem world, as opposed to tendencies toward convergence 
assumed by the modemisation/diffusion paradigm.
In the modem world, however, there have been not only exploitative and zero- 
sum relations, but also mutually beneficial relations that can be better understood and 
explained if analysed in the context of the global market economy. The concept of 
global market economy allows for both mutually beneficial relations and unequally 
distributive relations in international economic activities. In the process of 
globalisation of the market economy, international trade based upon comparative 
advantage can, as analysed in the previous section, benefit all the trading countries, 
while implying the possibility of an unequal distribution of the gains and, therefore, a 
widening development gap between the trading countries. By the same token, other 
international economic activities such as investment and financial flows can also be 
advantageous to the recipient countries in terms of creating employment, providing 
for needed capital, instilling new management knowledge and technical skills, while 
implying the possibility of benefiting the investor and donor countries more than the 
recipient countries and, therefore, the possibility of enlarging inequalities between 
them (see, for instance, Warren 1980:142; Kitching 1982:167; Larrain 1989:191).
In the context of the global market economy, therefore, we can see not only 
tendencies toward divergence in certain aspects of development resulting from the 
unequal distribution of benefits, but also tendencies toward convergence in certain 
aspects of development caused by, among other things, the mutually beneficial effects
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of international economic activities. Divergence in some aspects does not mean that 
there is no convergence in other aspects, and vice versa. The question is not, as 
argued by the dependency/world-system paradigm and the modemisation/diffusion 
paradigm, whether there are absolute tendencies toward divergence or absolute 
tendencies toward convergence in modem world, but what have been converging and 
what have been diverging in the modem world. Attention should be focused upon 
analysing the parallel tendencies toward divergence and convergence, their 
expressions in various aspects of development, and their different and common 
dynamics and mechanisms. Any attempt to stress only absolute divergence or 
absolute convergence is an oversimplification of the issue.9
The third key weakness relates to the de-linking strategy derived by the 
dependency/world-system theorists from their arguments about the undesirability of 
integration into the capitalist world system. Since they equated the capitalist world 
system with the global market economy, their de-linking strategy in fact meant ‘a 
break with the world market’ (Amin 1974:35). In order to prove the validity of the de­
linking strategy, they have to deny or weaken the possibility that the exploited, 
marginalised peripheral countries can develop within the capitalist/market world 
system, they have to denounce capitalism/market for everything that seems wrong in 
the modem world and announce its demise in a near future, and they have to expect 
socialist de-linking to be a panacea.
9 It is worth mentioning that the ‘simultaneous occurrence of both convergence and divergence’ in the 
modern world was noticed and analysed by some scholars, such as Hoover, with advanced quantitative 
methods, but they were still trapped in the theoretical framework of dependency/world-system 
paradigm. They could, therefore, only reach the findings that ‘partially support’ the paradigm’s basic 
view that ‘divergence occurs between the three zones (core, semiperiphery, and periphery), whereas 
convergence occurs within them’ (Hoover 1988:838). This further suggests that only once the 
theoretical framework of the dependency/world-system paradigm is transcended can Wallerstein’s 
‘technical and substantive’ problems be tackled in a correct theoretical direction, and can researchers 
make significant progress.
73
Such arguments could at best amount to eloquent revolutionary slogans, but 
would become very vulnerable when applied to the real world. At least three 
developments in the real world in the past few decades have pointed to the 
vulnerability of the arguments.
• Socialist countries in the East which carried out, according to the 
dependency/world-system theorists, the de-linking strategy previously, 
recently had to ‘reintegrate’ themselves ‘into the capitalist international 
division of labour’ (Frank 1984:226).
• Some developing countries in the South have achieved, despite the denial 
or reluctant recognition from the dependency/world-system theorists, 
tremendous developments.
• Capitalism in its centre (the West) is not, as the dependency/world-system 
theorists predicted, dying from its inherent contradictions and crises, but 
has recovered from crises and demonstrated considerable vitality.
Faced with these realities, proponents of the dependency/world-system paradigm 
could do little more than change or modify their arguments and beliefs. As a result, 
their arguments and beliefs became more and more divergent in recent years. Some, 
such as Wallerstein, continued to insist on the overoptimistic view that ‘capitalism as 
an historical system...will perhaps be no more by 2050’, but became more and more 
uncertain about ‘what kind of new historical system to build, and how’ (Wallerstein 
1993:5). Others, such as Amin, redefined the de-linking strategy as ‘the rebuilding of 
the world system on the basis of polycentrism’ and, therefore, actually abandoned the 
original meaning—‘a break with the world market’ (Amin 1991a: 84; 1974:35). Still 
others, such as Frank, changed from optimistic to ‘pessimistic because of his 
exaggerated emphasis on these (capitalist) “successes” and his impatience for more
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consistent policies on the part of antisystemic movements’ (Amin, Arrighi, Frank, and 
Wallerstein 1982:243). In such a confusion, developing countries are informed by the 
proponents of the paradigm little more than that they should continue to actively fight 
a ‘shadow-boxing’ battle with the so-called capitalist world system but have no idea 
about where the battle may lead, or they have to passively wait for this capitalist 
world system to pass away but still have no clear ideas about what kind of a new 
system is waiting for them.
We do not live in a capitalist world system but in a global market system. The 
confusion left by the dependency/world-system paradigm could be, it seems to me, 
better clarified in the light of such a worldview. Compared with the 
dependency/world-system paradigm, this worldview has at least two advantages in so 
far as the strategic dimension of the issue is concerned. On the one hand, it allows for, 
as analysed above, parallel tendencies toward convergence and divergence and, 
therefore, possibilities of development on the part of developing countries. The 
possibilities lie in that although participation in the global market economy can 
unequally benefit participant countries, the question of which particular country can 
gain or gain more is not, as dependency/world-system theorists argued, determined, 
but open. That is, it depends upon how the participant countries adapt their 
development strategy to the process of global market integration, expecially how they 
make the best use of market mechanisms in domestic and international economic 
activities. This argument provides, as opposed to the ‘static’, ‘mechanic’, ‘passive’, 
‘pessimistic’, and ‘determinisf arguments of the dependency/world-system paradigm, 
justifications for active development strategies which can better benefit developing 
countries in their participation in the global market economy. On the other hand, it 
distinguishes between the capitalist mode of production and the global market
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economy, allows for the coexistence of many different modes of production within 
the global market economy and, therefore, avoids the ‘utopian’ and ‘unrealistic’ 
views of the paradigm about the future of the system and the corresponding 
development strategies. Accumulating evidence of the increased integration of 
different modes of production in various parts of the world into the global market 
economy suggests that, even though some modes of production within the system 
might pass away as time goes on, the global market economic system has not so far 
developed to its full potential and will continue, contrary to what the 
dependency/world-system theorists predicted, well into the far future. Any country 
that wants to exist and develop in the present world, no matter whether it is a 
developed or developing country and no matter what kind of modes of production it 
has inherited from the past, should adopt ‘pragmatic’ development strategies at both 
the national and international levels to accommodate this reality. Any attempt at de­
linking with the global market economy is doomed to failure. Participation in the 
global market economy is, in a sense, inevitable for all members of the globe at this 
stage, and will continue to be so for a very long period of time to come.
The two debates can, as shown below, help us understand the theoretical 
background and the nature of China’s opening up since 1978, and then proceed to 
evaluate the impact of the opening up on China’s development performance. Each of 
the schools in the debates has its own strong points and weak points, in the meantime 
China’s opening up is well beyond the scope covered by the debates, so the study 
does not intend to verify or falsify any of the schools. In the concluding chapter, 
however, some arguments of these schools are mentioned in passing in the discussion 
on implications of the study for developing countries.
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3 From passive to active participation
China began to open up in 1978 when it adopted reform and open-door polices. This 
is one of the most significant events in the history of the People’s Republic of China 
in that it has involved the most fundamental changes in both domestic and foreign 
policies since the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949 and, therefore, 
signifies a radical change in China’s overall development strategy. How to understand 
China’s opening up from the perspective of a change in the development strategy? 
This is a crucial issue that has been addressed insufficiently so far. In this chapter the 
issue is examined in the light of the debates on participation in the global market 
economy in the field of development studies illustrated in the last chapter, and also in 
the light of the domestic and international backgrounds against which China’s 
strategic change occurred.
Radical strategic change in China
The debates on participation in the global market economy in development studies 
analysed in Chapter 2 shed a great deal of light on China’s radical strategic change 
since 1978. It is argued that underlying the reform and open-door policies has been a 
change in development strategy from socialist de-linking to socialist re-linking with 
market systems both domestically and internationally. From 1978 onward, therefore, 
China began to change from a passive to active participant in the global market 
economy, and opened up to market systems both domestically and internationally. 
The argument provides a basis for us to analyse all the policy changes that China has
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undergone since 1978. Apparently, however, it necessitates not only a comparison 
between the socialist de-linking and the socialist re-linking development strategy in 
the two periods, but also a broad definition of ‘opening up’ in China’s special case.
Socialist de-linking in retrospect
The socialist de-linking strategy has to be located in the context of increased global 
integration. By the twentieth century, globalisation had proceeded to such an extent 
that no country in the world could avoid being involved in the global market 
economic system. A country had to participate, either actively or passively, in the 
global market economy, whether it wanted to or not. Even if a country tried to de-link 
with market systems, as China did in the pre-1978 period, it still had to participate, 
passively though, in the global market economy. The socialist de-linking strategy 
does not mean, therefore, that China did not participate in the global market economy, 
and closed its door to the outside world in the pre-1978 period. Otherwise, China’s 
radical change in development strategy since 1978 cannot be properly understood, 
and the recent controversy over China’s open-door policy cannot be properly solved.
The open-door policy controversy. With the tremendous success of China’s open- 
door policy in the last decade or so, a great deal of attention has been paid to the 
origins and timing of that policy, its scope and dimensions, and its effects and 
consequences. Insufficient effort, however, has been made to analyse the nature of the 
policy change and relate it to other policy changes. This has resulted in considerable 
difficulties in defining and assessing the open-door policy and comparing it with the 
previous approach. Many questions have arisen.
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If the open-door policy simply ‘symbolises China’s sharp turn towards 
participation in the world market to speed up economic growth and technological 
modernisation’ (Riskin 1987:366), then China must have been ‘pursuing an autarchic 
development strategy’ in the previous ‘two decades, during which the door had been 
closed’ (Gittings 1989:227; Promfret 1991:1). This is obviously at odds with the fact 
that China had considerable economic contacts with the rest of the world before 1978 
(especially in the 1950s with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries; in the 
early 1960s, early 1970s, and 1976-1978 with Western countries). If China’s open- 
door policy is simply ‘a vital part of China’s new development strategy of intensive 
growth—growth through adoption and diffusion of technology, especially foreign 
technology’, then the novelty of the open-door is no more than the ‘willingness to 
acquire technology through foreign investment’ since ‘China imported foreign 
technology, including capitalist technology, in Mao’s era’ (Sung 1991:1). Clearly 
China’s open-door policy has many more dimensions than the simple acquisition of 
foreign technology through foreign investment. If China had already had considerable 
economic contact with the rest of the world well before China was generally said to 
initiate the open-door policy in 1978, why is it not possible for us to trace ‘the 
opening up of China to the early 1970s’ as ‘the door had slowly been opening since 
1970, when China began to move back into the world by increasing foreign trade and 
joining the United Nations’ (Brugger and Reglar 1994:1; Bucknall 1989:xvii)? There 
is indeed a degree of confusion about the timing of China’s open-door policy.
It seems that the lack of interest on the part of some China analysts in 
international development theories and realities was partly responsible for these 
difficulties. As Pomfret (1992:2) pointed out:
During the 1980s economists studying the process of economic reform in
China did so in a vacuum. There was little reference either to the literature on
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economic development or to reforms in other centrally planned economies. 
The reason for this lack of comparative analysis appears to have been a belief 
that the Chinese case was sui generis: too different from the market-oriented 
economy assumed in the non-Marxist development literature and from the 
feeble reforms occurring in the USSR or other communist countries before 
1989.
This ‘splendid isolation’ in China studies in the 1980s, described by Pomfret, seemed 
to be changing in the 1990s, but unfortunately has not changed very much. The 
difficulties could be better solved if we take into account the debate on participation 
in the global market economy in development studies.
Before adopting the open-door policy in 1978, China had actually pursued a 
typical comprehensive socialist de-linking development strategy recommended by the 
dependency/world-system school for almost three decades. Although there were 
diverging and changing interpretations and opinions within the school, the original 
meaning of the de-linking strategy was, as analysed previously, to ‘break with the 
world market’ (Amin 1974:35). The core of China’s socialist de-linking strategy over 
that period was to establish a socialist society based upon a planned economic system 
so that China could break with the ‘capitalist’ worldwide market economic system 
domestically and internationally. That socialist de-linking strategy found expressions 
in both China’s domestic and foreign policies, and determined that China’s 
participation in the global market economy could only be passive—passive in the 
sense that China’s economic structure was alien from those prevailing in the world 
market system, China’s attitude towards the existing world market system was radical 
and hostile, China followed an extremely inward-looking ISI trade and development 
pattern, and China’s economic contacts with the rest of the world were thus limited 
and restricted. During that period, China did not in any sense ‘emerge’ in the global 
market economy. To understand China’s opening up since 1978, it is very important
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to analyse China’s passive participation in the previous period in the light of China’s 
overall socialist de-linking orientation in both domestic and foreign policies.
Socialist de-linking in domestic policy. China’s socialist de-linking strategy was 
deeply rooted in the Chinese Communist Party’s understanding of China’s bitter 
experience in the past one hundred years, in orthodox Marxist theory and in the 
available Soviet model in Eastern Europe. It was especially based upon two notions. 
The first concerned the modem world system and China’s position in it. The modem 
world was supposed to be capitalist in nature and had reached, according to Lenin, its 
highest stage by the early twentieth century—the stage of imperialism based upon 
monopoly capitalism. The imperialist powers at the centre of the capitalist world 
system had divided the rest of the world into their colonies and spheres of influence. 
Peripheral countries, including China, were so severely exploited and oppressed by 
imperialist powers that they were actually denied any opportunity of independent 
capitalist development. Capitalist revolution and development in those countries was 
doomed to failure. Only socialist de-linking from the capitalist world system could 
lead those countries to development and prosperity. The second notion referred to an 
ideal type of socialism, and its superiority over capitalism. A capitalist society was 
supposed to operate in an anarchistic market system based upon private ownership, 
punctuated by economic crises of over-production, and characterised by increasing 
polarisation and intensified class struggle. A socialist society, in contrast, was 
supposed to operate in a planned system based upon public ownership, characterised 
by tight control of anarchistic markets until the eventual extinction of all commodity 
relations, and marked by both rapid and sustained economic development and 
increased social equality.
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It was upon the basis of those two notions that Communist leaders concluded 
that ‘only socialism can save China’, and, therefore, started to pursue the socialist de­
linking strategy immediately after they achieved national power in 1949. In domestic 
policy, the de-linking strategy bore three basic characteristics. The first characteristic 
concerned market mechanisms under socialism. Following orthodox Marxist theory 
as specified by the Soviet model, Communist Party leaders believed that in an ideal 
communist society there would be no commodity relations at all: ‘the producers do 
not exchange their products...since now, in contrast to capitalist society, individual 
labour no longer exists in an indirect fashion but directly as a component part of the 
total labour’ (Marx 1972:14-5). Although commodity and market relations were 
accepted to some extent in socialist society—the first stage of communism, they must 
be increasingly limited in scope, gradually eliminated and then replaced by economic 
planning. In short, market mechanisms were supposed to be by nature compatible 
with capitalism and incompatible with socialism. Based upon this assumption, 
mainstream Party leaders tried hard to expand socialist planning and to restrict market 
mechanisms.
The second characteristics related to ownership of the means of production. 
From orthodox Marxist-Leninist theory and the Soviet model, Communist Party 
leaders believed that a socialist planned economy could only be built upon public 
ownership rather than private ownership, since the latter was bound up with market 
anarchy. Due to such a belief, Party leaders considered the establishment of public 
ownership as a central task, and launched one campaign after another to eliminate all 
forms of ownership which were seen as antagonistic to socialism. The ‘socialist 
transformation’ process proceeded in such a rushed way that, by 1957, public 
ownership had been established almost all over the country, despite the fact that total
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socialisation was originally planned to be implemented by 1968. In a nutshell, the 
view animating Party leaders in that period was that the more public the ownership 
became, the better it served socialist development.
The third characteristics concerned class struggle and ‘continuous revolution’. 
From orthodox Marxist theory and the Soviet experience, Communist Party leaders 
believed that class struggle would exist under socialism for a rather long period of 
time, since the vestiges of old societies would continuously give birth to a ‘new 
capitalist class’ and socialism would inevitably meet resistance from internal and 
international capitalist forces. Such class struggles would find expression within the 
Communist Party itself and take the form of ‘two-line struggles’ between ‘capitalist 
roaders’ and those adhering to the socialist road. ‘Continuous revolution’ 
characterised by large-scale class struggle of a mass character, therefore, was needed 
to safeguard China from ‘the restoration of capitalism’. Although Party leaders 
continually stressed economic development as essential to create conditions for 
communism, the emphasis on class struggle submerged considerations of economic 
development. Political campaigns against capitalism in its various forms occurred like 
waves one after another, culminating in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 
(GPCR).
Socialist de-linking in foreign policy. Many efforts have been made in the last few 
decades to analyse the evolution of China’s diplomacy and foreign relations over that 
period and to draw out the difference between that period and the present one; but few 
have done so in the light of China’s overall socialist de-linking strategy. It is crucial 
to remember that China’s overall socialist de-linking strategy determined China’s 
foreign policy. There were two basic characteristics.
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The first was an overwhelming devotion to a worldwide socialist revolution. 
According to Marxism-Leninism, communist movements are international in 
nature—international in the sense that only united efforts of proletarian and other 
oppressed people in the world can defeat the united resistance of the bourgeoisie and 
other ruling classes. Proletarian internationalism was the dominant theme in China’s 
foreign policy. It was believed that the country succeeding first in the socialist 
revolution should actively engage in worldwide revolutionary struggles until the 
whole capitalist world system would be overthrown and replaced by a new 
socialist/communist world system. Such a mission Party leaders referred to as the 
indispensable proletarian internationalist duty. All foreign affairs were considered and 
dealt with in the light of discharging that duty. Considerations of that duty led China 
to ‘lean to one side’ in the 1950s. As the Party saw it: ‘all Chinese without exception 
must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism’ (Mao Zedong 
1968:416). With that notion, too, China began to oppose international ‘revisionism’ 
headed by the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s. Chinese Party leaders considered 
that the Soviet Union had betrayed socialism and had become an enemy as dangerous 
as, or even more dangerous than, the United States to what was considered to be the 
world revolutionary cause. On the basis of that notion, moreover, Chinese leaders 
extensively and enthusiastically supported all struggles in Third World countries 
which it considered ‘revolutionary’. The Party held that the oppressed people in these 
countries constituted the main forces in the struggle against imperialism and social- 
imperialism, and that they would follow China’s example in carrying out socialist 
revolution. This was the basis of China’s radical diplomacy over that period.
The second characteristic was an extremely restrictive attitude towards foreign 
economic relations. It was restrictive, first of all, in the sense that China’s foreign
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economic relations were subordinate to the worldwide socialist revolutionary cause 
mentioned above. Ideological and political factors, therefore, played an overwhelming 
role in China’s economic relations with foreign countries. Consider China’s economic 
relations in the 1950s which were largely restricted to the socialist Eastern bloc to the 
exclusion of almost any economic contact with the capitalist West. Such was the 
consequence of ‘leaning to one side’. Consider also China’s economic relations with 
the Western bloc after the split between China and the Soviet Union in the 1960s. At 
that time China developed economic relations with the West to the exclusion of 
almost any economic contact with the Eastern bloc, especially the Soviet Union. 
China’s economic relations with Third World countries over that period, such as 
China’s aid to Tanzania, Zambia, Viet Nam and Kampuchea, were also mainly 
characterised by subordination to political and ideological considerations.
It was also restricted in the sense that China’s foreign economic relations 
served an excessive self-reliance principle. The principle of self-reliance, developed 
in the pre-liberation period, originally meant relying on one’s own strength in 
political struggles (Mao Zedong 1968:1030). After liberation, however, partly 
because of the embargo on China placed by the United States as well as the conflict 
with the Soviet Union, and partly because of the ultra-leftist and idealist tendency 
within the Chinese Communist Party, that principle was applied to the economic field 
to such an extent that it actually denied the benefits of ordinary economic cooperation 
with other countries and international organisations. This trend culminated in the 
Cultural Revolution when China imposed on itself ‘a greater degree of economic 
isolation than was either desirable for growth or necessary for self-reliance’ (Riskin 
1987:209). Consider for a moment the Tangshan earthquake in the summer of 1976. 
In the wake of that catastrophe in which nearly half a million people died, the Chinese
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authorities refused any foreign aid. Such an excessive emphasis on self-reliance found 
expression in almost all fields of China’s foreign economic relations.
Lastly, it was restrictive in the sense that China’s foreign economic relations 
were under the influence of foreign trade theories which denied the benefits of the 
international division of labour. Structuralist theories of unequal exchange and a 
deterioration in the terms of trade prevailed in Chinese economic thinking in that 
period. If international trade was unequal, then it must be associated with cross­
country exploitation. It followed that if China developed international trade, then it 
must either exploit or be exploited by other countries. Neither was compatible with 
China’s socialist revolutionary ideology. The Chinese authorities believed, therefore, 
that China must only engage in equal foreign trade, and that a trade balance is the sole 
indicator of such trade. A trade deficit or a surplus indicates benefits to one party and 
losses to the other (Writers Group 1974-5:10; Wei Bingkui 1974:85; Liu Chaochin 
1978:9—10; Ma Shuyun 1986:297). Under the influence of such trade theories and the 
above-mentioned excessive self-reliance principle, China’s foreign trade was very 
limited, to the extent that imports only made up for shortages in domestic production 
while exports were only a means to provide foreign currency for imports. As a result, 
China actually adopted an inward-looking ISI trade and development pattern to 
increase its capacity for self-sufficiency, and failed to make full use of foreign trade 
to accelerate economic development. One of the indicators of such failure was 
China’s decreasing share in the total value of world trade: from 1.4 per cent in the 




The underlying assumption of the socialist de-linking strategy was, as seen above, 
that a ‘socialist’ planned economic system is different from, and opposite to, a 
‘capitalist’ market economic system. To the extent that this underlying assumption, as 
well as all the five basic characteristics of China’s overall socialist de-linking strategy 
analysed previously, has been under attack and has gradually lost legitimacy in China 
since 1978, the de-linking strategy has been gradually replaced by a re-linking 
strategy. In the strategic change, as seen below, China has deradicalised and 
reoriented its domestic and foreign policies, and has begun to be characterised, like 
most countries in the world, as having a ‘mixed economy’ combining market and 
planning on the one hand and diversifying ownership of the means of production on 
the other. China has begun to open up to market systems both domestically and 
internationally, and China’s participation in the global market economy has become 
active.
Socialist re-linking in domestic policy. As the socialist de-linking strategy in the 
period from 1949 to 1978 took shape within a complex national and international 
context, so has the socialist re-linking strategy since 1978. A detailed analysis of the 
national and international impetuses behind the strategic change is left to the next 
sections, but suffice it to say that the socialist de-linking strategy which China 
pursued for almost 30 years had created tremendous economic and political problems 
by the end of the 1970s. Rigid central economic planning and monolithic public 
ownership depressed producers’ enthusiasm for production and reduced economic 
efficiency, resulting in a continuing fall in the growth rate of total output value of
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society (TOVS) and national income (NI) in ‘Five Year Plan’ periods.1 Violent and 
fanatic class struggles and ‘continuous revolution’ led to periodic political and social 
chaos and, therefore, exacerbated the situation. Thus, the three basic characteristics of 
socialist de-linking in domestic policy, analysed above, were challenged immediately 
after the realistic and pragmatic tendency headed by Deng Xiaoping took power in 
1978.
Productive forces and modernisation first. The first characteristic to come 
under attack was the over-emphasis on class struggle and ‘continuous revolution’. In 
early 1978, a number of articles appeared in Jingji yanjiu (Economic Research) to 
question the theoretical assumptions of such over-emphasis, stressing instead the 
importance of productive forces (Xu Dixin 1978; Lin Zilin and You Lin 1978; Zhang 
Wen 1978). These criticisms were, however, quite tentative and reserved, since Mao 
Zedong’s statement of ‘class struggle as the key link’ was still honoured by the 
‘whateverists’ headed by Hua Guofeng, then Chairman of the Communist Party. The 
‘whateverists’ were denounced at the Third Plenum in 1978, when a decision was 
made to abandon Mao Zedong’s position and shift the focus of the Party to economic 
development. The development of ‘productive forces’ and the implementation of the 
‘socialist four modernisations’ would, it was said, outweigh class struggle and 
political campaigns in China’s overall new development strategy (Renmin ribao 25 
Dec 1978:4). After the Plenum, despite some criticisms, such an official position did 
not provoke fierce debate among theorists, especially economists. This was partly
1 The growth rates of TOVS and national income fell from 11.3 per cent and 8.9 per cent in the First 
Five Year Plan period (1953-1957) to 0.4 per cent and -3.1 per cent in the Second Five Year Plan 
period (1958-1962), respectively. The situation was so serious that the long-term economic planning 
had to be given up in the period between 1963 and 1965 which saw an increase in the growth rates of 
TOVS and national income, 15.5 per cent and 14.7 per cent, respectively. After the long-term 
economic planning was resumed, however, growth rates fell once again: the Third Five Year Plan 
period (1966-1970) saw a decrease in the growth rates of TOVS and national income, 9.3 per cent and 
8.3 per cent, respectively; and the Fourth Five Year Plan period (1971-75) witnessed a further 
decrease, 7.3 per cent and 5.5 per cent, respectively (see Ma Yuping and Huang Yuchong 1989:581).
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because they were concerned over the serious economic situation, and partly because 
they disliked intensely the political tension caused by previous class struggles. After 
all most were victims of such struggles. As to how to develop the productive forces 
and implement socialist modernisations, however, debates occurred which demanded 
abandoning other basic characteristics of the socialist de-linking strategy.
Combination of market and planning. The second characteristic under 
criticism was the assumed antithesis between a ‘socialist’ planned economy and a 
‘capitalist’ market economy. The criticism mainly concentrated on two issues. The 
first was the relationship between market mechanisms and planning. Some argued 
that market mechanisms and planning permeate each other or are ‘rubber-glued’ 
together. They are equal in importance, equal in the sense that they are 
complementary, correcting each other’s imperfections (Liu Guoguang and Zhao 
Renwei 1979; He Jianzhang, Wang Jiye, and Wu Kaitai 1980). Others advocated the 
precedence of planning over market mechanisms, arguing for ‘planned economy in 
the main and market regulation as the supplement’, likening a market-planning 
relationship to ‘a bird in a cage’ (Chen Yun 1986:12-3, 275-80; Renmin ribao 6 Jan 
1982:1). Still others believed that both market and planning are not fundamental 
attributes of economic systems but merely methods or managerial processes which 
can be used by different economic systems, socialism and capitalism alike (Gao 
Shangqing 1988:23-6). These three approaches can be said to represent the 
mainstream pro-market trend after 1978, as opposed to a small counter-current which 
continued to highlight the planned nature of socialist economic system. It was 
obvious that the degree of the pro-market tendency differed between the three 
approaches. The official position vacillated between the more market-oriented and the
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less market-oriented in accordance with China’s economic cycles in the period, but 
the former increasingly dominated as reform went on.
The second issue concerned the dimensions of market and planning 
respectively. For the former, some insisted on the orthodox Soviet view that the 
market under socialism is only a limited commodity market; the means of production 
is excluded from that market (Sun Yefang 1979; Gao Zhihua 1980). Critics argued 
that not only commodities, but also most productive resources such as labour, capital, 
funds, foreign exchange and the like should enter the market (Liu Guoguang 1979; 
Feng Baoxing, Wang Xin and Cheng Dajian 1979; He Wei 1986). The official 
position was in favour of the latter view. By the late 1980s, the market in China had 
expanded so rapidly that it included almost all resources to different degrees. As for 
the dimensions of planning, under critique was the orthodox Soviet view that socialist 
planning is basically mandatory, with compulsory targets for production and 
distribution. Critics argued that such mandatory planning was mainly responsible for 
the bad economic performance in previous years and, therefore, should be limited and 
reduced in favour of a new type of socialist planning—guidance planning, with only 
suggested targets. They believed that guidance planning (through economic levers 
such as prices, taxes, credit, and interest rates) allows the market mechanism to play a 
dominant role in economic development, and is the best way to combine market and 
planning to raise productivity. Such a position was increasingly accepted by the 
majority of economists and policymakers (Renmin ribao 6 Sept 1982; Beijing Review 
13 Sept 1982; Xie Yuhu 1982; Zhao Renwei 1985). As a result of these discussions, 
the beliefs that the planned economy is equal to socialism and that the market 
economy is equal to capitalism have been abandoned. Since 1978, China’s economy 
has developed more and more in a market-oriented direction. In 1992, Party leaders
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called for the establishment of ‘a socialist commodity economy’ and, therefore, 
officially affirmed the central role of market mechanisms in China’s socialist 
economic system and its overall development strategy.
Diversification of ownership. The third characteristic under attack related to 
public ownership of the means of production. As the belief in ‘exclusive’, ‘pure’ and 
‘monolithic’ socialist planning was undermined, so was that in ‘exclusive’, ‘pure’ and 
‘monolithic’ socialist public ownership of the means of production. The challenge 
was aimed first of all at previous public ownership: collective and state ownership. 
Collective ownership was challenged by the experimental rural reform of the 
‘contract production responsibility system’, initiated in 1978 by Wan Li and Zhao 
Ziyang in Anhui and Sichuan provinces where they were First Party Secretaries 
respectively. Although ownership of the land was still formally vested in communes 
(and later villages), the reform actually meant, as White (1993:100) noted, ‘a return to 
household agriculture’, and ‘set in train a d e  f a c to  decollectivisation of agriculture’. 
Despite some opposition, the reform proved to be a success in raising productivity 
and, therefore, gained support from the Chinese authorities. By the end of 1983, the 
reform had spread all over the country. State ownership was questioned mainly on the 
empirical ground that it had proven to be one of the main, if not the root, causes of all 
problems in China’s previous economic development.2 Two reform approaches were 
proposed. Some advocated changing state ownership into ‘workers’ ownership’, 
‘three-level ownership’, ‘enterprise ownership’, ‘share-holding ownership’ or even 
‘private ownership’ (Dong Fureng 1979; Li Weisen 1986; Jiang Yiwei 1987; He Wei
2 According to China’s official data (Wang Bingqian 1989:2; 1990: ix-xii; 1991:34-7; Ministry of 
Finance General Planning Department 1989:16-7), government subsidies to financial losses incurred 
by state-owned enterprises increased from about 12.5 billion yuan in 1978 to about 60 billion yuan in 
1989. This supported the World Bank’s assessment that the state-owned enterprises are a significant 
drain on the economy and a prime contributor to high and rising rates of inflation as the government 
must print money to cover the financial losses of these enterprises (World Bank 1994).
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1986; Shen Shouye 1987; Wall Street Journal 19 Feb 1988:16). Others advocated
reform of management without changing the nature of state ownership. Such 
management reform actually meant, imitating the reform in collective ownership, a 
‘separation of two rights’ (ownership rights and management rights) in the form of a 
‘management contract responsibility system’. The latter approach gained support 
from the authorities (Renmin ribao 26 Aug 1984; 12 Jan 1987), and by the late 1980s, 
the system had been adopted by most medium-size and small-size state enterprises.
The challenge continued with a reconsideration of other forms of ownership, 
especially private and share-holding ownership. Despite some criticisms, the 
necessity for private and share-holding ownership in China was increasingly accepted 
by most economists. They advocated ‘long-term coexistence and mutual competition’ 
between private and state enterprises, though the ‘negative influence’ of private 
ownership should be curbed (Guangming ribao 8 Nov 1986; 19 Sept 1987; Beijing 
Review 12 May 1986; Shijie jingji daobao 13 July 1987). They pointed to advantages 
of share-holding ownership, such as pooling idle financial resources for investment, 
and promoting workers’ participation in management (Beijing Review 12 May 1986; 
27 Dec 1986; Guangming ribao 6 Dec 1986; Jingji ribao 8 Nov 1988; Remin ribao 
26 Sept 1986). The Chinese government supported this position. In the late 1987, the 
Thirteenth Party Congress officially endorsed share-holding ownership. In April 
1988, the Seventh National People’s Congress revised the state Constitution to permit 
the existence and development of privately owned enterprises (Article ll) .3 
Meanwhile, especially into the 1990s, as an increasing number of state-owned 
enterprises made losses, various versions of de facto denationalisation of small-size 
and medium-size state-owned enterprises were endorsed by the government.
3 By 1988, the number of privately owned (including individually owned) enterprises increased to more 
than 14 millions (Lu Xueyi and Li Peilin 1991:25).
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Socialist re-linking in foreign policy. Changes in China’s domestic policy demanded 
corresponding changes in foreign policy. As socialist de-linking gave way to socialist 
re-linking in domestic policymaking, it also gave way in China’s foreign 
policymaking. China’s socialist re-linking in foreign policy consisted mainly of the 
following two elements.
Independent and modernisation-oriented diplomacy. The shift of focus 
from class struggle to modernisation in 1978 signified, among other things, the 
beginning of ideological deradicalisation of China’s domestic policy. However, 
corresponding ideological deradicalisation of China’s diplomacy did not occur until 
1982. As late as 1981, Party leaders still insisted on Mao Zedong’s theory of three 
worlds as the basis of a diplomatic strategy of a worldwide, united revolutionary front 
against ‘imperialism’ and ‘hegemonism’.4 The discrepancy in timing between 
ideological deradicalisation in China’s domestic policy and in China’s diplomacy may 
possibly be explained by the new Party leaders’ security concerns. The Soviet 
Union’s expansion into China’s neighbours such as Afghanistan and Indo-China 
countries, especially the Soviet Union’s support for Vietnam in its military conflict 
with China, threatened China’s security, and led Party leaders to believe that it was 
necessary to continue to maintain a strong anti-imperialist and anti-hegemonist 
ideological theme in its diplomacy in order to isolate the Soviet Union.
But after 1982, with detente between China and the Soviet Union, China’s 
diplomacy began to be deradicalised. On the one hand, China adopted an independent 
diplomacy in order to avoid a pseudo-alliance with either of the two superpowers. On
4 The continuing insistence on that revolutionary diplomacy was revealed in the Party’s ‘Resolution on 
Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China’ 
passed at the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Congress in 1981. In that document, many of Mao’s 
policies were criticised, but not his diplomatic strategy (Beijing Review 6 July 1981).
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the other hand, China withdrew from promoting radical worldwide revolution against 
imperialism and hegemonism. Such was the result of perceived changes in the global 
strategic balance. It was also dictated by China’s overall socialist re-linking 
development strategy, since modernisation could not be implemented in an 
antagonistic international environment. Underlying such a shift was a change in the 
guideline of China’s diplomacy: ‘discharging indispensable proletarian international 
duty’ was replaced by ‘discharging our lofty international duty to safeguard world 
peace and promote human progress’ (Beijing Review 17 Sept 1982). The ideological 
deradicalisation of China’s diplomacy was no doubt a part of, and also served, 
China’s new overall development strategy of socialist re-linking with the worldwide 
market economic system, since it implied that China had to change from opposing to 
accepting the existing global market system.5
Open attitude toward foreign economic relations. Socialist re-linking in 
domestic policy demanded not only a change from a ‘revolutionary’ to a 
‘modernisation-oriented’ diplomacy, but also a change from a restrictive to an open 
attitude toward foreign economic relations. Unlike the former, however, the latter 
occurred simultaneously with the change in domestic policy. At the Third Plenum of 
the Eleventh Central Committee, Party leaders declared that China would actively 
expand economic cooperation on terms of equality and mutual benefit with other 
countries and strive to adopt the world’s advanced technologies (,Beijing Review 29 
Dec 1978:11). The decision made at the Plenum signified the official endorsement of 
the open-door policy. China’s open-door policy was later clearly defined by Deng 
Xiaoping as ‘economic opening-up to the outside world’ (Deng Xiaoping 1985:19).
By 1982, China’s exports to market economies had accounted for 93.4 per cent of China’s total 
exports, a striking contrast with the 1950s when it accounted only for about 26 per cent. (Bucknall 
1989:195). Under such a circumstance, China had to change fundamentally its attitude towards the 
global market system.
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The official endorsement of the ‘economic open-door’ in 1978 set off a chain 
of criticisms of the previous restrictive attitude toward foreign economic relations. 
The first point under attack was the over-emphasis on self-reliance. It was argued that 
the principle of self-reliance was so badly misunderstood in the previous period, 
especially during the Cultural Revolution, that it was tantamount to ‘closing the 
country to international intercourse’ and that self-reliance does not contradict 
expanding economic cooperation with foreign countries in the fields of trade, finance, 
labour, aid, technology and sciences and so on (Hu Yaobang 1986). The second point 
under attack was the superiority of political over economic considerations in foreign 
affairs. It was argued that foreign economic relations should no longer be influenced 
nor determined by politics and diplomacy; that ideological factors should be 
downgraded in China’s economic relations with foreign countries; that China should 
develop economic relations with all countries in the world no matter what social 
system they have; and that China’s support for the ‘revolutionary cause’ in other 
countries should take into consideration mutual economic benefits (Hu Yaobang 
1986). The third point under challenge was the previous foreign trade theory and the 
trade and development pattern based upon it. Due to its increasing importance, this 
will be analysed in detail here.
The challenge started with a reassessment of the structuralist theory of 
unequal exchange and the classical and neoclassical economists’ theory of 
comparative advantage. The structuralist theory of unequal exchange was criticised 
for various reasons, but unequal exchange between developed and developing 
countries was still adhered to by most Chinese economists. They differed, however, 
on what caused the unequal exchange (Yuan Wenqi 1980:13; Gao Dichen 1983:18; 
Tao Yongyin 1983:10; Chen Longshen 1983:21-3). Despite the difference, they
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agreed that the existence of unequal exchange between developed and developing 
countries does not mean that the latter cannot benefit from international trade. It only 
means that gains from international trade are unequally distributed between them. 
This argument was first of all based upon the classical and neoclassical economists’ 
theory of comparative advantage, which was believed to be compatible with 
Marxism. Thus a consensus was reached among most Chinese economists that 
international trade has the dual nature of mutual benefit and unequal exchange (Jingji 
ribao 21 May 1987; Yao Zengyin 1983:1-3, Li Chenglin 1983:12). Such a consensus, 
as Ma Shuyun (1986:293) noted, could save China from making the difficult choice 
between ‘exploit’ and ‘be exploited’. With the dilemma overcome, the previous 
restrictive attitude toward foreign trade was criticised. It was argued that foreign 
trade, based upon comparative advantage, should make the best use of the 
international division of labour in order to actively promote national economic 
development—actively in the sense that ‘exports are not only the means to earn 
foreign currency necessary for imports, but also the means to promote technological 
transformation and structural reform of the national economy’, and in the sense that 
‘imports not only meet the needs in domestic market and production but also actively 
serve expanding exports’ (Wang Shaxi, Wang Shouchun, and Xu Yu 1992:28-9). 
This position gained overwhelming support from the authorities.
The challenge continued with a reevaluation of trade and development 
patterns. On the one hand, some criticised the previous inward-looking ISI trade and 
development pattern for leading to low product quality, high costs, lack of efficiency, 
and shortage of foreign exchange. They advocated, therefore, an outward-looking 
export-oriented trade and development pattern (Huang Fangyi 1985). On the other 
hand, others argued that, considering China’s size, the inward-looking ISI trade and
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development pattern should be China’s long-term orientation (Liu Changli 1987). 
Most Chinese economists, however, considered that there is no inherent 
incompatibility between these two patterns, that they both have their own strong 
points and shortcomings, and that they can be combined on a selective basis (Teng 
Weizao 1982; Li Yining 1989; Huang Shanhe 1988). The Party leaders in general 
supported that position and encouraged different regions to adopt different trade and 
development patterns. In view of the tremendous problems caused by the previous 
inward-looking IS I trade and development pattern, they proposed an ‘economic 
development strategy in coastal areas’ in late 1987. The essence of that strategy was 
that the coastal areas should develop in an outward-looking direction, import raw 
materials for home-processing but export the final products in the world market 
(Renmin ribao 23 Jan 1988; 30 Jan 1988). Despite some criticisms, such an outward­
looking trade and development pattern was endorsed by the Party Politburo in 
February 1988.
As analysed above, underlying China’s reform and open-door policies has 
been a change from a socialist de-linking to a socialist re-linking development 
strategy—re-linking China’s version of socialism with market systems both 
domestically and internationally, or from passive to active participation in the global 
market economy. In the context of the strategic change, ‘opening up’ should be 
understood as opening up to market systems both domestically and internationally, 
not as only opening up to the outside world. Therefore, an opening economy should 
be taken as an economy re-linking with, or opening up to, market systems both 
domestically and internationally, or an economy participating actively in the global 
market economy, or an economy undergoing a process of accelerated marketisation at 
both the national and the international level, or an economy undergoing a transition to
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market systems both domestically and internationally. Such a conception of opening
up is applied throughout the study.
Domestic impetus to the strategic change
China’s re-linking development strategy since 1978, outlined above, can be generally 
seen as a fundamental break from the dominant policies in the previous period; but 
some of the elements had already appeared before 1978. As Feuchtwang and Hussain 
(1983:3) noted:
The policies which have been introduced in China since 1976—in particular 
since 1978—are not all new. Most have either been tried—albeit for a short 
period of time—or proposed before—albeit rejected and denounced.
This suggests that the strategic change in the late 1970s was, first of all, the result of
domestic political and economic developments in the Republic, especially the
struggles within the Communist Party.
Political and economic developments in the People’s Republic of China after 
1949 were largely characterised by an enthusiastic pursuit of socialism, by intraparty 
conflicts between idealist and realist tendencies resulting in fluctuations in economic 
performance, and by a shift in dominance from the idealist to the realist tendency in 
the late 1970s.6 The idealists tended to insist primarily on an ideal type of communist 
society as the basis of their policymaking, and rely mainly on ideological motivations 
and political movements to achieve, as soon as possible, an utopian ‘commodity-free’ 
and ‘class-free’ society in China. That tendency held the upper hand in the period 
between 1949 and 1978 as a whole, providing the political basis for China’s passive
6 The distinction made here between idealist and realist tendencies, like any generalisation, may run the 
risk of oversimplification. To minimise the risk, I use the word ‘tendencies’, for clearly the 
components have been changing over time. As is well known, politicians change their positions from 
time to time, and that has been especially true of the Chinese politicians in the intra-party struggle
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participation and socialist de-linking strategy at the time. The realists tended to insist 
primarily on the backward reality of the Chinese society as the basis of their 
policymaking, and allow a role for market mechanisms and class pluralism in China’s 
development. This tendency emerged first in the 1950s and gained the upper hand 
from the late 1970s onwards, providing the main domestic impetus to China’s change 
toward active participation and a socialist re-linking strategy. The conflicts between 
the two tendencies were complex, involving many issues. To highlight the conflicts, 
attention is concentrated on two ‘winds’ which swept across the whole country: the 
‘communist wind’ and the ‘revolution wind’.
‘Communist wind’ and resistance to it
‘Communist wind’ refers to an over-optimistic and over-zealous mood concerning 
communism and socialism (as its first stage) among mainstream Party leaders which, 
though also found in other periods of time, culminated in the Socialist High Tide, the 
Great Leap Forward and the People’s Commune movements in the 1950s. That period 
is very important in the history of the People’s Republic in that it saw the first open 
confrontation between idealist and realist tendencies within the Party since 1949.
In the view of mainstream Party leaders, the establishment of the People’s 
Republic in 1949 signified the end of a ‘new democratic’ phase and the beginning of 
a socialist and communist era in the Chinese revolution. From then on, the main task 
of the Party was ‘to transform China from an agricultural to an industrial country, 
from a ‘new democratic’ to a socialist and communist society, and eventually to
since 1949. To minimise simplification, I identify within each of the tendencies two groups— ‘radicals’ 
and ‘moderates’, that is, radical and moderate idealists, and radical and moderate realists.
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abolish classes and bring about Great Harmony (Mao Zedong 1961:1369).7 After 
three years (1949-52), which saw the ‘recovery of the national economy’, therefore, 
the Party leaders began to launch large-scale movements of ‘socialist transformation’ 
and ‘socialist construction’ to achieve that goal.
The concrete content of socialist transformation and construction in the 1950s 
was to establish the planned economic system and public ownership of the means of 
production so as to achieve economic and social developments at a high speed. 
Economic planning and the socialisation of the means of production actually began 
well before 1953, even before 1949 in some ‘liberated areas’. At that time, however, 
economic planning was confined either to regional experiments or to short-term 
expedients. Socialisation, moreover, was, basically confined to the confiscation of 
‘bureaucratic and comprador capital’ and the purchase of existing foreign capital. 
‘National capitalist enterprises’ and individual businesses in the cities were allowed to 
exist, and individual household ownership in the countryside was encouraged after 
‘land reform’. It was only with the First Five Year Plan for National Economic 
Development, proclaimed in 1953 but only published two years later, that China 
started its long-term planning for national economic development and accelerate 
ownership change. The First Five Year Plan concentrated more on social 
transformation than on economic development, for two of its three main tasks 
concerned the transformation of the means of production from private (including 
individual) to public ownership both in cities and in the countryside.8 The salience 
accorded to ownership change in the First Five Year Plan reflected the Party’s firm 
belief that socialist economic development in a planned way could only be based
7 The ideal of ‘great harmony’ (datong) was a view of a perfect society perceived by Chinese 
intellectuals in the past. It had different meanings in different periods of Chinese history. Here Mao
Zedong, from a Marxist perspective, referred to a classless Communist society.
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upon public ownership of the means of production (see, for example, Mao Zedong 
1955; 1967).
The transformation of ownership was originally planned, under the influence 
of the realist tendency, as a very long process; but it actually proceeded, under the 
influence of an idealist tendency, at a very high speed. The conflict between realist 
and idealist tendencies rose to the surface in that process, and intensified over the 
issue of rural collectivisation.8 9 The First Five Year Plan showed a great degree of 
realism and pragmatism, stipulating that only one-third of peasant households would 
join the semi-socialist elementary Agricultural Producers Cooperatives (APCs) by 
1957. Guided by the Plan, collectivisation in the countryside went on slowly and 
steadily. Any ‘rash advance’ was criticised and many ‘premature cooperatives’ were 
dissolved in the spring of 1955. That realist tendency was represented at that time 
mainly by Chen Yun (Vice-Premier, in charge of drafting the Plan) and Deng Zihui 
(Vice-Premier, in charge of rural affairs). But their ‘gradualist’ policy of rural 
collectivisation gained considerable support from other top Party leaders such as Liu 
Shaoqi (Vice-Chairman of the People’s Republic and Chairman of the National 
People’s Congress), Zhou Enlai (Premier), Deng Xiaoping (Vice-Premier), Li Fuchun 
(Vice-Premier), and Li Xiannian (Vice-Premier). Underlying the realist tendency’s 
rural policy was the assumption that China was too backward to advance toward rural 
collectivisation at the high speed experienced by the Soviet Union, that rural 
collectivisation should be based upon the development of the productive forces 
(especially industrialisation), and that any attempt to eradicate rural private ownership
8 The third task was to lay down the foundation of socialist industrialisation by establishing hundreds 
of construction projects with assistance from the Soviet Union.
9 Basically, due to the confiscation of ‘bureaucrat and comprador capital’, public ownership had been 
predominant in industry, transportation, commerce and finance by the end of 1952. In the countryside, 
however, there were only a few ‘semi-socialist’ elementary cooperatives; individual household
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before the ‘necessary conditions’ were ready was a ‘utopian conception of 
agricultural socialism’ (see, for example, Deng Zihui 1954; Liu Shaoqi 1951a; 1951b; 
1956). That assumption and the policy based upon it was, however, increasingly 
challenged by a rising idealistic tendency within the Communist Party represented 
mainly by Mao Zedong (Chairman of the Party).
Beginning from July 1955, Mao Zedong made a series of speeches and 
comments to attack the realists’ policy of gradual rural collectivisation, and called for 
a ‘socialist high tide’ in China’s countryside. Underlying Mao Zedong’s argument 
was the assumption that rural collectivisation should advance side-by-side with 
industrialisation or even precede it, as had occurred in the Soviet Union, that private 
ownership should be eliminated through collectivisation so as to ensure an ideal type 
of socialist equality, that China’s backwardness was not an obstacle but an impetus to 
rural collectivisation since ‘poverty gives rise to a desire for change’ toward 
socialism, and that rural collectivisation could be completed very quickly through 
mobilising this desire among the masses to the effect that China could reach 
communism in the near future (Mao Zedong 1967:329-34; 1955; see also Hu Hua 
1985:102). By that time (1955), Mao Zedong had actually begun to be overwhelmed 
by an over-optimistic and over-zealous mood toward communism, saying that ‘fifty 
years from now, a communist China will emerge’ (Joint Publications Research 
Service 1974:26, 210-1, 394; see also Gurley 1976:228). He criticised realists as 
‘rightist conservatives’, ‘tottering along like a woman with bound feet, always 
complaining that others are going too fast’ (Mao Zedong 1967; 1955). Under the 
influence of Mao Zedong, the idealist tendency gained the upper hand within the
ownership prevailed. Rural collectivisation, therefore, became the focus of China’s transformation of 
ownership, and thus the focus of political conflicts in the 1950s.
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Party and the tempo of rural collectivisation was speeded up.10 By the end of 1956, 
rural collectivisation was claimed to be basically completed: 87.8 per cent of China’s 
peasant households had joined socialist advanced APCs, and most of the rest had 
joined semi-socialist elementary APCs. The socialist transformation of handicrafts 
and the remainder of private industry and commerce, influenced by the ‘socialist high 
tide’ in the countryside, was also claimed to have been basically completed by that 
time. 92.2 per cent of people engaged in handicrafts joined the ‘handicraft producers 
cooperatives’, 99 per cent of private industrialists and 85 per cent of private 
merchants joined joint state-private enterprises (Yang Qinwei, Chen Rongxun, and 
Yuan Zhishun 1990:47-50).
The ‘socialist high tide’ of 1955-1956 was the first open manifestation of an 
over-optimistic and over-zealous mood within the Party, a prelude to the ‘communist 
wind’ in China. It swept across the countryside in such a hasty manner that many 
peasants were forced to join the APCs, surrender their properties without due 
compensation, and invest their money against their will. Many APCs were short of 
experienced cadres to do routine work such as planning and accounting. Serious 
management problems ensued. Industrial crops and subsidiary occupations were 
neglected, and the supply of raw materials for industry and export was severely 
affected (Xinhua 19 June 1956; Dagongbao 1 May 1956; Deng Zihui 1956; Chang 
1975:22-3). As a result, the rash advance met resistance among both peasants and 
some Party members. Peasants, under threat, slaughtered their livestock and draught 
animals, withdrew their savings from the banks, concealed their money and other 
properties, and disobeyed the APCs’ orders and rules (Renmin ribao 18 Dec 1955; 17
10 After July 1955, many top Party leaders who had been in favour of the gradualist policy changed 
their position to support Mao Zedong’s radical policy of rural collectivisation. The plan for rural 
collectivisation was modified several times in that period; each time, the planned date for completion 
was advanced (see Chang 1975).
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May 1956; 19 April 1957; Xinhua 26 Dec 1955; 19 June 1956; Chang 1975:22). The 
realist tendency within the Party criticised the over-optimistic and over-zealous mood 
as ‘reckless advance’ in socialist development, and attacked those who attempted to 
fulfil socialist development programs ‘with a single stroke in two or three months’
(Renmin ribao 20 June 1956; Xinhua 4 April 1956). The realists’ counter-attack was 
so strong that it even gained the upper hand temporarily at the Communist Party’s 
Eighth Congress in September 1956, which ‘was characterised by realism and 
moderation’ (Chang 1975:30)." To the ‘idealists’, however, the rapid completion of 
the socialist transformation during the ‘socialist high tide’ doubtless proved their 
radical approach to socialist development to be correct. Resistance and criticism were 
merely the expressions of the ‘spontaneous force of capitalism’ among peasants or the 
‘rightist conservatism’ within the Party. To defeat them and to promote socialist 
development, more radical mass movements were needed.12
In 1958, ‘idealists’, headed by Mao Zedong, initiated the Great Leap Forward 
and the People’s Commune movement. A ‘communist wind’ swept over all the 
country, city and countryside alike. The over-optimistic and over-zealous mood 
toward communism underlying the movements was partly inspired by the Soviet 
Union’s launch of Sputnik on 4 October 1957, which signified, in the idealists’ eyes, 
that the balance of forces in the world had shifted in favour of what then characterised 
the ‘socialist camp’. In November 1957, Mao Zedong stated with certainty, in 
Moscow, that ‘the East wind is prevailing over the West wind’ and that China would 
surpass Britain in the output of steel, iron and other important industrial products in 
about fifteen years (Chang 1975:39; Yang Qinwen, Chen Rongxun, and Yuan
11 The ‘realist tendency’ at the conference was demonstrated in Liu Shaoqi’s ‘Political Report’, Zhou 
Enlai’s ‘Report on the Proposal for the Second Five Year Plan’, Chen Yun’s, Li Xiannian’s and Bo 
Yibo’s speeches and various documents passed by the Congress.
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Zhishun 1990:82). At the Second Session of the Party’s Eighth Congress in May 
1958, in which the idealist tendency gained the upper hand, some radical idealists 
even claimed that it was possible to overtake Britain in about five years, and the 
United States in about fifteen years (Yang Qinwen, Chen Rongxun, and Yuan 
Zhishun 1990:84). After the Second Session of the Congress, the Great Leap and 
people’s commune movements began to gain momentum.
The objective of the Great Leap Forward was outlined in the Party’s new 
‘General Line for Socialist Construction’, proposed by Mao Zedong and passed by 
the Second Session, namely, ‘go all out, aim high, and achieve greater, faster, better 
and more economical results in building socialism’. The core of the General Line was 
to achieve ‘high speed’ in socialist development through mobilising the socialist 
consciousness of the masses (Yang Qinwen, Chen Rongxun, and Yuan Zhishun 
1990:83^4). The Great Leap Forward was aimed at achieving rapid socialist 
development in the forces of production. Many unrealistic targets were set for 
industry and agriculture, such as doubling the output of steel, and increasing the 
output of agricultural products many times in the single year of 1958. The People’s 
Communes were designed to achieve socialist development in relations of production 
in order to prepare for the transition to communism in the near future. The Party’s 
‘Resolution on the Establishment of People’s Communes in Rural Areas’ (Renmin 
ribao 10 Sept 1958) predicted that ‘the attainment of communism in China is no 
longer a remote future event. We should actively use the form of the people’s 
communes to explore the practical road of transition to communism’. Actually, at the 
peak of the Great Leap, the over-optimistic and over-zealous mood toward
12 Mao Zedong, on several occasions, later openly blamed the realists for their move against ‘reckless- 
advance’ (Yang Qinwei, Chen Rongxun, and Yuan Zhishun 1990:81-3).
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communism was so strong that the Party’s newspaper Renmin ribao (6 Aug 1958) 
even confidently proclaimed:
China is moving forward at the speed of space flight. Not long ago, peasants 
in their fifties were worried that they might not last long enough to see the 
good days of communism. Now even octogenarians and nonagenarians firmly 
believe that they will enjoy the happiness of communism. Indeed, some old 
men believe that they are already living in the communist age.
Such an over-optimistic and over-zealous mood stirred up the ‘communist wind’
during the Great Leap and People’s Commune movements.
The consequences of the movements were disastrous. In pursuit of high
production targets, the overall economic growth rate did rise (TOVS rose from 213.8
billion yuan in 1958 to 267.9 billion yuan in I960),13 but the improved figures masked
considerable degrees of statistical exaggeration and sectoral imbalances. From 1958
to 1960, for instance, the total value of output of industry rose from 108.3 to 163.7
billion yuan, while the total value of output of agriculture fell from 56.6 to 45.7
billion yuan', the total value of output of heavy industry rose from 58 to 109 billion
yuan, whereas the total value of output of light industry rose only from 50.3 to 54.7
billion yuan', the accumulation ratio rose from 23.9 to 39.6 per cent, while the
consumption ratio fell from 66.1 to 60.4 per cent (Ma Yuping and Huang Yuchong
1989:573-98).
The negative effect of the imbalanced economic development was later clearly 
demonstrated in the two years immediately following the Great Leap: from 1960 to 
1962, TOVS fell from 267 to 180 billion yuan, national income fell from 120 to 92.4 
billion yuan, per capita income fell from 183 to 139 yuan, and the value of imports 
and exports fell from 12.8 to 8.1 billion yuan (Ma Yuping and Huang Yuchong
13 Total output value of society. China did not have statistics of GNP or GDP before 1978, so we have 
to use TOVS instead (Statistical Yearbook of China 1984-1993).
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1989:573-98).14 In pursuit of the transition to communism, peasants’ properties such
as private plots, tools, cattle, houses and trees were all transferred to communes
without due compensation. Commodity relations and rural markets were increasingly
replaced by a supply system (including food and clothes). Peasants’ enthusiasm for
production was dampened, agricultural production fell, peasants suffered from
starvation and increased their resistance (New Construction 9, 1958; Renmin ribao 19
Sept 1958; Chang 1975:98; Yang Qinwei, Chen Rongxun, and Yuan Zhishun
1990:87-90). The situation was serious and the intraparty conflict between realist and
idealist tendencies intensified once again.
The Great Leap and the People’s Communes movements were initiated by the
idealist tendency headed by Mao Zedong, but at the climax of the movements in 1958
most Party leaders were overwhelmed by an over-optimistic and over-zealous mood,
even those formerly in favour of the realist tendency. As Joseph (1984:78) noted:
It was not as if Deng Xiaoping, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and others could 
claim to be entirely blameless in the formulation of the Great Leap policy; 
they, too, had lent varying degrees of vocal and organisational support to the 
launching of the movement and had thus contributed to the radicalisation of 
the political environment that had made the excesses of the ‘high tide’ 
possible.
As the disastrous consequences became visible, however, the realist tendency arose 
once again, and strengthened its position within the Party. As early as late 1958, Deng 
Xiaoping, Hu Qiaomu and others began to criticise radical idealists such as Zhang 
Chunqiao and Chen Boda for their proposals to abolish the ‘bourgeois right’ 
expressed in the salary system, commodity exchange, and money in order to prepare 
for the transition to communism.15 The critique was even accepted at that time by
14 The decrease in gross imports and exports was obviously aggravated by China’s radical 
revolutionary foreign policy, especially the increasing ideological conflict with the Soviet Union.
15 For Zhang Chunqiao’s and Chen Boda’s propositions, see Zhang Chunqiao (1958) and Chen Boda 
(1958). For Deng Xiaoping’s and others’ critique of the propositions, see Renmin ribao (17 Oct 1958); 
Current Background (537:5-37); Joseph (1984:66-7).
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Mao Zedong who became more ‘moderate’ in his idealist thinking as the disastrous 
consequences became apparent.16
The critique of the Great Leap and the People’s Communes culminated at the 
Communist Party’s Lushan Conference in July 1959, when Peng Dehuai (Vice- 
Premier and Minister of Defence) and others blamed idealists for attempting to ‘jump 
into communism in one step’, thus committing the error of ‘petty-bourgeois 
fanaticism’ (Peng Dehuai 1959). Although the show-down at Lushan ended with the 
failure of the so-called ‘Peng Dehuai Anti-Party Group’ and a ‘campaign against 
rightist opportunism’ ensued, the idealist tendency suffered heavily and Mao Zedong 
retreated to the ‘second front’—withdrawing from active participation in the 
policymaking process. After a short-lived ‘Second Great Leap Forward’ in 1959, the 
realist tendency achieved influence in 1961, and gained the upper hand at the ‘Seven 
Thousand Cadres Conference’ in Beijing in January 1962. Represented by those on 
the ‘first front’, such as Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, Deng 
Zihui, Peng Zhen, Bo Yibo, Li Xiannian and Li Fuchun, the realist tendency put into 
place many ‘pragmatic’ policies to save the imperilled national economy. High 
production targets were cut, imbalances were adjusted, market mechanisms and 
material incentives were emphasised, private farming in the form of the ‘production 
responsibility system’ was encouraged, and a more moderate foreign policy was 
adopted. Though confined within the limits set by Mao Zedong, those policies gained 
increasing support within the Party and contributed significantly to China’s post-1962 
economic recovery. From 1962 to 1966, TOVS increased from 180 to 306.2 billion
16 The ‘deradicalisation’ of Mao Zedong’s idealist thinking was demonstrated in his speeches and 
comments at the Party’s First Zhengzhou Conference (2-10 Nov 1958), the Wuchang Conference (21- 
7 Nov 1958), the Sixth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee (28 Nov -1 0  Dec 1958), and the 
Second Zhengzhou Conference (late Feb-early March 1958). At these conferences, he began to 
criticise the ‘communist wind’. See Yang Qinwei, Chen Rongxun, and Yuan Zhishun (1990:91-5); 
Chang (1975:101-5); Joseph (1984:67-72).
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yuan, the output value of agriculture from 58.4 to 91 billion yuan, the output value of 
industry from 92 to 162.4 billion yuan, national income from 92.4 to 158.6 billion 
yuan, per capita income from 139 to 216 yuan, and the total value of imports and 
exports from 8.09 to 12.71 billion yuan (Ma Yuping and Huang Yuchong 1989:573- 
98). The economic recovery continued until 1966, when the idealist tendency fought 
back and stirred up a turbulent ‘revolution wind’.
‘Revolution wind’ and resistance to it
‘Revolution wind’ refers to a fanatic and over-enthusiastic mood towards revolution 
aimed at containing or even eradicating all non-proletarian classes which, though 
found in other periods of time, culminated in the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution between 1966 and 1976. That Cultural Revolution pushed intraparty 
conflicts between idealist and realist tendencies to a climax, and cleared the way for 
the shift in power from the former to the latter in 1978.
The concept ‘revolution’ occupied a prominent place in the Party’s ideology; 
but its meaning and focus changed over time. In the late 1950s, it mainly meant an 
‘uninterrupted revolution’ (buduan geming lun) which, as Brugger (1989b:2) noted,17 
saw
progress within a socialist system proceeding in a wave-like manner through 
the ceaseless development and ‘correct handling’ of social contradictions. 
Class struggle was not central to that formation—a more basic term being the 
dichotomy of ‘people’ and ‘enemy’ seen as behavioural categories.
This conception reflected a dominant view within the Party at that time that the prime
task under socialism is not class struggle but socialist construction, for ‘large-scale
and turbulent class struggles of the masses characteristic of the previous revolutionary
17 For a detailed analysis, see Young and Woodward (1978:915-23); Joseph (1984:87); see also 
Schram (1973:94).
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periods have in the main ended’ (Mao Zedong 1977:389). That view was shared by 
both idealists and realists, though they differed, as shown above, on how to achieve 
socialist construction. It was precisely their disputes over that issue during the Great 
Leap and People’s Communes movements which gave rise to a fanatic and over- 
enthusiastic mood concerning class struggle and revolution. That mood underlay the 
‘revolution wind’, and shifted the focus of revolution to class struggle in the 1960s.
Although the mainstream Party leadership, headed by Mao Zedong, often 
mentioned ‘class struggle between the proletariat and bourgeoisie’ and sometimes 
even described it as the ‘primary contradiction’ under socialism in the 1950s, they 
neither developed a systematic theory of class struggle under socialism which took 
into consideration intraparty conflicts, nor intended to launch a revolution to deal with 
it at the time. The intensified conflict between idealist and realist tendencies at the 
Lushan Conference in 1959 and the gradual increase in influence of the realist 
tendency in the early 1960s, however, led idealists to the conclusion that the strongest 
resistance to their ideal type of communism/socialism came from within the 
Communist Party itself, and that this resistance was the main expression of the 
‘struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie, between capitalism and socialism’. 
They felt that the resistance must be overcome to ensure the communist/socialist 
direction of China’s development.
Immediately after the Lushan Conference, Mao Zedong (1959) stated: ‘the 
struggle at Lushan was a class struggle, a continuation of the life-and-death struggle 
between the two antagonistic classes of bourgeoisie and proletariat in the process of 
socialist revolution in the last ten years’. The ‘Peng Dehuai Group’ was denounced as 
representing an ‘anti-socialist right-opportunist line’, and the ‘line struggle’ within the 
Party was related to the class struggle in society at large. At the Tenth Plenum of the
110
Eighth Conference in September 1962, Mao Zedong further criticised the realists’ 
policy to promote the ‘production responsibility system’ as a capitalist and revisionist 
‘tendency toward individual farming’, and demanded that the Party should ‘never 
forget the class struggle’. To ‘take class struggle as the key link’, three campaigns 
were launched by Mao Zedong in the period between 1963 and 1966. The first was 
the Socialist Education Campaign to fight against ‘capitalist forces’ in the countryside 
and revisionism within the Party in order to prevent ‘capitalist restoration’. Here the 
realist tendency was criticised and many radical slogans were posed by Mao Zedong 
such as: ‘once class struggle is grasped, miracles are possible’; and ‘the focal target of 
the campaign is capitalist roaders in power within the party’.18 The second was a 
political movement to fight against capitalist and revisionist influences in ideological 
and cultural spheres, in which many academics and their supporters in the Party were 
blamed for their ‘anti-socialist, anti-Marxist and anti-Party’ academic works and 
political behaviour. The third was a theoretical debate aimed at ‘Soviet revisionism’, 
headed by the ‘Khrushchev Group’, in which ‘international revisionism’ was 
criticised in order to attack capitalist and revisionist tendencies at home (Chang 
1975:173; see also Liao Kuangsheng 1984:189-207).
Due to the skilful resistance of the realist tendency, the three campaigns did 
not achieve the main goal which Mao Zedong and other idealists wanted them to, that 
is, purging the Chinese revisionists at the top of the Party—‘capitalist roaders in 
power’.19 Powerful resistance from within the Party reinforced the idealists’ 
judgement about the class struggle under socialism, and convinced them that a large- 
scale revolution, characterised by intensive class struggle, was needed to safeguard
18 As for Mao Zedong’s statements about class struggle in this period, see Yang Qinwen, Chen 
Rongxun and Yuan Zhishun (1990:126-8).
19 As for the resistance from the ‘realists’, see Brugger (1977:38-40); Chang (1975:143, 158-71); 
Yang Qinwen, Chen Rongxun, and Yuan Zhishun (1990:126-57).
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socialism. Against that background, the Cultural Revolution occurred in 1966. To 
deepen our understanding, Chang’s insightful analysis, back in the 1970s, is worth 
quoting at length here:
The GPCR began when Mao decided it was necessary to oust some of his 
‘comrades-in-arms’. As pointed out earlier, Mao’s control over the party was 
weakened substantially when his grandiose Great Leap and commune 
programs failed, sending him to the political background as other Party leaders 
came to the fore to save China from profound economic crisis. A set of 
pragmatic policies sponsored by Liu Shaoqi and others extricated China from 
the crisis by the fall of 1962, but Mao was alarmed by Liu’s leadership, which, 
in his view, was leading China to the path of revisionism and ‘restoration of 
capitalism’. Despite Mao’s persistent efforts to reimpose his policies and 
assert his leadership, he found himself unable to make the party responsive to 
his will, for other leaders who controlled the party organisations had used 
sabotage, obstruction, and passive resistance to frustrate his goals. Mao 
became convinced that if he were to control the direction of the Chinese 
Revolution and carry out his own revolutionary vision, he would have to 
remove from positions of authority those leaders ‘who are taking the capitalist 
road’(Chang 1975:147).
The connection between the launching of the Cultural Revolution and intraparty 
conflicts in the previous period was clearly demonstrated in Mao Zedong’s ‘Bombard 
the Headquarters: my first big character poster’, written before the Eleventh Plenum 
of the Eighth Conference in October 1966. In that poster, he indirectly blamed Liu 
Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and others for their ‘rightist errors’ in the early 1960s 
(Renmin ribao 31 July 1967). That Plenum officially started the Cultural Revolution.
Instigated by a fanatical revolutionary mood geared for class struggle at the 
height of the Cultural Revolution in 1967, a noticeable change occurred in the 
meaning of revolution in dominant Party ideology. ‘Uninterrupted revolution’ 
(buduan geming luri) was replaced by ‘continuous revolution’ (jixu geming lun) (see, 
for instance, Renmin ribao 18 May 1967; 6 Nov 1967). Radical idealists such as Chen 
Boda and Yao Wenyuan, on the basis of Mao Zedong’s statements about class 
struggle since the late 1950s, developed a synthetic theory of class struggle and 
revolution under socialism, and formally defined it as ‘the theory of continuous
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revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat’ (Renmin ribao 6 Nov 1967). 
Underlying the theory was the assumption that the struggle between bourgeoisie and 
proletariat and the struggle between capitalism and socialism continue to exist in 
socialist society. The danger of capitalist restoration remains under socialism. Class 
struggles inevitably find expressions within the Party to the point that ‘capitalist 
roaders in power’ are the representatives of the bourgeoisie in society. Thus, 
proletarians must continue revolution characterised by class struggle after seizing 
national power in order to exercise all-round dictatorship over the bourgeoisie, and 
repudiate revisionists’ attempt to restore capitalism (Yang Qinwen, Chen Rongxun, 
and Yuan Zhishun 1990:158-9; Renmin ribao 6 Nov 1967). The theory of 
‘continuous revolution’ was the cornerstone of the theoretical framework of the 
idealist tendency during the Cultural Revolution, and the catalyst of the ‘revolution 
wind’ which swept all over China over that period.
Under the influence of ‘the theory of continuous revolution’, realist policies 
which had proven to be so successful in the post-1962 economic recovery were 
denounced as capitalist ‘three freedoms and one guarantee’ (that is, plots for private 
use, free markets, enterprises with sole responsibility for their own profit or loss, and 
fixing output quotas on a household basis) and revisionist ‘three reconciliations and 
one reduction’ (that is, making peace with imperialists, reactionaries and revisionists, 
and reducing aid to the world revolutionary movements). Tolerance towards market 
mechanisms and class pluralism was replaced by an attempt at ‘all-round’ dictatorship 
of proletariat both domestically and internationally.
The Cultural Revolution was officially said to last a decade (1966-76), but its 
‘high tide’ was the first two years or so (late 1966-late 1968) in which the ‘revolution 
wind’ blew the hardest. The disastrous effects of the Cultural Revolution on China’s
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development were much greater than those of the Great Leap. Class relations and 
social relations were increasingly strained, and domestic order was completely 
destroyed. Government and Party officials at various levels were criticised as 
‘revisionists’, and intellectuals were denounced as ‘reactionary authoritative 
academics’. Red Guards could ‘doubt everything and overthrow everything’, and they 
often resorted to violence. Workers and peasants were encouraged to despise 
authorities, and they tended to ignore all rules and disciplines. Factories, shops and 
public buildings were damaged, schools and universities were closed, and traditional 
cultural items such as books, painting, antiques and statues were destroyed as 
‘poisonous weeds’ of exploitative classes.
At that time, relations with foreign countries were also extremely strained. 
Radicalisation of domestic politics resulted in an anti-foreigner mood. Not only was 
the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs invaded but the British Embassy in Beijing 
was set on fire by Red Guards. Not only was the Western ‘capitalist’ culture totally 
negated but the Eastern European ‘revisionist’ culture was also denounced. Those 
who had relatives in foreign countries were looked down upon, and those who had 
ordinary communications with foreigners were suspected of being ‘foreign spies’. 
Such anti-foreignism isolated China from almost all countries in the world, except 
Albania which pursued a similar radical revolutionary policy over that period. 
Although China improved its diplomatic relations with the United States and other 
‘capitalist’ countries in the early 1970s in order to contain the Soviet Union, 
ideological hostility toward these countries still remained strong and economic 
relations with them were very limited.
Under such a wild ‘revolution wind’, the national economy suffered heavily. 
In the ‘high tide’ of the Cultural Revolution in the period from 1966 to 1968, TOYS
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fell from 306.2 to 264.8 billion yuan, national income from 158.6 to 141.5 billion
yuan, and foreign trade from 12.71 to 10.85 billion yuan. Although the national
economy started to pick up after 1969, this was mainly, as shown soon, attributed to
the realists’ efforts to save the economy. Despite the gradual recovery after 1969, the
period between 1966 and 1976 as a whole still saw a fall in the growth rate of TOVS
by 7.5 percentage points, as compared with the previous three years (1963-65) in
which the realist tendency prevailed (Ma Yuping and Huang Yuchong 1989:591).
Possibly because the damage was greater, the ‘revolution wind’ met much
stronger resistance from the realist tendency than the ‘communist wind’. The Cultural
Revolution was openly and extensively resisted by the realist tendency right from its
beginning in 1966, or even in 1965 when it was in the making (see, for instance,
Brugger 1977:281-316; Chang 1975:147-71). The initial resistance was crushed in
the ‘high tide’ of the Cultural Revolution, when many realists were denounced as
‘capitalist roaders in pow er’, and either dismissed from office or reduced to a low
rank. As the ‘high tide’ wound down and the disastrous consequences became
apparent, however, the realist tendency began to revive under the aegis of Zhou Enlai
in the early 1970s.20 As Bucknall (1989:4) noted:
The power of the right-wing of the party began to increase after 1969. Zhou 
Enlai had been under pressure and threat from the ultra-left, but his skilful 
defence of the administration and the economy, which he had protected as far 
as he was able, began to bear fruit. More people began to see that the economy 
had to be promoted rather than allowed to wither, as tended to happen when 
the ultra-left placed class struggle in prime place, rather than accepting 
‘business as usual’.
Realists’ efforts to reestablish domestic order, to relax tense foreign relations 
(especially with the United States and other Western countries), and to recover the
20 It was said that, due to Zhou Enlai’s efforts, ‘one-half to two-thirds of the 366 ministers, vice 
ministers, heads and deputy heads of central commissions kept their posts from 1966 to 1968’ (Brugger 
and Reglar 1994:40), and many ‘overthrown’ senior officials were rehabilitated after 1969 (Yang 
Qinwei, Chen Rongxun, and Yuan Zhishun 1990:171-3).
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national economy even gained support from Mao Zedong who had become more 
‘moderate’ by that time, but they were challenged by a radical idealist group headed 
by Lin Biao (Vice-chairman of the Party and Minister of Defence).21 That conflict 
ended with the collapse of the Lin Biao Group on 13 September 1971, and the 
increase in power of the realist tendency headed by Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying at 
that time.22
After the ‘9.13 Event’ (signifying the Lin Biao coup), many realistic and 
pragmatic policies and measures were put into place by the realist tendency, though 
within the limits set by Mao Zedong. Senior government and Party officials began to 
be rehabilitated (including Deng Xiaoping in 1973 who later became a key figure in 
the realist tendency). Domestic order and rules were restored, foreign relations were 
relaxed (the People’s Republic replaced Taiwan as a member of the United Nations in 
1971, started to normalise relations with the United States and Japan in 1972, and 
introduced technology from Western countries in 1972-73), and economic 
development and modernisation were emphasised. The realist tendency was further 
strengthened in 1975 when Deng Xiaoping took charge of the day-to-day work of the 
government. Due to realists’ efforts, the national economy began to pick up after 
1969, especially in 1975. From 1969 to 1975, for example, TOVS increased from 
318.4 to 537.9 billion yuan, national income from 161.7 to 250 billion yuan, per 
capita income from 203 to 273 yuan, and the value of imports and exports from 10.7 
to 29 billion yuan (Ma Yuping and Huang Yuchong 1989:573-98). After suffering a 
set-back in early 1976, when Deng Xiaoping was dismissed from office once again by 
Mao Zedong, the realist tendency purged a radical idealist group called the ‘Gang of
21 It was said that the Lin Biao Group especially opposed the realists’ foreign policy which proposed a 
detente with the United States. See, for example, O’Leary (1980); Camilleri (1980).
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Four’ immediately after Mao Zedong’s death in the autumn of 1976, and began to 
defeat a remaining moderate idealist group headed by Hua Guofeng at the famous 
Third Plenum of the Eleventh Congress in late 1978.23 From then on, the realist 
tendency began to dominate the Party, and initiated the significant strategic change 
analysed in the preceding section.
The victory of the realist over the idealist tendency, as well as the significant 
strategic change initiated by the former in the late 1970s, was a logical result of 
China's political and economic developments since 1949. It was logical in the sense 
that, although the overall development performance of the People’s Republic had 
been outstanding since 1949, the periods in which the idealist tendency rose in 
influence demonstrated a less efficient, less successful, and sometimes even 
disastrous economic performance (for example, the period between 1958 and 1962, 
and the late 1960s), whereas the periods in which the realist tendency rose in 
influence demonstrated a more efficient and more successful economic performance 
(for example, the period between 1963 and 1966, and the early 1970s). The 
fluctuations in development performance not only proved to the Chinese people that 
the realist tendency could better cope with China’s reality, could better deal with 
China’s development problems, and therefore was more desirable, but also provided 
the rationale for the realist tendency to discredit the idealist tendency and initiate the 
strategic change from the late 1970s onwards. It should not come as a surprise,
22 After the ‘9.13 Event’, in which Lin Biao died escaping abroad by air, Zhou Enlai began to take 
charge of the day-to-day work of the Central Committee of the Party and Ye Jianying took charge of 
the Central Military Commission (Yang Qinwei, Chen Rongxun, and Yuan Zhishun 1990:170)
23 The ‘Gang of Four’ included Jiang Qing (Mao Zedong’s wife, member of the Politburo), Wang 
Hongwen (Vice Chairman of the Party), Zhang Chunqiao (member of the Standing Committee of the 
Politburo) and Yao Wenyuan (member of the Politburo). Hua Guofeng became Chairman of the Party 
after Mao Zedong’s death and remained in the post formally until 1982. He joined hands with realists 
to beat the ‘Gang of Four’ in late 1976; but he basically maintained a moderate idealist way of thinking 
and insisted on what was called ‘whateverism’— upholding ‘whatever Mao Zedong said’. His influence 
was significantly shaken after the Third Plenum in 1978.
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therefore, when it is found that Barnett (1970:3-4) predicted that outcome more than 
two decades ago:
As a matter of fact, I think it is highly possible that post-Mao leadership will 
move almost precisely in the direction that Mao has feared: it will move away 
from the idea of great, utopian, apocalyptic, grand strategies; away from the 
radical revolutionary policies that Mao has tried to promote the last few years. 
Of necessity, I think it will move toward a somewhat more realistic, pragmatic 
policy designed simply to cope with the immediate and very pressing 
problems that the country faces and will face. There will be concern about the 
need to restore a larger degree of order, a larger degree of unity, a larger 
degree of purpose, to get the country back on the course of rational 
development. I believe China will move in these directions.
It is exactly the pursuit of ‘rational development’ that has underlain the post-Mao
realist leadership’s re-linking strategy since 1978.
International impetus to the strategic change
China’s radical change from socialist de-linking to a socialist re-linking development 
strategy occurred in a period of time which witnessed the most significant and historic 
events in the contemporary world. To identify the international impetuses behind 
China’s strategic change, however, we need to focus attention on two broad trends: 
increasing global integration and increasing uneven development. As a main 
expression of the coexistence of convergence and divergence analysed in Chapter 2, 
the two trends ran parallel, though in opposite directions. They exerted, however, 
equally strong pressure upon China, and played an equally important role in 
promoting China’s strategic change.
Increasing global integration
Global integration is, in the terminology of the diffusion/modernisation paradigm, no 
doubt a trend towards convergence. It is, however, convergence to what? This has
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long been an issue of dispute. Inspired by the tremendous success of the Industrial 
Revolution, most scholars in the nineteenth century, from Comte to Hegel and Marx, 
implicitly or explicitly shared a view that the contemporary world was converging 
into a single system exemplified by the advanced Western capitalist industrial 
countries, though they differed over the future of the system. Inspired by the success 
of socialist revolutions after World War One (in the Soviet Union) and World War 
Two (in Eastern European countries, China, North Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba), a 
notion became popular (at least in the East) that the contemporary world was 
converging into a single system specified by socialist countries. But with the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the set-backs suffered by other socialist countries in recent 
years, one saw once again the notion of convergence towards liberal capitalism or, as 
Fukuyama (1992) said, the ‘end of history’. How long are we to remain trapped in 
such an ideological cage? The ideological dichotomy between ‘capitalist’ and 
‘socialist’ global integration must be transcended before we can obtain greater 
insights into the accelerated globalisation in the contemporary world.
Various terms have been used to describe the global integration process in 
recent years, such as ‘biased integration’, ‘asymmetric integration’, ‘negative 
integration’, ‘positive integration’, ‘international integration’, ‘worldwide integration’ 
(see, for instance, Ethier 1988:523; Robson 1984:2; El-Agraa 1989:2). Evidence 
shows, however, that market integration underlies, directly or indirectly, all 
phenomena related to globalisation. This is so obvious that some even concluded: 
‘globalisation denotes the increasing interdependence of international markets. It 
means that markets, industries, and enterprises transcend national boundaries’ 
(Bureau of Industry Economics 1989:xiii). The teleological process of market 
integration is simple. Peoples have been brought increasingly into an increasingly
119
‘free’ exchange system which connects them economically, politically, institutionally 
and culturally. As such, global integration originated in ancient times, developed on a 
worldwide scale after the discovery of the ‘new world’ at the end of the fifteenth 
century, accelerated after the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century, and 
came into its own with the new technological revolution in the postwar period. 
Dimensions of the increased global market integration in the postwar period were 
manifold, but only three are illustrated here.
Economic integration. One of the most marked developments in global economic 
integration since the Second World War has been the unprecedented expansion of the 
international commodity market, expressed mainly in the enormous increase in 
international trade. According to World Bank’s estimate, the growth of international 
trade between 1950 and 1980 was ‘the highest recorded in history’, and international 
trade grew faster than world output throughout the postwar period. Between 1950 and 
1988, for instance, the average annual growth rate of international trade was about six 
per cent, whereas the average annual growth rate of world GDP was only about four 
per cent (World Bank 1991:9). In absolute terms, the growth of international trade 
was even more impressive. The volume of world imports increased, for instance, by a 
multiple of almost five between 1960 and 1990 (Clark et al 1993:12). The massive 
growth of international trade indicates that nations in the contemporary world have 
been increasingly connected to each other by commodity relations.
The integration of the global economy through international trade has been 
reinforced by the internationalisation of production and finance. The international 
flow of capital in the form of foreign direct investment increased by a multiple of 
almost four between 1960 and 1988 (World Bank 199lb:9). The international flow of
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capital in other forms, such as loans, securities, and bonds, also grew very fast. As a 
result of international capital flows, the share of assets of international banks in the 
world GDP increased markedly (see Figure 1). Promoted by the internationalisation 
of production and finance, international markets of productive resources such as 
capital, labour, and information expanded along with the growth of the international 
commodity market. Multinational and transnational enterprises have been the primary 
force behind the economic integration of international markets, and the control of 
national governments over their economies has been rapidly diminishing.24 The whole 
world has been so closely connected economically in a single exchange system after 
the Second World War that some even announced ‘the end of geography’ (O’Brien 
1992).
Figure 1 Share of assets of international banks in world GDP, 1970-1989 (%)
1970
1980 1990
Source: the World Bank (1991b: 12-4).
24 By the end of 1980s, 500 of the largest multinational and transnational enterprises had accounted for 
more than one-half of world production, revenue, and investment. They received at least 40 per cent of 
their revenue from international operations (Matsuura 1991:13-5).
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Institutional integration. Increased economic integration through the expansion of 
international markets demanded increasing institutional integration. After the Second 
World War, the growth of international institutions grew much faster than before. 
Between 1940 and 1985, for instance, the number of international institutions 
(including both governmental and nongovernmental institutions) increased by a factor 
of six (Hughes 1991:219). These international institutions, especially the United 
Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the 
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or, later on, the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), played an increasingly crucial role in international economic, 
political, cultural, and environmental cooperation. The whole world has been so 
closely connected together institutionally in addressing problems that affect mankind 
as a whole that there emerged a ‘planetary consciousness’, expressed in such concepts 
as ‘Spaceship Earth’ and the ‘Global Commons’ (Hettne 1990:114).
In addition to institutional integration at the global level, there has been 
increasing regional institutional integration. The most successful examples were 
found in the developed world, such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), the European Community (EC), the European Union 
(EU), and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). In the developing world, 
there were also examples of regional integration, such as the Association of South- 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC). In recent years, efforts were made to connect the two worlds together, as 
shown by the Northern American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Association (APECA). From a long-term perspective, regional 
institutional integration was part of the globalisation process, and reinforced the sense 
of interdependence among nations (Kym and Richard 1993:xxii).
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Systemic integration. Increased integration among different economic systems has 
been another expression and result of market expansion in the postwar period. The 
core of this integration has been the increased incorporation of various forms of the 
planned economic system in Eastern socialist countries into the global market system. 
An indicator was the marked increase in East-West trade. Between 1971 and 1981, 
for instance, gross imports and exports in East-West Trade increased by a multiple of 
almost eight. By the early 1980s, East-West trade had accounted for more than 45 per 
cent of the total Eastern trade (Bunce 1989:243; Ethier 1988:541). Along with 
market-oriented reforms in Eastern countries, systemic integration accelerated in 
recent years.
Systemic integration, of course, fluctuated according to political and 
ideological conflicts between the ‘socialist’ East and the ‘capitalist’ West. 
Governments in the East were cautious of Western ‘capitalist’ influence and were 
hesitant as to how far they might go in their relationship with the West; their 
counterparts in the West were worried about the consequences of transferring high 
technology and were critical of human right issues in the East; and both sides engaged 
in a new version of ‘Cold War’ and kept an eye on the strategic balance of 
international powers. However, the trend towards integration was so strong that it 
would eventually overcome and transcend political and ideological constraints. As 
Dallago et al (1992: 1) noted: ‘there are economic and social-structural tendencies in 
both capitalist and socialist societies and economies which result in convergence 
towards one uniform system’.
The ‘uniform system’, mentioned here, could be nothing but a global market 
system. As argued above, the increased worldwide expansion of the market system
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has been the driving force behind all forms of the postwar integration. The currently 
popular terms such as globalisation, internationalisation, economic integration, and 
convergence must be understood in this sense.
Increasing uneven development
Increased global market integration led to unprecedented economic growth in the 
postwar period (World Bank 1987; 1988; 1989; 1990). This, however, was only one 
side of the coin. The other side revealed a picture of increasing uneven development, 
or increasing divergence between countries. The following dimensions of increasing 
uneven development were most alarming.
Uneven development between developed and developing countries. This uneven 
development was often referred to, in development literature, as the ‘development 
gap’. Most scholars agreed that the gap has been increasingly widening since the 
Second World War, and there was growing evidence in support of this view (see, for 
instance, Ward, Runnalls, and D’Anjou 1971; Todaro 1989; Hogendom 1992; Cole 
1981; Seligson and Passe-Smith 1993; World Bank 1987; 1988; 1989; 1990).
One case in point is the ‘absolute gap’—the difference between per capita 
GNP of developed countries and that of developing countries. It was estimated that 
the absolute gap nearly doubled for all developing regions in the postwar period (see 
Figure 2). Another case is the ‘relative gap’, estimating per capita GNP of developing 
countries as a percentage of that of developed countries. Between 1962 and 1990, the 
relative gap increased from 19 per cent to 14 per cent for middle income countries, 
and from 4.22 per cent to 2.61 per cent for low income countries. It was estimated 
that, at the present growth rates, it would take most developing countries thousands of
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years to close the development gaps (Morawetz 1977:28; Hogendom 1992:12; Passe-
Smith 1993:18-23).
Figure 2 Widening absolute gap between developed and developing countries 
grouped by region, 1962-1990 (US$ at 1980 constant prices)
□  1962 
■  1990







Note: Absolute gap refers to the difference between per capita GNP of developed 
countries and that of developing countries.
Source: World Bank, 1992. The World Tables 1992, Washington; IMF, 1984. 
International Financial Statistics: supplement on output statistics, No.8, Washington.
Uneven development within developing countries. Uneven development occurred 
not only between developed and developing countries, but also within each of these 
groups. It was noticed, however, that ‘the gap between rich and poor is considerably 
wider within the developing economies than within the developed ones’ (Ahluwalia 
1974:31). Uneven development within the developing world has been, therefore, 
another focus of attention since the Second World War.
By analytical group, exporters of manufactures experienced the highest and 
most sustained growth while oil exporters, highly indebted countries, and Sub-
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Saharan Africa recorded the worst rates of economic growth (see Table 3). The 
exporters of manufactures were mainly the so-called newly industrialised countries in 
Eastern Asia. Their economic performance in terms of growth rate outstripped not 
only other developing countries, but also the developed ones. As a result, these 
countries as a group managed to narrow the relative development gap nearly by half 
in the period (from 11.8 per cent in 1962 to about 22.1 per cent in 1990), whereas 
most developing countries saw a widening relative development gap.
Table 3 Growth of per capita GDP in developing economies classified by 
analytical groups, 1965-1986 (% )
Group 1965-73 1973-80 1980-86
All developing countries 3.9 3.2 1.5
Exporters of manufactures 4.8 4.1 4.3
Oil exporters 4.3 3.2 -1.8
Highly indebted countries 4.2 2.9 -1.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.6 0.3 -0.3
Source: World Bank, 1987. World Development Report 1987, Washington: 26.
By individual countries, the contrast was more striking. It was estimated that 
in the postwar period, not only the seven fastest-growing but also the seven most 
slowly growing economies were in the developing World (see Figure 3). As a result, 
some of the fastest-growing economies (such as Singapore and Hong Kong) have 
gradually closed the development gap while the slowly-growing developing 
economies have little hope of doing so.25
25 According to Jones’s estimate, Hong Kong and Singapore had closed the absolute development gap 
by the 1990s (Jones 1993:19). According to Passe-Smith’s estimate, at the same growth rate as in the 
period between 1962 and 1990, it would take Yugoslavia (with a 3.09 per cent annual growth rate) 
2,007 years to close the absolute development gap. All the seven slowest-growing economies had a 
negative growth rate and, therefore, could only lag further and further behind (Passe-Smith 1993:18- 
23).
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Figure 3 Uneven growth between individual developing economies, 1962-1990
(per capita GNP growth rate %)
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Note: Those with positive growth rate were the seven fastest-growing economies, 
and those with negative growth rate were the seven most slowly growing economies, 
in the world over the period.
Source: World Bank, 1992. The World Tables 1992, Washington; IMF, 1984. 
International Financial Statistics: supplement on output statistics, No.8,
Washington.__________________________________________________________
Implications for China
Increased global integration and increasing uneven development constituted the broad 
global background against which China’s radical change in development strategy 
occurred. The implications of increased global integration and increasing uneven 
development for China were far-reaching and profound.
Global integration indicated increasing interdependence between nations in 
the global market system. This demanded a change in China’s attitude towards the 
existing global market system. In the early 1970s, although China regained its seat in 
the United Nations (1971), China’s attitude towards the global market system was
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still passive, or even hostile. China did not want to join the IMF, the World Bank, and 
the GATT, though as early as in 1973, the President of the World Band already sent 
an invitation telegram to Beijing. This is because China’s leaders still pursued a 
socialist de-linking development strategy, and considered these international 
economic institutions were incompatible with China’s socialist planned economic 
system. As Jacobson and Oksenberg (1990:64-5) pointed out, China’s leaders 
believed that those institutions were
contradictory to a socialist monetary system. They feared that China would 
face restrictions on the determination of its foreign exchange rate and control 
over the administration of its foreign exchange. This was considered 
unacceptable at a time when China’s leaders adhered to a policy of extreme 
self-reliance in world affairs. The Chinese system for foreign trade was 
designed to insulate the Chinese economy from world market forces, which 
were regarded as irrational and harmful to Chinese national interests. The 
system in effect created an ‘air lock’ between the Chinese and the 
international economies.
Two progresses in global integration facilitated the change in China’s attitude 
towards the global market system. First, China’s trading partnership had undergone 
fundamental changes by the late 1970s. The share of China’s trade with socialist 
countries in China’s total foreign trade fell from 74 per cent in 1954 to 13.2 per cent 
in 1978. Conversely, by the late 1970s, China’s trade with market economies had 
accounted for 86.8 per cent of China’s total foreign trade. More than half of China’s 
foreign trade in the late 1970s was with advanced Western market economies. The 
share of trade with Japan in China’s total foreign trade, for instance, was 22.9 per cent 
in 1978, nearly doubling the share of China’s trade with all socialist countries 
(Bucknall 1989:191-201). China’s increased trade with market economies indicated 
the increasing incorporation of the Chinese economy into the global market economy, 
and therefore the failure of the de-linking strategy. China’s Communist leaders had to 
face the harsh reality.
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Second, by the late 1970s, some socialist countries had set examples to China. 
Romania and Yugoslavia, for instance, already joined the IMF. This eased, to a 
degree, worries on the part of China’s leaders about further participation in the global 
market system. Immediately after the Third Plenum in 1978, China decided to 
participate in the IMF and the World Bank, and sent a delegation to Romania and 
Yugoslavia to leam how they worked within the global market system. In 1980, 
China entered the IMF and the World Bank. In 1986, China formally requested full 
participation in the GATT. China’s decisions to participate in those keystone 
international economic institutions were an important part of China’s re-linking 
development strategy, and they clearly showed China’s determination to 
accommodate its planned economy to the global market economy. Although there are 
still some obstacles to China’s participation in the GATT (now WTO), it can be 
expected that China will join it before long.
If increased integration informed China of a ‘global consciousness’, then 
increasing uneven development conveyed to China a ‘feeling of crisis’. In the 1950s, 
China’s leaders were overwhelmed by a belief that China could catch up with 
advanced Western countries in economic development in one decade or two. After 
nearly three decades of development, however, China’s leaders found the 
development gap with Western countries was not closing as they had expected. 
According to Morawetz’s estimate in 1977, at the growth rate of that time, it would 
take China 2,900 years to close the absolute gap (Morawetz 1977:26-30)! Even 
though Morawetz’s estimate was based upon World Bank’s data in 1977 when the 
Chinese official data were still not available, the Chinese official data, released later, 
did not change the overall picture.26
26 According to the Chinese official data, China’s growth rate between 1960 and 1975 was higher, but 
the GNP per capita in 1975 was much less, than what Morawetz estimated (Ma Yuping and Huang
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Note: Four Small Dragons are Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. 
Sources: World Bank, 1988. World Development Report 1988, Washington; 
Official Statistics of Taiwan, Taibei._______________________________________
A ‘feeling of crisis’ arose, therefore, in China, from the late 1970s onwards. It 
was further reinforced by the rapid growth experienced by China’s neighbours, 
especially the Four Small Dragons—Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and South 
Korea. Although China’s economic growth before the late 1970s was impressive as 
compared with most developing countries, it was lower than that of the Four Small 
Dragons (see Table 4). Even Indonesia (with a growth rate of 7.9 per cent) and 
Malaysia (with a growth rate of 7.4 per cent) outstripped China in economic 
performance over that period. This was really an alarming challenge to China’s 
Communist leaders. If they could possibly attribute the development gap with 
developed Western countries to century-long semi-colonial exploitation, how could 
they explain away the rising development gap with China’s Third World neighbours? 
If they wanted to maintain the Party’s legitimacy, they had to prove to the Chinese 
people that socialist China could achieve better economic performance than countries 
with different economic systems.
Yuchong 1989:573-99; Jacobson and Oksenberg 1990:73). As for the dispute over statistics of China’s 
economy, see Garnaut and Ma Guonan (1993).
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In order to do so, they had to abandon idealistic fantasy and look reality in the 
face. They had to learn from the experience of China’s fast-growing Third World 
neighbours. It was increasingly apparent that all China’s neighbours, which 
experienced faster economic growth than China, were active participants in the global 
market economy. They did not pursue a de-linking strategy but adopted a market- 
oriented economic system. A feeling arose among the Chinese leaders that the radical 
de-linking strategy was partly responsible for China’s unsatisfactory development 
performance (see Jacobson and Oksenberg 1990:68). As China opened up to market 
forces from the late 1970s onward, that awareness strengthened and increasingly 
became a strong impetus for China’s re-linking strategy. This was later revealed by 
Deng Xiaoping in his southern tour of 1992. During that tour, he asked Guangdong 
province, the fastest-growing area in China, to step up reform and opening up so as to 
catch up with the ‘four small dragons’ in twenty years.
The above analysis shows that China has opened up to market systems both 
domestically and internationally since 1978 thanks to the adoption of reform and 
open-door policies. China’s opening up has involved a radical change from a socialist 
de-linking to a socialist re-linking development strategy or from passive to active 
participation in the global market economy. The strategic change was the logical 
result of the operation of China’s political economy in the sense that it was 
indispensable for achieving economic efficiency and development, and was promoted 
by two broad trends in the contemporary world: global integration and uneven 
development. With this in mind, it is understandable that Marxism and socialism in 
China are no longer the orthodox versions exemplified by the former Soviet Union. 
They are now home-made, ‘realist’ versions in the sense that they are emerging in, 
and adapting to, the reality of China’s opening up to market systems, and in the sense
131
that they are changing and developing in the opening process. China’s Marxism and 
socialism have to be understood this way in this thesis, and they do not conform to 
any orthodox textbooks about Marxism and socialism. A theoretical clarification of 
China’s versions of Marxism and socialism in the opening process is not the focus of 
the thesis, and what concerns us most here is the impact of the opening up on China’s 
development performance.
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4 Active participation and rapid economic growth
China’s opening up to market systems or active participation in the global market 
economy has had a tremendous impact on China’s development performance. 
Evaluation of the impact is a very challenging task, a task to which the remaining 
chapters are devoted. It is challenging in the sense that opening up as defined in our 
study is a very complicated phenomenon, and conventional theories, including the 
development theories illustrated in Chapter 2, can shed very limited light on how to 
evaluate its impact on development performance. A new theoretical framework has to 
be developed, and related hypotheses have to be derived and tested. This is an 
adventurous endeavour, a risk that we have to take to fulfill the task.
This chapter is to work out a new growth framework to explain how China’s 
rapid economic growth occurred in the process of opening up to market systems. 
First, China’s extraordinary economic performance and the challenges it gives to 
conventional growth theories are examined. Then the new growth framework is 
presented, and tested against China’s experience. Lastly, interpretations and remarks 
are made with regard to the growth framework and its test results. In subsequent 
chapters, the growth framework is applied to derive and test hypotheses about the 
impact of opening up on China’s uneven sectoral growth and uneven regional 
development.
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China’s growth miracle: a challenge to growth theory
East Asia experienced faster economic growth than other parts of the world in the 
postwar period, a phenomenon described as the ‘East Asian miracle’. China’s rapid 
economic growth in the post-1978 period can be seen as the ‘greatest miracle’ in East 
Asia, for China surpassed all the East Asian NICs in terms of economic growth. 
China’s extraordinary growth performance cannot be, however, explained 
satisfactorily by conventional growth theories, especially by the exogenous 
neoclassical growth model and the accounting of total factor productivity (TFP). 
Confronted with China’s rapid and sustained economic growth in the re-linking or 
opening process, conventional wisdom reveals considerable limitations.
Extraordinary growth performance
After World War II, especially after the reconstruction period, the world witnessed 
rapid economic growth. In recent years, numerous studies have been devoted to 
analysing growth performances of individual countries and regions, work which was 
facilitated enormously by the data provided by the World Bank on GDP and per 
capita income of most countries from 1960 onwards. World Bank data are used here 
with the time series divided into two periods: the period between 1960 and 1978 and 
that between 1978 and 1993.
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Table 5 The 40 fastest-growing economies in the world, 1960-1993 (average 
annual growth rate % )
1960-1978 1978-1993
Country Growth rate Country Growth rate
Oman 14.61 Suriname 10.07
Cyprus 13.70 Botswana 9.45
United Arab Emirate 10.45 China 8.98
Libya 10.40 Maldives 8.75
Saudi Arabia 10.39 Azerba 8.62
Botswana 10.23 Korea, Republic of 8.11
Korea, Republic of 9.72 Oman 7.69
Cote d'Ivoire 9.62 Taiwan 7.66
Romania 9.60 Thailand 7.48
Taiwan 9.60 Macao 7.10
Singapore 9.07 Singapore 6.82
Ecuador 8.69 St. Lucia 6.74
Gabon 8.29 Bhutan 6.69
Hong Kong 8.28 Hong Kong 6.58
Armenia 7.90 Cape Verde 6.46
Japan 7.80 Pakistan 6.11
Belarus 7.73 Solomon Islands 6.09
Syrian Arab Republic 7.72 Antigua and Barbuda 6.09
Malta 7.68 St. Vincent and the Grenadines 6.03
Brazil 7.64 Malaysia 6.02
Israel 7.45 Cyprus 5.94
Thailand 7.43 Indonesia 5.63
Lithuania 7.40 Cambodia 5.61
Swaziland 7.33 Viet Nam 5.42
Iceland 7.22 Belize 5.39
Uzbekistan 7.15 St. Kitts and Nevis 5.39
Dominican Republic 6.88 Mauritius 5.26
Kenya 6.84 India 5.07
Malaysia 6.74 Turkey 4.79
China 6.73 Chile 4.67
Kazakhstan 6.61 Lao People's Democratic Republic 4.66
Mexico 6.57 Dominica 4.64
Lesotho 6.52 Egypt, Arab Republic of 4.63
Greece 6.41 Congo 4.46
Tajikistan 6.41 Grenada 4.45
Latvia 6.37 Sri Lanka 4.35
Costa Rica 6.34 Nepal 4.26
Estonia 6.22 Chad 4.26
Panama 6.15 Malta 4.23
Puerto Rico 6.12 Bangladesh 4.22
World 4.77 World 2.72
High-income 4.40 High-income 2.74
Middle-income 7.15 Middle-income 1.92
Low and middle-income 6.49 Low and middle-income 2.67
Latin America and Caribbean 5.63 Latin America and Caribbean 1.96
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.28 Sub-Saharan Africa 1.68
Middle East and North Africa 6.47 Middle East and North Africa 0.20
Europe and Central Asia 9.98 Europe and Central Asia 0.95
Notes: Growth rates are calculated at US$ 1987 constant prices. 
Source: International Economic Databank, ANU.____________
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As Table 5 shows, in the period between 1960 and 1978 China’s average 
annual GDP growth rate was 6.7 per cent, ranking thirtieth in the world, lower than 
most East Asian economies such as South Korea (9.72 per cent), Taiwan (9.6 per 
cent), Singapore (9.07 per cent), Hong Kong (8.28 per cent), Japan (7.8 per cent), 
Thailand (7.43 per cent), and Malaysia (6.74 per cent). In the period between 1978 
and 1993, however, China’s average annual GDP growth rate was about 9 per cent, 
ranking third in the world, higher than all East Asian economies such as Korea (8.11 
per cent), Taiwan (7.66 per cent), Thailand (7.48 per cent), Macao (7.11 per cent), 
Singapore (6.82 per cent), Hong Kong (6.58 per cent), Malaysia (6.02 per cent), and 
Indonesia (5.63 per cent).
It is worth noticing that China’s accelerated economic growth since 1978 
occurred during a period of time when the world economy experienced a recession 
and was suffering from the so-called ‘productivity slow-down’. Compared with the 
earlier period, China’s average annual GDP growth rate rose by 3.3 percentage points, 
while the average annual GDP growth rate of the world fell by 2.05 percentage points, 
that of high-income economies fell by 1.66 percentage points, that of middle-income 
economies fell by 5.23 percentage points, that of low-income economies fell by 3.82 
percentage points.
China’s rapid growth in GDP was accompanied by rapid growth of per capita 
income. As shown in Table 6, in the pre-1978 period per capita income in China 
increased only by 171 per cent, very close to the per capita income increase of the 
world average (158 per cent), slower than that of high-income economies represented 
mainly by OECD members (184 per cent), and that of East Asian and Pacific 
economies (192 per cent). From 1978 to 1993, however, per capita income in China
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increased by 300 per cent, much faster than the world average (116 per cent), and that
in all the country groups listed by the World Bank (see Table 6).
Table 6 Per capita income in China and in other countries, 1960-1993 (US$ at 
current prices)
Country 1960 1978 1993
China 70 120 360
Low-income economies 160 220 360
High-income economies 7160 13200 17460
East Asia and Pacific 120 230 590
Sub-Saharan African 440 590 450
Latin American and Caribbean 1130 1820 1830
OECD members 7380 13560 17840
World 1870 2950 3430
Source: International Economic Databank, ANU.
A quick look at Chinese economic history would suggest that China’s
economic performance has been quite good since the establishment of the PRC in 
1949. Examined in detail, however, it can be seen that there are important differences 
between the pre-1978 and the post-1978 periods. As the World Bank data on GDP 
and per capita income do not cover the period before 1960, the data on national 
income (NI) and total output value of society (TOVS) can be used for making 
historical comparisons.1 Consistent data on China’s NI and TOVS in the period 
between 1952 and 1992 are provided in Table 7, and are also plotted in Figure 4 to 
give a clear picture of China’s growth performance in the period as a whole.
1 National income is net material product (NMP) in the socialist accounting framework, and it is equal 
to gross value of output minus material consumption.
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Table 7 China’s national income and total output value of society, 1952-1992
(value and indices)
Year National income Total output value of society
Value (yuan at Indices Value (yuan at Indices
current prices) (1952=100) current prices) (1952=100)
1952 589.00 100.00 1015.00 100.00
1953 709.00 114.00 1241.00 118.70
1954 748.00 120.60 1346.00 128.80
1955 788.00 128.30 1415.00 136.60
1956 882.00 146.40 1639.00 161.10
1957 908.00 153.00 1606.00 170.90
1958 1118.00 186.70 2138.00 226.60
1959 1222.00 202.00 2548.00 267.40
1960 1220.00 199.10 2679.00 279.80
1961 996.00 140.00 1978.00 186.20
1962 924.00 130.90 1800.00 167.50
1963 1000.00 144.90 1956.00 184.60
1964 1166.00 168.80 2268.00 216.90
1965 1387.00 197.40 2695.00 258.20
1966 1586.00 231.00 3062.00 301.90
1967 1487.00 214.30 2774.00 272.00
1968 1415.00 200.30 2648.00 259.20
1969 1617.00 239.00 3184.00 324.70
1970 1926.00 294.60 3800.00 403.20
1971 2077.00 315.30 4203.00 445.40
1972 2136.00 324.30 4396.00 465.30
1973 2318.00 351.20 4776.00 505.50
1974 2348.00 355.20 4859.00 515.10
1975 2503.00 384.70 5379.00 574.40
1976 2427.00 374.50 5433.00 582.30
1977 2644.00 403.70 6003.00 642.50
1978 3010.00 453.40 6846.00 726.30
1979 3350.00 485.10 7642.00 788.20
1980 3688.00 516.30 8534.00 854.20
1981 3941.00 541.50 9075.00 891.70
1982 4258.00 585.80 9966.00 976.40
1983 4736.00 644.20 11131.00 1076.20
1984 5652.00 731.90 13171.00 1234.60
1985 7020.00 830.60 16582.00 1446.30
1986 7859.00 894.50 19045.00 1593.10
1987 9313.00 985.70 23034.00 1818.20
1988 11738.00 1097.20 29807.00 2106.00
1989 13176.00 1137.20 34519.00 2219.90
1990 14429.00 1191.60 37996.00 2364.20
1991 16557.00 1287.80 44142.00 2640.00
1992 20223.00 1473.20 55842.00 3212.60
Source: Statistical Yearbook o f China 1993, Beijing.
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Figure 4 China’s national income and total output value of society, 1952-1992
(yuan at current prices)
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Note: NI denotes national income, and TOVS denotes total output value of society. 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1993, Beijing.________________________
From Figure 4 and Table 7, it is very clear that there was a sharp rise in the 
growth of China’s NI and TOVS from the late 1970s onwards. Between 1952 and 
1992, China’s average annual TOVS growth rate and China’s average annual NI 
growth rate were high by any standard—7.96 per cent and 6.36 per cent, respectively. 
They were, however, much higher in the period between 1978 and 1992 (10.72 per 
cent and 8.64 per cent, respectively) than in the period between 1952 and 1978 (6.76 
per cent and 5.24 per cent, respectively).
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Figure 5 China’s total output value of society, 1952-1978 (yuan at current prices)
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Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1993, Beijing.
The striking difference between the two periods lies not only in growth rate 
but also in the stability of the growth performance. In Figures 5 and 6, China’s TOVS 
is plotted for the two periods. As the figures show, China’s growth performance was
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unstable in the pre-1978 period, undergoing two major crises. As explained in the 
previous chapter, these were the result of adverse interventions from the central 
government: one was the result of the ‘communist wind’ and the other the result of 
the ‘revolution wind’. In fact, as analysed previously, the Chinese economy had 
suffered from a crisis due to the socialist de-linking strategy by the late 1970s, and 
could not maintain its growth momentum. In the post-1978 period, by contrast, 
China’s growth performance has been quite stable, and demonstrates a great potential 
for long-run sustainability.
Conventional wisdom challenged
No matter what ideological preference might be held, there is no denying that the 
growth ‘miracle’ should be attributed, first of all, to the reform and open-door 
policies, or the re-linking development strategy—re-linking China’s version of 
socialism with market mechanisms both domestically and internationally in order to 
achieve economic efficiency and development. From 1978 onwards, therefore, 
accelerated marketisation at both the domestic and the international levels ushered in 
a new era in the history of the PRC, and exerted an increasingly strong influence on 
the Chinese economy. Any effort to model China’s growth performance would be 
unconvincing if it ignores or ‘exogenises’ the significant change in the direction of 
marketisation.
The significant change can, however, hardly be captured satisfactorily by the 
dominant neoclassical growth paradigm, which is characterised by an exogenous 
growth theory and various TFP accounting exercises. An official Chinese newspaper 
the Economic Daily announced, for instance, a TFP accounting result on 20 October 
1995: of the observed growth in the period, physical capital and labour inputs
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accounted for 71.3 per cent and TFP accounted for the remaining 28.7 per cent. The 
accounting result cannot tell where the TFP came from, and what role marketisation 
played. It only implies that China’s growth seemed to be driven mainly by massive 
physical inputs, not much different from the previous period. The same is true of most 
other growth accounting exercises on China’s recent growth performance, though 
some of them only focus on one or another industrial level (see, for instance, Chen, 
Wang, Zheng, Jefferson, Rawski 1988; Jefferson, Rawski, and Zheng 1994; 
Borensztein and Jonathan 1996). Given the deficiencies in the theory, epistemology, 
and methodology of the paradigm, as seen below, these unconvincing accounting 
results could be expected.
The neoclassical growth paradigm has dominated empirical studies on growth 
since the seminal work of Robert Solow (1956, 1957). It pointed out that ‘growth in 
conventional inputs explains little of the observed growth in output’ in developed 
countries, and that the explanation has to be found somewhere else (Griliches 1994:1). 
This significant finding has been increasingly proven to be robust, and is shown in 
this study to be true of developing countries undergoing a re-linking or opening 
process like China. Meanwhile, however, theoretical and empirical problems with the 
paradigm have been proven to be so serious that they have led to confusing and wrong 
conclusions about the dynamics of growth (Chyi 1995; Srinivasan 1995).
The neoclassical growth paradigm is based on an aggregate production 
function which can be written as
Y = AF{K, L) (1)
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where Y stands for output, K for physical capital input, L for labour input, and A for 
TFP progress or all that cannot be explained by the inputs. What distinguishes the 
model from the classical one is the special role ascribed to TFP. The disembodied 
TFP was invented to capture ‘any kind of shift in the production function’ (Solow 
1957:12). To this end, a number of assumptions were made such as that of constant 
returns to scale, neutrality of TFP progress, and a closed economy with competitive 
output and input markets (Solow 1957; Chow 1995).
It is now widely acknowledged that the most important pitfall in the 
theoretical framework of the neoclassical growth paradigm lies in exogenising TFP 
and an inability to explain where it comes from. As a result, TFP has become, no 
matter whether it is measured as a residual or a coefficient on a time trend, ‘a 
measurement of our ignorance’, and has few, if any, policy implications (Griliches 
1994; Chyi 1995). It has also been acknowledged that most of the assumptions 
underlying the model violate the most obvious facts about the real world, and have 
inevitably led to serious problems with estimation in growth accounting exercises 
(Boskin and Lau 1992; Srinivasan 1995). From Equation 1, it can be seen that TFP 
progress is ‘exogenised’ as a Hicks-neutral factor in the production function. As 
constant returns to scale are assumed, the exogenous TFP actually becomes the most 
dynamic source of growth. Neutral TFP progress is, however, a serious distortion of 
reality. It is here that ‘new growth theories’ have given the strongest challenge to the 
paradigm. Proponents of the new theories argued that TFP progress is embodied in 
various inputs, and is expressed in increased human capital accumulation or improved 
quality of physical inputs. New growth models tried to ‘endogenised’ TFP by 
including such factors as Teaming by doing’, ‘knowledge spillover’, and government 
fiscal policies on trade and R&D. They not only undermined the basic assumption of
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constant returns to scale and neutral TFP progress (Römer 1986; Lucas 1988), but 
also discredited the growth accounting results based on them (Szirmai 1993; 
Srinivasan 1995).2
A related pitfall in the theoretical framework of the neoclassical growth
paradigm lies in oversimplifying inputs and an inability to explain the mechanisms by
which inputs are efficiently allocated. As has been repeatedly pointed out by ‘new
growth theories’, inputs should not be understood in a narrow sense as if they only
include ‘capital and labour inputs in physical units’ (Solow 1957:312), but they
should include human capital accumulation in a broad sense. However, the absence of
market mechanisms in the neoclassical growth paradigm has not received sufficient
attention from ‘new growth theories’. Given that the mainstream neoclassical
economics is characterised by, among other things, the predominant role ascribed to
market mechanisms in improving efficiency in resource (input) allocation, it is quite
reasonable to ask whether a model failing to explain the role of market mechanisms in
growth deserves the name ‘neoclassical’.
The neoclassical growth model and the TFP accounting practice are not,
therefore, very helpful in the understanding of the dynamics of growth. It is unhelpful
in the sense that it has led researchers to focus only on the supply side to the point that
the demand side is basically ignored. As Adrian Pagan (1995:327) pointed out:
It is intriguing to see how demand management has been relegated to a back­
seat in the discussion. Historically, economists treated demand in its various
2 According to the estimation made by Solow (1957) without allowance for quality change in physical 
inputs, for instance, technical change accounted for 87.5 per cent of economic growth in the USA in 
this century while the remaining 12.5 per cent was accounted for by capital and labour inputs. 
According to the estimation made by Jorgenson (1990), with allowance for quality changes, however, 
technical change accounted for only 22 per cent of the growth while the remaining 78 per cent was 
accounted for by capital and labour inputs. Although they did not examine exactly the same period, the 
strikingly variant estimations could not be explained away by the time difference, as noted by 
Srinivasan (1995:55). A similar controversy also occurred between Denison and Kendrick, as pointed 
by Szirmai (1993:6-8). The sharply contradicting accounting results show that the exogenous 
neoclassical growth model has to be transcended before we can make any allowance for human capital 
accumulation and quality changes in physical inputs.
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guises, e.g. trade, as a most important factor in generating growth, as
evidenced by the staple theory of growth.
The absence of the demand side might not be a problem if the Solowian model had 
remained a production function per se. There is a problem, however, if it becomes, as 
it did, a framework of a growth model, especially a framework of a ‘long-run macro- 
model’ of growth as Solow (1957:312) called it. It is unhelpful also in the sense that it 
makes the model especially inapplicable to the case of developing countries, 
especially those undergoing a transition or opening process. Not only is the expansion 
of foreign markets essential to rapid economic growth as shown by the experience of 
the NICs, but also the opening of domestic markets is indispensable for sustained 
long-run growth as suggested by the experiences of China and other former socialist 
de-linking countries (see, for instance, Young 1993; Kim and Lau 1994; Ito and 
Krueger 1995).
It is worth noticing that recent efforts in new growth theories and empirics to 
relate trade to growth have either concentrated on the role of foreign trade in 
transferring knowledge, or have isolated foreign trade from domestic trade (see, for 
instance, Lucas 1988; Grossman and Helpman 1990a; 1990b; 1991; Tybout 1992; 
Wei 1995). That is, the ‘invisible hand’ is only partly rediscovered in new growth 
theories. It is here that perhaps lies the most outstanding theoretical problem with new 
growth theories and empirics: while there is a consistent theoretical framework in the 
exogenous neoclassical paradigm, there is not one in endogenous new growth models 
to link contributive factors together logically and effectively, as admitted by Römer 
(1995)3. Given the fact that at least 50 variables have been found to be significantly
3 Römer (1995:69) noted: ‘We have not yet reached consensus about how to write down a model that 
blends elements like learning by doing, knowledge spillovers, patents, explicit research and 
development, and government support for science. But we are once again making a serious effort 
toward reaching this goal’.
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correlated to economic growth in regression analyses, the absence of a consensus 
theoretical framework to group key explanatory variables in a logical way in new 
growth theories and empirics inevitably leads researchers to focus on so vastly 
divergent elements that the resulting estimates are doomed to be very fragile. As 
Levine and Renelt (1992) pointed out:
There does not exist a consensus theoretical framework to guide empirical 
work on growth, and existing models do not completely specify the variables 
that should be held constant while conducting statistical inference on the 
relationship between growth and the variables of primary interest. This has 
produced a diverse and sometimes unwieldy literature, in which few studies 
control for the variables analysed by other researchers.
The theoretical deficiency in new growth models helps to explain why the 
neoclassical growth paradigm still, though with so many pitfalls, enjoys wide 
popularity in empirical work (see, for instance, Dowrick and Nguyen 1989; World 
Bank 1991; 1993; Benhabib and Jovanovic 1991; Boskin and Lau, 1992a; 1992b; Kin 
and Lau 1992, 1994; IMF 1995; Borensztein and Jonathan 1996).
In a sense, the epistemological problem with both the neoclassical growth 
paradigm and the new growth theories and empirics is the same: overdue eagerness 
for exhaustive explanation. While neoclassical growth theorists and empiricists try to 
find ‘a way of exhaustively accounting for the ingredients that lead to the observed 
growth trend’ by a single TFP without any concrete meaning (Samuelson, Nordhaus, 
Richardson, Scott and Vallace 1992:496), new growth theorists and empiricists tend 
to find ways of exhaustively explaining the observed growth by as many variables as 
possible without a consistent link between them. The realistic and yet promising goal 
of a growth model should lie in between, that is, to capture the key rather than all the 
mechanics of growth. We should admit that we can never explain completely such a 
complicated process as economic growth due to both the limited ability of our
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intellectuality and the limited availability of the data. A theoretical model or a well- 
established paradigm can, no matter how ‘perfect’ it appears to be, only be justified 
relatively, and this has been proved to be true by our intellectual history (Kuhn 1970).
In the next section, a ‘two-way effect’ approach to modelling growth is 
presented to capture the key mechanics of growth in transition or opening economies: 
the interaction between various inputs on the one hand and efficiency in input 
allocation and utilisation introduced by market orientations on the other.
Besides the theoretical and epistemological limitations, there are also 
methodological problems with the neoclassical growth paradigm, which have, 
together with the problems analysed above, resulted in enormous imprecision in 
estimation in TFP accounting. Table 8 shows, for instance, vast variations in TFP 
growth rates for Singapore estimated by different researchers. For an analysis of the 
possible causes of the variation, it is necessary to distinguish between different effects 
and look into various estimation approaches. Two broad approaches can be identified 
in growth accounting exercises. The first can be labelled the stock/rate approach, 
which estimates either the effect of input stocks on GDP (Equation 1) or the effect of 
the growth rate of the input stocks on the GDP growth rate (Equation 2).
where A denotes change over previous period. The stock/rate approach is ‘typical’ of 
the neoclassical growth accounting exercises initiated by Solow, and is also ‘ideal’ 
according to the neoclassical growth theoretical framework if only the necessary data 
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Being more or less an ‘accumulative effect’ estimation, as shown in the next 
section, both the stock and the growth rate approaches demand, among other things, 
an accurate calculation of accumulated physical capital stock, a task which is so 
difficult, or even impossible, that Solow himself (1957:314) had to admit that it ‘will 
really drive a purist mad’. As a result, growth accounting exercises face two choices 
in empirical studies. On the one hand, one or another approach to estimating physical 
capital stock has to be invented no matter how arbitrary it is. The unreliability of the 
existing three approaches to capital stock estimation (that is, gross capital stock at 
replacement cost; the net capital stock; cumulative gross investment) was already 
pointed out by Scott (1989:xxix, 90-3). If the capital stock cannot be estimated 
accurately, how can we expect the accounting results based on the estimation to be 
precise? On the other hand, if the capital stock and its growth rate cannot be
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estimated, proxies have to be found. This leads to the second estimation approach 
within the neoclassical growth paradigm: ‘mixed-effect’ estimation.
Mixed-effect estimation occurs when the right-hand variables in a regression 
are not in an unified form, and thereby the estimated effects are conflated. The mixed- 
effect approach has been very popular in neoclassical growth accounting exercises in 
recent years as the capital stock growth rate was increasingly proxied by the ratio of 
gross investment to GDP. In that case, the mixed-effect estimation can be expressed 
mathematically as
L *£\
Y ’ L }
(3)
where I  denotes gross investment. The inconsistency in estimation of the effects can 
be seen from the equation. Although there could be justification for use of the 
investment ratio as a proxy for the capital stock growth rate (see, for instance, Feder 
1982:62-3), its impact on the GDP growth rate could not be the same since 
investment and GDP might not increase proportionally at the same pace as the capital 
stock grows* 4. The capital stock in the USA in the first half of the century tended, for 
instance, to rise rather steadily from US$ 146,142 million in 1909 to US$ 289,360 
million in 1949 (Solow 1957). By contrast, however, the investment ratio in the USA 
fell from 17.9 per cent in the period between 1890 and 1909 to 12.7 per cent in the 
period between 1930 and 1949 (Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1995). The mixed-effect
4 For instance, if investment remains the same as in the previous year while GDP grows due to other
contributive factors such as increased labour and human capital inputs or improved efficiency in input
allocation and utilisation, the growth rate of physical capital stock will be zero while the investment
4 3
ratio might decline from, say, to —  . The effect of a zero capital stock growth rate and that of a 
declining investment ratio are obviously not the same in a regression.
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approach would inevitably produce inaccurate estimates in growth accounting where 
the shares of the right-hand variables in the total effect need to be calculated and 
compared according to regression coefficients. In that situation, the effect of capital 
stock growth (proxied by the investment ratio) could be either overestimated or 
underestimated, and the decomposed contribution of TFP to growth could be very 
misleading.
Two reasons stand out for the popularity of the mixed-effect approach. One 
is the insurmountable difficulties in calculating capital stock as noted above, and the 
other is the increasing interest in cross-country comparison. As Dowrick and Nguyen 
(1989:1016-7) admitted:5
Lacking estimates of capital stock for all countries in our sample, we will 
initially follow the common practice of proxying capital growth by the 
average annual share of investment in output, (I/Q). Implicit in this practice is 
an assumption that capital-output ratios are constant across countries and over 
time...This assumption is clearly open to criticism.
It is perhaps exactly due to the same two reasons that the mixed-effect approach was
also quite popular in existing endogenous new growth models, where not only the
investment ratio but also the export ratio, schooling ratio, literate rate, government
expenditure ratio, etc., were mixed up with growth rates such as labour input growth
rate, population growth rate, inflation rate, and domestic credit growth rate (see
Levine and Renelt 1992; Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1995). It is obvious that future
growth models need to address the effect estimation problems. To this end, a net-
increase effect approach is applied in our growth modelling, and is illustrated in the
next section.
5 Their assumption that ‘capital-output ratios are constant across countries and over time’ is in 
violation of reality. As shown by Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995:8-9), for instance, the investment ratio 
declined steadily in the USA but rose steadily in Canada, France, Japan, Australia, and other countries
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What created the miracle: a model and its application to China
To overcome the limitations of conventional growth modelling, a growth framework 
for transition or opening economies is developed to capture a key mechanism of 
China’s growth performance. For the epistemological reason given above, it should be 
pointed out from the very outset that the growth framework is intended to identify the 
main rather than all mechanisms of economic growth, that is, a two-way net-increase 
relationship in economic growth in a transition or opening economy. The growth 
framework is specified first, and then is tested against China’s growth performance in 
the post-1978 period.
Model specification
The theoretical framework of the model is quite simple, and can be expressed 
mathematically as
AY = F(AI,AE) (4)
where Y stands for GDP, I for various inputs such as labour, physical capital and 
human capital, E for efficiency in input allocation and utilisation introduced by 
domestic and international market orientations. A stands for net increase, so 
AY =Yt -  Yt_x , AI = 7, -  , and AE = Et -  Et_x. As can be seen from Equation 4,
the model is better named the two-way net-increase effect model.
in the first half of the century. The varying investment ratios apparently imply varying capital-output 
ratios.
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Figure 7 T w o-w ay net-increase effect model
In crease  
in Inputs
L
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0 A E  a n d  u tilisa tion
Note: Economic growth is expressed as a function of the interaction betv/een the 
increase in inputs and the increase in efficiency in input allocation and utilisation 
through market orientations. The interaction pushes the growth isoquant along the 
growth locus L from Gl to G2, G3...
By ‘two-way’ effect, it is meant that economic growth takes place because 
either various inputs are increased or efficiency in input allocation and utilisation is 
improved through market orientations, or both. The dynamics of growth come, 
therefore, from the two main directions. A diagrammatic exposition of the theoretical 
framework of the model can be found in Figure 7, where the vertical axis expresses 
net increases in various inputs and the horizontal axis expresses net increases in 
efficiency in input allocation and utilisation introduced by market orientations. Better 
allocation of existing resources and improved utilisation of existing resources would 
be caught up as the residual. But here, they are seen as separate factors. Line L stands 
for the growth locus the slope of which is determined by the ratio of input increase to 
efficiency increase in a particular growth process. In this hypothesised case, the ratio
is ~ ~ ~  ■ Gl, G2, G3 are growth isoquants, with G1<G2<G3. A growth isoquant
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shows all the possible combinations between an input increase and an efficiency 
increase that are functionally capable of producing a given increase in GDP. 
Economic growth is expressed in the figure as the movement along the growth locus 
upwards from Gl to G2, G3...due to the effect of the interaction between increases in 
inputs and increases in efficiency in input allocation and utilisation through market 
orientations.
Obviously, there are two assumptions underlying the ‘two-way effect’ 
argument. The first assumption is that in developing countries undergoing a transition 
or opening process, market orientations can lead to increasing efficiency in resource 
allocation and utilisation. The assumption should be understood in at least two ways.
First, what determine economic growth are not only what happens on the 
supply side (especially various inputs such as labour, physical and human capital) but 
also what happens on the demand side (including both domestic and international 
markets). The long-run supply curve is not vertical in labour-surplus developing 
countries with enormous rural unemployment and underemployment, expecially those 
in a transition or opening process.6 It is similar or even identical to the short-run 
supply curve. If market demand increases due to non-price determinants (such as the 
increase in disposable income, expansion of foreign trade), the market demand curve 
shall shift, as shown in Figure 8, outward from DD to D ’D \  and the economy shall be 
led to make fuller use of its resources than before to meet the rising demand. In that 
case, no matter whether the supply curve SS remains constant or is pushed outward to 
S ’S ’, the aggregate supply (GDP) increases from Ge to G’e or to G’’e, and the output 
growth of the economy is thus accelerated.
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Figure 8 Shift in market demand curve: consequences
Note: In labour-surplus developing countries, the long-run supply curve is not 
vertical. If demand curve shifts from DD to D'D\  and the supply curve SS either 
remains constant or is pushed outward to S'S', the aggregate supply increases from 
Ge to G’e or to G”e.
Secondly, market orientations increase efficiency also by reallocating 
resources from sectors with lower productivity to sectors with higher productivity, 
and thereby the output produced by the same amount of resources increases. This is 
especially true of developing countries where there exists a significant productivity 
gap between primary and non-primary industry due to the surplus rural labour, as is 
the case in China (Gillis, Perkins, Roemer, and Snodgrass 1992:53-62). As shown in 
the next chapter, the productivity of non-primary industry is about 4 or 5 times as high 
as that of primary industry in China, and uneven changes in market demand for goods 
produced in the two kinds of industry (measured as coefficients of income elasticities
6 A vertical supply curve is based upon the assumption of full employment and capacity output. The 
assumption does not hold in labour-surplus developing countries, especially those in a transition or
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of demand) have drawn resources from the latter to the former.7 This is also especially 
true of transition or opening economies where there exists a significant productivity 
gap between state-owned and non-state owned enterprises due to previous adverse 
government intervention, as in the case of China. As seen in the next chapter, the 
productivity of non-state owned enterprises is 2 or 3 times as high as that of state- 
owned enterprises in China, and market competition has drawn resources from the 
latter to the former. Resource flows between these sectors mean that they are more 
efficiently utilised, and that output produced by the available resources increases 
substantially. As Figure 9 shows, the reallocation of inputs from sector 1 to sector 2 
more than doubles output in the hypothesised case.







Note: Market competition reallocates inputs from sectors with lower productivity 
(sector 1 in the figure) to sectors with higher productivity (sector 2 in the figure), the 
output produced by the same amount of inputs increases._______________________
Under both circumstances, the economy moves from an inferior position 
towards the production possibility frontier, as shown in Figure 10. The economy
opening process, owing to redundant labour forces in agriculture or state-owned enterprises.
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would move away from the production possibility frontier if the opposite happens. 
That is, market demand decreases due to non-price determinants, more and more 
available inputs lie idle, and a recession ensues; or alternatively, inputs flow, due to 
adverse government intervention, from sectors with higher productivity to sectors 
with lower productivity (as occurred in the former socialist-de-linking countries), and 
the output produced by available resources decreases.
Figure 10 The production possibility frontier
Quantity of good Y 
produced per unit time 
period
Quantity of goods X 
produced per unit 
time period
Note: Improvement in efficiency in resource allocation and utilisation through 
market orientations can lead an economy to move toward the production possibility 
frontier.
It should be pointed out that in developing countries undergoing the transition 
to markets systems like China, increasing market orientations can indicate not only 
efficiency gains buy also the success of government policy reforms. Government can 
play a positive role in the process, and ‘good’ government policies and reform
7 Primary industry is equal agriculture in China.
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measures are those that can provide legal, social, and physical infrastructure necessary 
for making full use of market mechanisms on the one hand and correct ‘market 
failures’ on the other. Given that the pre-1978 de-linking strategy was aimed at 
eradicating all trade and commodity relations and the post-1978 re-linking strategy 
was to release trade and commodity relations to increase efficiency (see Chapter 3), it 
may be argued that the increase in domestic and foreign trade can be taken as a proxy 
for increasing market orientations and the ensuing efficiency gains introduced by 
policy reforms in the re-linking process, and this argument is further justified by the 
particular long-run supply curve of developing countries in a transition or opening 
process (see Figure 8). This proxy is better than the decrease in government 
intervention within the context of China’s special case, though the latter could also be 
an appropriate measure in some circumstances.
Another assumption underlying the ‘two-way effect’ argument is that human 
capital input represents the accumulation of human knowledge and the improvement 
in the quality of physical capital and labour inputs and, therefore, is a special input 
different from physical capital and labour inputs. As such, its increase indicates, 
together with the increase in efficiency in input allocation and utilization through 
market orientations, ‘productivity’ progress, and the conventional definition of
o
productivity has to be modified thereby. All these ‘non-physical’ factors are, as 
‘endogenised’ TFP, the most active driving forces of long-run sustainable economic 
growth. Their aggregate share in the total effect on growth is, therefore, a very 
important indicator of sustainability of economic growth in an economy, especially a 
transition or opening economy.
8 Productivity was conventionally defined as ‘the ratio of aggregate output to aggregate input’ or ‘our 
economic ability to turn resources into output’ (Sargent 1986:3). As conventional inputs or resources 
included only ‘capital and labour inputs in physical unit’ (Solow 1957:312), human capital increases
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By ‘net-increase effect’ it is meant that economic growth boils down to the net 
increase in GDP, which is a function of the net increase in all the contributing factors. 
The ‘net-increase effect’ argument distinguishes the model from almost all existing 
models, no matter whether it is a consistent stock effect model (Equation 1), growth 
rate effect model (Equation 2), or an inconsistent mixed-effect model (such as that in 
Equation 3). The distinction between a ‘net-increase effect’ model and consistent 
stock/rate effect models is not as easily recognised as that between a net increase 
effect model and an inconsistent mixed-effect model, and therefore should be given 
more attention here. In a word, both the stock effect and the growth rate effect are 
more or less ‘accumulative effects’ while the net increase effect is not. The most 
obvious case is the stock effect which is characteristic of any aggregate production 
function in the form of Equation 1. It only shows how GDP increases from zero to a 
certain level due to the effect of factor accumulation (stocks), but it cannot tell exactly 
how GDP increases from one level to another due to the effect of net factor increases. 
That is, it cannot explain how growth happens! It is therefore basically a ‘static’ 
effect model, as Sarel (1995) called it. It should not be used as a growth model in the 
true sense, although it could be used to measure the aggregate performance of an 
economy if the necessary data were available.
The growth rate effect is more ‘dynamic’ than the stock effect, but it is still 
overshadowed by an ‘accumulative effect’ since a net increase has to be divided by a
‘accumulative-effect free’ (Ax), as is the case in Equation 4. The difference between a
growth rate effect and a net increase effect has long been neglected to the point that 
only the former is taken as ‘dynamic’ (Saral 1995) and is used in growth modelling.
should be taken as part of productivity progress. In that context, the above definition of productivity
previously accumulated Only the ‘net-increase effect’ model is
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The difference can, however, be shown in a simple test in any regression. As growth 
rate effect estimation is very sensitive to the previously accumulated level of the 
right-hand variables, net increase effect estimation is highly recommended in growth 
modelling. The recommendation is further justified by the insurmountable difficulties 
in calculating accumulated capital stock and its growth rate, since all these difficulties 
can be avoided in a ‘net-increase effect’ model.
Underlying the ‘net-increase effect’ argument is an assumption that what has 
an effect on net increases in GDP is ultimately the net increase in, rather than the 
previous accumulated level of, all the contributing factors. A related counter-factual 
hypothesis would be: if a country maintains the previously accumulated level of all 
the contributing factors for years (it is actually impossible), its GDP could not 
possibly increase or might even decrease in a competitive global market context. A 
question arises here, however, with regard to what are net increases in physical and 
human capital inputs. To avoid arbitrarily estimating the depreciation rate of physical 
capital (not to mention human capital) as the neoclassical growth theorists and 
empiricists did, we follow Scott (1989; 1993) and use new investments in the period 
concerned (/ ,) as proxies for net increases in physical (and human) capital inputs in
our net-increase effect model.
Empirical test
In applying the two-way net-increase effect model to China, a set of panel data 
was collected which covers all the 30 provinces and metropolitan cities in China for 
the 16-year period from 1978 to 1993. The increase in inputs is divided into three 
parts: the increase in labour input ( AL ), the increase in physical capital input ( A Pc),
has to be modified.
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and the increase in human capital input ( AHe), and they are proxied respectively by 
the increase in the number of labourers employed, the new investment in fixed assets, 
and the new government expenditures on culture, education, science and health care 
(including the so-called ‘three funds’ for science and technology). The increase in 
efficiency introduced by market orientations is divided into two parts: the increase in 
efficiency through increased domestic market orientation ( ADm ) and the increase in 
efficiency through increased international market orientation (Aim), and they are 
proxied by the increase in the total value of retail sales and the increase in the total 
value of imports and exports respectively.9 By substituting these for AI and AE in 
Equation 4, we obtain
Ay = F{ AL, APc, AHe, ADm, A Im) (5)
where AY stands for the increase in GDP.
We then specify the relationship in Equation 5 with the familiar statistical 
model known as the exponential regression model:
A Yu = AAL?' APc* AHc* ADm* A Im* e“‘ (6)
where u stands for the stochastic disturbance term, e for the base of natural 
logarithms, i for the ith province and t for the rth time period. It should be pointed out 
that the model assumes a zero or even negative intercept.10 We use the intercept-
9 All data come from the various statistical yearbooks published by the state and local governments in 
China, including the Statistical Yearbook of China (1983-1995), Almanac of China’s Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade (1984-1995), and the Statistical Yearbooks of the 30 provinces and 
metropolitan cities. Occasional missing values are estimated by regressions with ‘goodness of fit’ (R2) 
no less than 0.95.
10 See the assumption made previously for the ‘net-increase effect’ argument.
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present rather than the regression-through-origin statistical model for the practical 
purpose of testing the assumption (Gujarati 1995). After log-transformation, Equation 
6 becomes:
LnAYit = a + ß , LnALü + ß 2LnAPcit + ß 3LnAHcit
+ß4LnADmit + ß 5LnAlmjt +ujt (7)
where a (constant) stands for LnA.
Equation 7 can be used for the analysis of pooled cross-sectional and time 
series data in two ways: classical pooling to obtain invariant parameters for China in 
the period as a whole, and controlled pooling to obtain variant parameters for different 
regions and periods. Here, the analysis is confined to the former for illustrative 
purpose. Equation 7 is already a statistical model for classical pooling with its 
invariant parameters. To make clearer the distinction between the classical pooling 
and the controlled pooling, Equation 7 is rewritten in a simple summation form:
K
LnAYit = a + ^  ß K LnAXKit -I- uit (8)
k =\
where X stands for explanatory variable, k for the Idh explanatory variable and k =1, 
2, 3, 4, 5 in our case, a and ß  are the mean intercept and the mean slope, respectively 
(Dielman 1989).
Before running the regression, a technical problem has to be addressed: there 
are negative and zero values in both dependent and explanatory variables which 
cannot be log-transformed, and which are therefore treated as missing data.
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Ln(Yit +w)or Ln(XKit -t-w) could be used to transform negative values into positive 
ones, as suggested by Gujarati (1995:387).’1 However, the treatment of data would, 
especially in the multiple regression, distort the real relationship between variables in 
the model, for the value given to w could be very arbitrary. In this way, a researcher 
can virtually achieve almost any output desired simply by changing the value of w. It 
is preferable, therefore, to leave the data as they are without any ‘manipulation’ so as 
to ‘let the data speak for themselves’. Such ‘objectivism’ in data treatment has 
actually a very significant advantage for the two-way net-increase effect model: it 
allows capture of the ‘net increase effect’ in the true sense since all the decrease 
effects are excluded in the regression procedure. The effect on growth of an increase 
of one million labourers could be very different from that of a decrease of one million 
labourers. By excluding all the decrease effects, we can now safely say that what is 
being captured in the model is the ‘net increase effect’ per se. The cost of this 
‘objectivism’ in the data treatment is, first of all, the loss of a considerable number of 
degrees of freedom. This does not do much harm to the estimation due to the large 
size of the sample. Another cost is that the Kmenta model cannot be applied due to 
the unequal length of time periods. Therefore, ordinary least square (OLS) estimation 
is used with the normal statistical assumption that the errors uit are independent and
normally distributed N(0,(j]) for all individuals and in all time periods. The 
regression is run on SHAZAM, and the regression results are reported in Table 9.
11 Here w is a positive number chosen in such a way that all the values of Y and X k become positive.
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Table 9 R egression results on E quation 7 (dependent variable: In net increase in 
GDP)
Variable Coefficient
C onstant -0 .0 2
( -0 .0 9 )
[-0 .0 8 ]
Ln AL 0 .0 3
(0 .0 9 )
[0 .0 9 ]
Ln A P c 0  2 7 ***
(3 .0 6 )
[2 .5 9 ]
L n A H c 0 .4 8 * * *
(4 .9 2 )
[3 .9 1 ]
Ln A D m 0 .3 8 * * *
(6 .0 9 )
[6 .0 3 ]
Ln A im 0 .0 9 * * *
(3 .4 7 )
[2 .3 0 ]
F statistic
5 2 7 .9 4 * * *
_ 2
R 0 .8 7
D eg rees o f  freedom 3 8 6
N o te : N um bers in parentheses under the c o e ff ic ie n t estim a tes are a sso c ia ted  t-ratios. C o effic ien t  
estim a tes w ith  *** are sig n ifica n t at the 0 .01  s ig n ifica n ce  lev e l. W hite h eterosced astic ity  con sisten t t- 
statistics are in square brackets[ ]. D urb in -W atson  statistic is 2 .0 0 8 .
The intercept is negative and insignificant, indicating that the true intercept is 
in fact zero. This supports the assumption we made about the net increase effect. The 
estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables can be taken as elasticities of the 
change in the net increase in GDP with respect to the change in the net increase in the 
explanatory variables. For example, the coefficient of the increase in physical capital
163
input shows that a 1 per cent change in the net increase in physical capital input could 
lead to a 0.27 per cent change in the net increase in GDP, other factors held constant.
Taking the elasticities as equal to the effective shares in the GDP increase due 
to the increase in the contributing factors, as the conventional growth accounting did 
(Solow 1957; Benhabib and Jovanovic 1991), we can decompose the total GDP 






where AX kc stands for the contribution of the net increase in the *th factor, AX ks for 
the effective share ( ß )  of the net increase in the *th factor, AX^rfor the average 
annual percentage change of the net increase in the *th factor, and Ayr for the 
average annual percentage change of the net increase in GDP. The decomposed
1 7contribution of each of the factors is reported in Table 10.
Table 10 shows that conventional labour and capital inputs in ‘physical units’ 
have contributed only 25 per cent of the observed growth in post-1978 China while 
the rest could be attributed to ‘non-physical’ factors, or TFP if the conventional 
growth accounting terminology is used. It would be preferable, however, to leave 
aside the vague term of TFP, and decompose the contributions in the way shown
12 The effective share (coefficient) tells us what percentage change in the net increase in GDP can be 
introduced by a 1 per cent change in the net increase in the contributing factor (other factors held 
constant), whereas the average annual percentage change shows what percentage change in the net 
increase in the contributing factor has actually occurred annually on average. Therefore, the sum of the 
weighted effective shares can be seen as the total contribution, and is, as could be expected, very close 
to the average annual percentage change of the net increase in GDP. We should be aware, however, 
that, in statistical terms, there is still 13 per cent of the net increase in GDP unexplained by the model, 
_  2
as indicated by the R  value in Table 9.
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above. The overwhelming aggregate contribution of market efficiency and human 
capital input (75 per cent) does not, however, indicate that China’s market efficiency 
and human capital input has reached a high level. But what it does say is that they 
played an overwhelming role in promoting China’s growth in the period concerned. 
What is measured here is a ‘dynamic’ net-increase effect rather than a ‘static’ 
accumulative-effect.
Table 10 Decomposition of contributions to China’s GDP growth from 1978 to 
1993
Variable Effective share( ß ) Annual change(%) Contribution^)
( A X , ) ( A X ,  s) (AX kr) ( A X , c )
In crease  in la b o u r inpu t 0 .03 0 .45 0 .0 0
In crease  in p h y sica l 
cap ita l in p u t
0 .27 17.46 2 4 .6 2
In crease  in hum an  
cap ita l inpu t
0 .48 13.36 33 .48
In crease  in e ffic ien cy  
th ro u g h  d o m e s tic  m ark e t 
o rien ta tio n
0 .38 14.71 2 9 .1 9
In crease  in e ffic ie n cy  
th ro u g h  in te rn a tio n a l 
m ark e t o rie n ta tio n
0 .0 9 2 7 .4 0 12.90
Note: Average annual percentage change is calculated using the ‘constant growth 
model’ LnAx,  = ß , + ß , where x stands for the variable to be calculated.
Interpretations and remarks
The two-way net-increase effect model passes the econometric test, and the 
decomposition results can shed a great deal of light on the mechanics of China’s rapid
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economic growth in the transition or opening process. Here it is necessary to give 
some interpretations and remarks with regard to the model and its test results.
Growth determinants
As can be seen from Table 10, the contribution of ‘inputs in physical unit’ was
attributed completely to physical capital input (25 per cent), so China should continue
to mobilise domestic and international physical capital resources to maintain growth
momentum. The increase in labour input had no significant impact on China’s
economic growth. This is consistent with the fact that China is a labour-surplus
1 ^developing country with enormous rural unemployment or underemployment. 
However, this conclusion does not deny that an increase in labour input can contribute 
to economic growth in some economic sectors. Reallocation of labour resources 
between sectors with different productivity levels plays an important role in 
improving efficiency and, therefore, in accelerating economic growth. It is here that 
market forces released in the re-linking or opening process can play a major role in 
transferring physical inputs including labour from less efficient primary industry to 
more efficient non-primary industry, and from less efficient state-owned enterprises to 
more efficient non-state owned enterprises, as shown in the next chapter. Therefore, 
China should pay attention to improving efficiency in input allocation and utilisation 
through market orientations.
The significant contribution to economic growth by human capital inputs (33 
per cent) deserves attention from policymakers. China began to reform its education 
system in the late 1970s, and Deng Xiaoping declared that ‘science and technology 
are the prime productive force’ soon afterwards. As a result, government expenditure
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on the improvement of human resources increased, elementary education 
strengthened, science and technology developed rapidly, and cultural and education 
levels were enhanced. All of these have contributed significantly to China’s rapid 
economic growth, so China should continue to increase human capital input to 
maintain its growth momentum.14 However, the experience of the Great Cultural 
Revolution in the 1960s shows that increased human capital inputs have to be 
allocated and utilised properly, otherwise they could block economic growth. It is 
here, once again, that market forces released in the re-linking or opening process play 
a major role in allocating the human capital input according to the needs of rational 
economic development rather than political campaigns and, therefore, in improving 
efficiency in human capital utilisation.
Apparently, improvements in efficiency in the allocation and utilisation of 
both physical and human resources through market orientations play an extremely 
important role in economic growth, as suggested by our regression and decomposition 
results in Tables 9 and 10. The significant contribution to GDP growth from the 
increase in efficiency through domestic and international market orientations (42 per 
cent) is consistent with the fact that China underwent a radical change from a de­
linking to a re-linking development strategy, and began to open up to market systems 
both domestically and internationally. Four points need to be made, however, with 
regard to the two variables representing efficiency introduced by domestic and 
international market orientations in the model.
First, as seen from Chapter 3, most of the discussion on market forces in China 
has focused on the contradiction between use of free market forces and government
13 It was estimated that unemployment rate in rural China was as high as 35 per cent in 1997.
14 It is not a coincidence that quite a few recent studies showed that increased human capital inputs and 
enhanced cultural and educational level have also been an important determinant of the rise of the 
newly industrialised countries in East Asia.
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intervention. Actually, this is only part, or even not the most important part, of the 
story, at least as far as transition or opening economies like China are concerned. The 
essence of transition or opening up is a shift from a comprehensive de-linking strategy 
aimed at eradicating all trade and commodity relations toward a comprehensive re­
linking strategy aimed at making full use of trade and commodity relations. It is not a 
question of the extent to which governments intervene in ‘free’ markets. Actually, 
completely ‘free’ markets have been only a dream of some economists since Smith 
and have never become a reality, for government intervention has accompanied even 
the most marketised economies. Economic history showed that proper government 
intervention could facilitate the development of markets and, therefore, accelerate 
economic growth. The market variables in the model should not be, therefore, 
considered as a force contradicting government intervention. On the contrary, they 
should be considered as resulting from government intervention in China’s special 
case, that is, from the reform and open-door policies adopted by the Chinese 
government. Government intervention under the re-linking strategy differs, however, 
from that under the de-linking strategy in that the former aims at making full use of 
market mechanisms while the latter aims at eradicating all trade and commodity 
relations.
Secondly, owing to the difference between goods produced in primary 
industry and those produced in non-primary industry, there will be an increasing 
market demand for goods produced in non-primary industry in due course as incomes 
increase (the Engel’s Law). The increase in the demand can, therefore, lead to 
resource flows from primary industry with lower productivity to non-primary industry 
with higher productivity and, therefore, to improved efficiency in resource utilisation 
and sustained economic growth. In the case of China, that change occurred around
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1985 when grain as the main good produced in primary industry underwent, as shown 
in the next chapter, a change from a normal good to an inferior good. That is, after 
1985, people tended to buy less of grain as their income increased. By contrast, goods 
produced in non-primary industry have generally been normal goods. That is, people 
tended to buy more of them as their income increased. This explains why the strategy 
of re-linking with market systems led to the rise of the share of non-primary industry 
in China’s GDP from 69 per cent in 1978 to 80 per cent in 1993. Considering that the 
productivity of non-primary industry is about 4 or 5 times as high as that of primary 
industry in China, it should not come as a surprise when we find a close correlation 
between the industry structural change and sustained economic growth in post-1978 
China.
This is a very enlightening phenomenon since the correlation has occurred in 
every market-oriented developing country with successful development performance. 
The history of now-developed countries provides a case in point. Although we do not 
have historical data on developed countries throughout their whole development 
process, recent studies (see, for instance, Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1995) showed that 
the average annual per capita GDP growth rate was about 2 per cent in these countries 
in the period between 1870 and 1990, well above that in the rest of the world, and that 
the share of non-primary industry in GDP had risen to between 96 per cent (Italy, 
Australia, Holland, and Denmark) and 98 per cent (the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and Germany) in these countries by 1989. Another case is the NICs in East 
Asia, which have been in an accelerated developing process for the past few decades. 
The average annual GDP growth rate was, for instance, between 6.6 per cent 
(Malaysia) and 8.8 per cent (Korea) in the NICs in the period between 1960 and 1993, 
well above the world average (3.7 per cent), and the share of non-primary industry in
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GDP had risen to between 83 per cent (Malaysia) and 93 per cent (Korea) in the NICs 
by the end of 1993.15 Apparently, market forces play a key role in the close 
correlation between industry structural change and sustained economic growth.
Thirdly, as shown in Table 10, improved efficiency though the domestic 
market orientation made a much greater contribution to China’s GDP growth than that 
through the international market orientation. This is consistent with the large size of 
China’s population and territory. China is different from the ‘four small dragons’ in 
East Asia which have to rely heavily on international markets owing to the small size 
of their population and territory. In 1993, for instance, the ratio of the value of exports 
and imports to GDP was 0.41 in China, whereas it was 2.85 in Singapore, and 2.50 in 
Hong Kong. Therefore, while continuing to develop its international markets, China 
should pay major attention to making full use of its huge domestic markets so as to 
ensure the sustainability of economic growth.
Finally, we should be aware of the limitations of the model. While it is 
convenient to take the increase in domestic and international trade as representing 
China’s re-linking with market systems, for instance, it should be kept in mind that 
the re-linking process has many more dimensions than increases in domestic and 
foreign trade, such as the development of finance markets, labour markets, and 
science and technology markets. The contribution to economic growth by re-linking 
with, or opening up to, market systems might well be underestimated if it were 
measured only by the two market variables in the model. Owing to data constraints, 
however, it is impossible to find the ‘best’ proxies for market variables, and the same 
is true of input variables in the model. Therefore, all the proxies in the model do not 
match exactly what they are supposed to represent. The coefficients in the regression
15 International Economic Databank, Australian National University.
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output illustrated in Table 9 and the decomposed contributions illustrated in Table 10 
should be considered only as rough estimates. This is true of not only the study, but 
also of all other empirical studies of such an involved process as economic growth. 
Nevertheless, the empirical estimation strongly suggests that market forces released in 
the re-linking or opening process contributed significantly to the rapid economic 
growth in post-1978 China. As long as China continues to carry out reform and open- 
door policies to improve efficiency in resource allocation and utilisation through 
market orientations, while increasing capital inputs, especially human capital input, 
China can maintain its growth momentum.
Improvements in people’s livelihood
It was shown above that the long-run supply curve is not vertical in labour-surplus 
developing countries, especially those in a transition or opening process, so increased 
market demand can play an important role in economic growth. Given that increased 
demand is different from quantity demanded, and is determined by non-price factors, 
especially by the increase in people’s disposable income and consumption, it may be 
argued that economic growth cannot sustain without improvements in people’s 
livelihood. Sustained economic development should be, therefore, an integrated 
process involving not only GDP growth but also improvements in people’s livelihood. 
This argument gains strong support from China’s experience in the pre-and post-1978 
periods.
China’s unsustainable economic growth in the pre-1978 period was correlated 
with slow improvements in people’s livelihood. In the 26 years from 1952 to 1978, 
for instance, the average annual per capita real wages of staff and workers increased 
by only 10.3 per cent, from 445 yuan to 490.84 yuan. From 1965 to 1978, average
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annual per capita real income rose only by 25 per cent, from 132 yuan to 165 yuan. 
As far as the difference between urban and rural residents was concerned, the latter 
were worse off than the former: average annual per capita real income of rural 
residents increased only by 20.4 per cent, from 110.17 yuan to 132.64 yuan while 
average annual per capita real income of urban residents increased by 26.8 per cent, 
from 313.8 yuan to 397.8 yuan16. Until the late 1970s and early 1980s, the majority of 
China’s 1 billion population were still very poor after 30 years of socialist 
development. Moreover, more than 200 million people (mainly in rural areas in 
China’s western provinces) lived in absolute poverty without sufficient food, clothing, 
and housing. In 1981, according to World Bank statistics, there were 199 million 
Chinese living below the absolute poverty line (World Bank 1996). As a result, 
people’s consumption of basic consumer goods did not increase very much, or even 
decreased slightly. As Table 11 shows, from 1957 to 1978, China’s per capita 
consumption of selected basic consumer goods witnessed declines in grain, edible 
vegetable oil, beef and mutton, poultry, and aquatic products, and only a slight 
increase for pork, poultry, fresh eggs, sugar, cigarettes, liquor, tea, cloth, woollen 
fabric, and silk and satin. The decreased consumption deprived the economy of 
growth momentum, and contributed to the unsustainability of China’s growth 
performance over that period.
16 The increases in wages and income are calculated at 1952 constant prices. Per capita income of urban 
residents refers to ‘total income’ in Chinese terms, and is the ‘total actual cash income, including 
regular or fixed income and one-off income. Circulating income such as withdrawal from bank 
deposits, loans borrowed from relatives or friends, repayment of loans received and various temporary 
collection of money is excluded’. Per capita income of rural residents refers to ‘net income’ in Chinese 
terms, and is the ‘total income after the deduction of expenses, which can be spent for investments for 
production and non-production construction and for improvement of daily life, while loan income 
borrowed from banks or friends and relatives is not included’ (Statistical Yearbook of China 7994:291).
Ir Pr+ IrPu
Per capita income are calculated using the formula: la = -------------- , where la stands for average
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Table 11 Per capita consumption of selected basic consumer goods in China, 
1957-1978
Goods 1957 1962 1965 1970 1975 1978
Grain (kg) 203.06 164.63 182.84 187.22 190.52 195.46
Edible vegetable oil (kg) 2.42 1.09 1.72 1.61 1.73 1.60
Pork (kg) 5.08 2.22 6.29 6.02 7.63 7.67
Beef and mutton (kg) 1.11 0.79 1.02 0.82 0.72 0.75
Poultry (kg) 0.50 0.38 0.36 0.32 0.35 0.44
Fresh eggs (kg) 1.26 0.77 1.42 1.32 1.63 1.97
Aquatic products (kg) 4.34 2.96 3.33 2.94 3.26 3.50
Sugar (kg) 1.51 1.60 1.68 2.06 2.26 3.42
Cigarettes (packs) 16.90 9.70 16.15 20.52 26.22 30.82
Liquor (kg) 1.37 1.14 1.30 1.51 2.18 2.57
Tea(kg) 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.14
Cloth (m) 6.82 3.70 6.17 8.11 7.62 8.03
Woollen fabric (m) 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.08
Silk and satin (m) 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.25 0.25 0.28
Notes: (1) Consumption includes materials supplied both through markets and through subsistence
living. Figures for grain, edible vegetable oil, pork, beef and mutton, poultry, fresh eggs, aquatic 
products, sugar, cloth, woollen fabric, silk and satin include processing consumption that consumes 
those materials, such as grain, edible vegetable oil, pork, beef and mutton, and sugar consumption in 
processing food, as well as cloth, woollen fabric, silk and satin consumption in processing clothing, 
shoes and caps. (2) Grain refers to trade grain, edible vegetable oil includes oil-bearing crops 
converted into oil, and cloth includes cotton cloth, cotton/chemical fibre-blend cloth and chemical 
fibres.
Source: Statistical Yearbook o f China 1994, Beijing.
By contrast, China’s sustained economic growth since 1978 has been 
accompanied by rapid improvement in people’s livelihood. Calculated at 1978 
constant prices, as shown in Table 12, the average annual per capita real wages of 
staff and workers increased by 1.86 times in the period between 1978 and 1993, from 
615 yuan to 1143.34 yuan. The average annual per capita real income increased by 
3.3 times, from 166.25 yuan to 548.73 yuan. As far as the difference between urban 
and rural residents is concerned, the latter witnessed a faster growth than the former: 
average annual per capita real income of rural residents increased by 3.39 times, from 
133.6 yuan to 452.27 yuan while average annual per capita real income of urban
annual per capita income, Ir for annual per capita income of rural residents, Iu for annual per capita
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residents increased by 2.5 times, from 316 yuan to 795.1 yuan. The rapid increase in 
incomes triggered increases in people’s consumption. As shown in Table 13, from 
1978 to 1993, average annual per capita real consumption (calculated at 1978 constant 
prices) increased by 2.8 times, from 175 yuan to 485.6 yuan. Rural residents’ annual 
per capita real consumption increased by 2.7 times, from 132 yuan to 352.3 yuan, 
while urban residents’ annual per capita real consumption increased by 2.5 times, 
from 383 yuan to 956.4 yuan. Comparing the post-1978 period with the earlier period, 
as shown in Figures 11 and 12, there was a sharp rise in real incomes and real 
consumption from the late 1970s onwards.
Table 12 Increase in per capita real wages and real income in China, 
1978-1993 (yuan at 1978 constant prices)
Year Wage Average income Urban income Rural income
1978 615.00 166.25 316.00 133.57
1980 695.29 226.51 401.32 184.46
1985 855.87 387.24 510.66 348.88
1990 962.03 460.64 625.05 401.64
1992 1067.54 516.48 721.43 438.24
1993 1143.34 548.73 795.06 452.27
Note: Urban income refers to annual per capita income available for the living 
of urban residents, and rural income refers to annual per capita net income of 
rural residents.
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1984-1994, Beijing.________________
income o f urban residents, P for population, Pr for rural population, and Pu for urban population.
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Table 13 Per Capita real consumption in China, 1978-1993 (yuan at 1978 
constant prices)
Y e a r A ll  r e s id e n ts R u r a l  r e s id e n ts U rb a n  r e s id e n ts
1978 175.00 132.00 383.00
1979 186.73 141.11 399.09
1980 204.40 154.84 427.43
1981 218.58 166.98 464.20
1982 229.60 179.65 459.60
1983 245.35 196.02 468.41
1984 272.30 220.31 498.28
1985 308.18 250.80 541.56
1986 321.30 256.87 580.25
1987 339.68 267.70 634.25
1988 362.95 284.06 679.44
1989 359.98 281.42 665.65
1990 367.85 280.10 704.72
1991 398.30 299.11 770.21
1992 444.50 327.89 870.18
1993 485.60 352.31 956.35
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1994, Beijing.
Figure 11 Increase in per capita real income in China, 1952-1993 (yuan at 
current prices)
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1984-1994, Beijing.
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Figure 12 Increase in per capita real consumption in China, 1952-1993 {yuan at 
current prices)
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1984-1994, Beijing.
The rise in consumption covered many dimensions. As could be expected, the 
consumption of basic consumer goods increased. As Table 14 shows, per capita 
consumption of all the selected basic consumer goods increased quite remarkably, 
especially edible vegetable oil (by 3.9 times), pork (by 2.38 times), beef and mutton 
(by 2.73 times), poultry (by 5.25 times), fresh eggs (by 3.93 times), aquatic products 
(by 2.1 times), sugar (by 1.58 times), and liquor (by 5.04 times). The most distinctive 
feature of the rising consumption in the period was, however, not the increase in these 
basic consumer goods, but the rapid increase in people’s possession of durable 
consumer goods. Up to 1978, the durable consumer goods available to ordinary 
Chinese residents were only bicycles, clocks, wristwatches, radio sets, sewing 
machines, and cameras. Urban residents looked upon them as the most valuable 
luxuries, and very few rural residents could afford to buy them. Ordinary Chinese
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residents could never aspire to own TV sets, recorders, refrigerators, washing 
machines, electric fans, and motorcycles. As China opened up, all these durable 
consumer goods were introduced from abroad to domestic markets, and the demand 
for these goods rose dramatically along with the increase in people’s income. From 
1978 onwards, as Tables 15, 16, and 17 show, these durable consumer goods 
increasingly entered ordinary households, urban and rural alike. Meanwhile, what had 
been conventional durable consumer goods possessed by ordinary residents before 
1978 either increased enormously (especially in rural China), or were increasingly 
replaced by new durable consumer goods (especially in urban China).
Table 14 Per capita consumption of selected basic consumer goods in China, 1978- 
1992
Goods 1978 1980 1983 1985 1987 1990 1991 1992
Grain (kg) 195.50 213.80 231.50 251.70 248.90 238.80 234.50 235.90
Edible vegetable oil (kg) 1.60 2.30 4.01 5.08 5.60 5.67 5.89 6.29
Pork(kg) 7.67 11.16 12.30 13.84 14.40 16.60 17.40 18.20
Beef and 0.75 0.83 1.10 1.31 1.43 1.73 1.79 2.05
Mutton (kg) 0.44 0.80 1.18 1.56 1.71 1.73 1.98 2.31
Poultry (kg) 1.97 2.27 2.95 4.93 5.50 6.27 7.10 7.75
Fresh eggs (kg) 3.50 3.41 4.00 4.84 5.49 6.53 6.79 7.29
Aquatic products (Kg) 3.42 3.83 4.46 5.57 6.59 4.98 4.98 5.42
Sugar(kg) 30.80 40.60 48.97 60.61 65.70 71.50 70.90 70.00
Cigarettes (packs) 2.57 3.41 5.79 7.61 10.40 11.60 11.90 12.90
Liquor(kg) 0.14 0.21 0.23 0.30 0.34 0.37 0.36 0.39
Tea(kg) 8.03 10.10 10.30 11.60 11.20 10.60 10.30 10.70
Clothe (m) 0.08 0.14 0.20 0.29 0.28 0.23 0.26 0.25
Woollen fabric (m) 0.28 0.45 0.56 0.85 0.86 0.64 0.68 0.66
Silk and satin (m) 78.00 80.00 83.00 85.00 87.00 90.00 91.00 92.00
Notes: (1) Consumption includes materials supplied through markets and provided on a subsistence basis. 
Figures for grain, edible vegetable oil, pork, beef and mutton, poultry, fresh eggs, aquatic products, sugar, 
cloth, woollen fabric, silk and satin include processing consumption that consume those materials, such as 
grain, edible vegetable oil, pork, beef and mutton, and sugar consumption in processing food, as well as 
cloth, woollen fabric, silk and satin consumption in processing clothing, shoes and caps. (2) Grain refers 
to trade grain, edible vegetable oil includes oil-bearing crops converted into oil, and cloth includes cotton 
cloth, cotton/chemical fibre-blend cloth and chemical fibres.
Source: Statistical Yearbook o f China 1994, Beijing.____________________________________________
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Table 15 Possession of selected durable consumer goods in China, 1978-1992
(per 100 persons)
Goods 1978 1980 1985 1987 1989 1990 1991 1992
Sewing machines 3.50 4.70 9.40 11.00 12.20 12.30 12.60 12.80
Bicycles 7.70 9.70 21.40 27.10 32.80 34.20 36.20 38.50
Electric fans 1.00 1.40 6.10 10.40 15.60 17.60 19.80 22.00
Washing machines 0.00 0.00 2.90 5.30 7.80 8.40 9.20 10.00
Refrigerators 0.00 0.00 0.40 1.10 2.30 2.60 3.00 3.40
Television sets 0.30 0.90 6.70 10.70 14.90 16.20 17.80 19.50
Tape recorders 0.20 0.50 3.50 6.50 9.60 10.40 11.30 12.20
Cameras 0.50 0.60 1.10 1.50 1.90 2.00 2.10 2.30
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1984-1994, Beijing.
Table 16 Urban household possession of selected durable consumer goods in 
China, 1981-1993 (per 100 households)
Goods 1981 1983 1985 1989 1991 1992 1993
Bicycles 135.90 159.93 152.27 184.68 158.51 190.48 197.16
Sewing machines 70.41 76.21 70.82 70.35 66.43 65.92 66.58
Electric fans 42.62 63.61 73.91 128.68 143.48 146.04 151.64
Washing machines 6.31 29.08 48.29 76.21 80.58 83.41 86.36
Refrigerators 0.22 1.65 6.58 36.47 48.70 52.60 56.68
Black&white TV sets 57.06 80.58 66.86 55.71 43.93 37.71 35.92
Colour TV sets 0.59 2.57 17.21 51.47 68.41 74.87 79.46
Tape recorders 12.97 27.11 41.16 67.07 70.34 73.59 75.53
Cameras 4.29 7.28 8.52 17.27 21.32 24.32 26.48
Source: Statistical Yearbook o f China 1984-1994, Beijing.
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Table 17 Rural household possession of selected durable consumer goods in 
China, 1978-1993 (per 100 households)
Goods 1978 1980 1985 1987 1991 1992 1993
Bicycles 30.73 36.87 80.64 98.52 121.64 125.66 133.39
Sewing machines 19.80 23.31 43.21 49.79 55.84 57.31 61.31
Clocks 24.33 30.95 37.32 46.92 47.95 52.21 62.56
Wristwatches 27.42 37.58 136.32 161.22 160.98 164.94 170.08
Electric fans , , 9.66 19.76 53.30 60.08 71.79
Washing machines 1.90 4.78 10.99 12.23 13.82
Refrigerators 0.06 0.31 1.64 2.17 3.05
Motorcycles . . 0.56 1.10 1.42 2.14
Radio sets 17.41 33.54 54.19 52.98 32.41 31.95 32.22
Black & white TV sets 0.30 10.94 22.04 47.53 52.44 58.3
Colour TV sets 0.80 2.34 6.44 8.08 10.86
Tape recorders .. 4.33 9.68 19.64 20.95 24.24
Cameras 0.50 0.87 1.00 0.99
Note: .. denotes that data are not available.
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1984-1994, Beijing.
Besides durable consumer goods, people’s demand for better living conditions 
rose significantly with the increase in their incomes, and their living space increased 
remarkably. From 1978 to 1993, as Table 18 shows, urban residents’ per capita living 
space increased by 2.1 times, from 3.6 square meters to 7.5 square meters, while rural 
residents’ per capita living space increased by 2.6 times, from 8.1 square meters to 
20.7 square meters. The increasing demand for durable consumer goods as well as for 
living space stimulated the rapid growth of secondary industry, and contributed 
significantly to China’s rapid industry structural change, as shown in the following 
chapter.
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Table 18 Increase in urban and rural residents’ per capita living space in 
China, 1978-1993 (square meters)














Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1994, Beijing.
The increase in incomes also stimulated people’s demand for education, 
culture and arts, medical care, and entertainment, which led, together with the rise of 
China’s international tourism, to the rapid growth of tertiary industry. Meanwhile, as 
shown in Table 19, the growth of various service industries was in turn an additional 
indicator of the improvement in the quality of people’s life. By 1995, the majority of 
China’s 1.3 billion population had moved out of poverty, and the quality of their 
livelihood had improved significantly. According to statistics provided by the World 
Bank and the State Statistical Bureau of China, people living under the absolute 
poverty line in China declined from 199 millions in 1981, to 98 millions in 1990, and 
to 60 millions in 1995.17 The rapid improvement in people’s livelihood increased 
market demand, provided a growth momentum for the economy, and contributed 
significantly to China’s sustained economic growth in the post-1978 period.
17 International Economic Databank, ANU; China TV News (12 August 1996), Beijing.
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Table 19 Some indicators of improving quality of people’s life in China, 1978- 
1993
Indicators (per 10000 persons) 1978 1980 1985 1990 1993
University students 8.90 11.60 16.10 18.04 21.40
Hospital beds 19.28 20.08 21.06 22.95 24.00
Doctors 10.73 11.68 13.35 15.42 15.80
Food/sale service networks 13.04 20.49 100.80 103.70
Workers in food/sale services 63.14 93.90 238.70 251.10
Green area (hectares) 10.60 9.60 13.70 32.20 34.90
Note: .. denotes that data are not available.
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1984-1994, Beijing.
What has led to the difference in people’s livelihood in the two periods? Once 
again, it is the re-linking with market systems or opening up to market forces. In the 
pre-1978 period, socialist planning system and public ownership necessitated the rigid 
control over people’s disposable income in both urban and rural areas so as to ensure 
massive investment in ‘socialist construction’ on the one hand, and socialist equality 
in people’s living standard on the other. People remained relatively poor, and their 
demand for consumer goods were depressed for decades. In the process of opening up 
to market forces, the rigid socialist planning system was relaxed, ownership of means 
of production was diversified, and there emerged numerous opportunities for people 
to become richer and richer. One of the opportunities can be found, for instance, in the 
rapid development of non-primary industry (especially in rural China) and non-public 
ownership introduced by market orientations, as shown in the next chapter.
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5 Active participation and uneven sectoral growth
China’s development performance has been characterised not only by rapid economic 
growth, but also by uneven sectoral growth and uneven regional development. 
Especially in recent years, uneven sectoral growth and uneven regional development 
accelerate, and draw increasing attention from policymakers and scholars alike. In this 
chapter, attention is focused on uneven sectoral growth, leaving uneven regional 
development to the next. First, the main dimensions of uneven sectoral growth are 
examined. Then, the model presented in the last chapter is used to analyse how 
uneven sectoral growth occurred in the process of active participation in the global 
market economy or opening up to market systems. Lastly, the significance and 
consequences of uneven sectoral growth are discussed.
Winners and losers
If the process of economic development is seen as a race and the various sectors in an 
economy as participants, the fast growing sectors can be considered as winners and 
the slowly growing sectors as losers. This metaphor can be seen as particularly apt 
when the determinants of uneven sectoral growth are explained in a competitive 
market context in the following section. Before embarking on that task, however, we 
have to identify which are the winners and which are the losers in the race in the first 
place.
A transition or opening economy consists of various sectors which can be 
classified in two ways: by what they produce, and by who owns them. The former
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divides an economy into different industry sectors such as primary industry, 
secondary industry, tertiary industry, and the subsectors within each of them. The 
latter divides an economy into different forms of ownership such as state ownership, 
collective ownership, private ownership, and the subdivisions within each of them. 
China’s uneven sectoral growth occurred not only between industry sectors but also 
between forms of ownership.
Uneven growth between industry sectors
After China opened up, uneven growth occurred almost everywhere between 
individual industry sectors and subsectors, but only the most significant are examined 
here. Figures 13 and 14 present an overall picture of uneven growth between three 
main industry sectors in China in the period between 1978 and 1993. They show that 
secondary industry and tertiary industry grew much faster than primary industry in 
terms of both output and employment.1 The average annual growth rate of secondary 
industry GDP was 10.51 per cent, that of tertiary industry GDP was 10.05 per cent, 
whereas the primary industry GDP growth rate was only 5.22 per cent. Meanwhile, 
the average annual growth rate of labourers employed in secondary industry was 4.5 
per cent, and that in tertiary industry was 6.6 per cent, whereas the growth rate of 
labourers employed in primary industry was only 1.2 per cent.
1 Primary industry is equal to agriculture in China.
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Note: Calculated at 1978 constant prices.
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1994, Beijing.
Figure 14 Average annual growth rate of labourers employed in China’s main 
industry sectors, 1978-1993 (%)
Tertiary industryPrimary industry Secondary industry
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1994, Beijing.
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The rapid growth of non-primary industry was rooted in rural China. Rural 
non-primary industry grew, as Figure 15 shows, much faster than the nation’s non­
primary industry as a whole. From 1978 to 1993, the average annual growth rate of 
the output value of rural non-primary industry was 27.8 per cent, 2.4 times the 
nation’s average (11.6 per cent), that of rural secondary industry was 27.6 per cent,
2.3 times the nation’s average (11.9 per cent), and that of rural tertiary industry was 
33.7 per cent, 3.5 times the nation’s average (9.7 per cent). Meanwhile, as shown in 
Figure 16, the number of labourers employed in rural non-primary industry also grew 
faster than in the nation’s non-primary industry as a whole. From 1978 to 1993, the 
average annual growth rate of labourers employed in rural non-primary industry was
11.3 per cent, 2.1 times the nation’s average (5.4 per cent), that in rural secondary 
industry was 10.7 per cent, 2.4 times the nation’s average (4.5 per cent), while that in 
rural tertiary industry was 18 per cent, 2.7 times the nation’s average (6.6 per cent).
Figure 15 Average annual growth rate of the output value of China’s rural non­








■  National average
Tertiary
industry
Note: Calculated at 1978 constant prices.
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1994, Beijing.
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Figure 16 Average annual growth rate of labourers employed in China’s rural 
non-primary industry as compared with the national average, 1978-1993 (%)
18
All non- Secondary Tertiary
primary industry industry
industry
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1994, Beijing.
Uneven growth between the three main industry sectors inevitably resulted in 
radical changes in industry structure. From 1978 to 1993, as shown in Figure 17, the 
share of secondary industry in GDP rose from 49 per cent to 52 per cent, and that of 
tertiary industry rose from 23 per cent to 27 per cent, whereas that of primary industry 
declined from 28 per cent to 21 per cent. Meanwhile, as shown in Figure 18, the share 
of secondary industry in total employment rose from 17 per cent to 23 per cent, that of 
tertiary industry rose from 12 per cent to 21 per cent, and that of primary industry 
declined from 71 per cent to 56 per cent.
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Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1994, Beijing.
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Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1994, Beijing.
Worthy of notice is the rise of new sectors in non-primary industry, especially 
the rise of international tourism (shown in Figure 19). International tourism existed in 
China well before 1978, but it is only since 1978 that it has become an industry sector 
in the true sense and achieved rapid growth.
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Figure 19 Rapid growth of international tourism in China, 1980-1993 (average 




Note: Calculated at current prices.
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1994, Beijing.
Uneven growth between forms of ownership
Uneven growth between forms of ownership (state, collective, and private) 
existed before 1978, but the direction was exactly opposite to that experienced in the 
post-1978 period. In the pre-1978 period, public ownership (including both state and 
collective) grew much faster than non-public ownership due to government 
intervention, and increasingly replaced the latter. In the post-1978 period, the opposite 
happened: non-public ownership reappeared and grew rapidly, whereas public 
ownership as a whole declined.
Individual farming in the form of the household responsibility system grew 
rapidly after 1978, and had replaced the cooperatives and communes in primary 
industry all over the country by the early 1980s. From then onwards, uneven growth 
between forms of ownership occurred mainly in China’s non-primary industry, and
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one of the most remarkable phenomena was the decline of state-owned enterprises 
previously dominant in non-primary industry. This occurred everywhere in non­
primary industry, but only the most significant are highlighted. In the post-1978 
period, as shown in Figure 20, the average annual growth rate of the output value of 
industry under state ownership was only 7.8 per cent, while that under collective 
ownership was 18.6 per cent, that under individual ownership was 65.2 per cent, and 
that under other forms of ownership was 38.9 per cent. As shown in Figure 21, the 
average annual output growth rate of the output value of the construction industry 
under state ownership was 16.2 per cent, that under collective ownership was 20.8 per 
cent, that under other forms of ownership was 32.1 per cent. As shown in Figure 22, 
the average annual growth rate of retail sales under state ownership was 12.1 per cent, 
lower than that under joint ownership (39.4 per cent) and that under individual 
ownership (45.8 per cent). Although it was a little bit higher than that under collective 
ownership (10.9 per cent), it was still lower than that under all the forms of non-state 
ownership as a whole (16.5 per cent). Meanwhile, employment in non-primary 
industry under state ownership also grew much slower than under non-state 
ownership. As shown in Figure 23, the average annual growth rate of labourers in 
non-primary industry under state ownership was 2.6 per cent, that under collective 
ownership was 6.6 per cent, that under individual ownership was 42.2 per cent, and 
that under other forms of ownership was 15.9 per cent.
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Figure 20 Average annual growth rate of the output value of main forms of 
ownership in China’s industry, 1978-1993 (%)
State Collective Individual Other forms
Notes: (1) Calculated at 1978 constant prices; (2) Other forms of ownership mainly 
include foreign-funded and overseas Chinese-funded enterprises, joint management 
enterprises, and stock-sharing enterprises.
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1994, Beijing._____________________
Figure 21 Average annual growth rate of the output value of main forms of 




Notes: (1) Calculated at 1980 constant prices; (2) Other forms of ownership refers to 
miscellaneous rural construction teams and affiliated construction units.
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1994, Beijing._____________________
190
Figure 22 Average annual growth rate of retail sales of main forms of ownership 




Note: Calculated at current prices.
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1994, Beijing.
Figure 23 Average annual growth rate of labourers employed in main forms of 
ownership in China’s non-primary industry, 1978—1993 (%)
Other formsCollective Individual
Note: Other forms of ownership mainly include foreign-funded and overseas 
Chinese-funded enterprises, joint management enterprises, and stock-sharing 
enterprises.
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1994, Beijing._____________________
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Rapid growth of non-state ownership inevitably led to radical changes in the 
structure of ownership in China’s non-primary industry in the post-1978 period. The 
share of state-owned enterprises in the output value of industry fell from 78 per cent 
to 43 per cent, whereas that under collective ownership rose from 22 per cent to 38 
per cent, that under individual ownership rose from zero to 8 per cent, and that under 
other forms of ownership rose from zero to 10 per cent (Figure 24). The share of 
state-owned enterprises in the output value of construction industry fell from 64 per 
cent to 37 per cent, whereas that under collective ownership rose from 19 per cent to 
21 per cent, and that under other forms of ownership rose from 17 per cent to 42 per 
cent (Figure 25). The share of state-owned enterprises in total value of retail sales 
declined from 55 per cent to 40 per cent, that under collective ownership also declined 
from 43 per cent to 26 per cent, whereas that under joint ownership rose from zero to 
1 per cent, that under individual ownership rose from zero to 23 per cent, and that 
under other forms of ownership rose from 2 per cent to 10 per cent (Figure 26). 
Meanwhile, ownership structural changes also occurred in employment. The share of 
state-owned enterprises in the total employment of non-primary industry fell from 60 
per cent to 36 per cent, whereas that under collective ownership rose from 39 per cent 
to 51 per cent, that under individual ownership rose from 1 per cent to 10 per cent, 
and that under other forms of ownership rose from zero to 3 per cent (Figure 27).
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Figure 24 Changing shares of main forms of ownership in the output value of 
China’s industry, 1978-1993 (%)
1978 1993
10%
Note: Other forms of ownership mainly include foreign-funded 
Chinese-funded enterprises, joint management enterprises, and 
enterprises.
Source: Statistical Yearbook o f China 1983-1994, Beijing.
and overseas 
stock-sharing
Figure 25 Changing shares of main forms of ownership in the output value of 
China’s construction industry, 1980-1993 (%)
1978 1993
Note: Other forms of ownership refer to miscellaneous rural construction teams and 
affiliated construction units.
Source: Statistical Yearbook o f China 1983-1994, Beijing.______________________
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Note: Retail sales under other forms of ownership refer to those sold by agricultural 
residents to non-agncultural residents.
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1994, Beijing._____________________
Figure 27 Changing shares of main forms of ownership in the total employment 
of China’s non-primary industry, 1978-1993 (%)
Note: Other forms of ownership mainly include private ownership, foreign-funded 
and overseas Chinese-funded enterprises, joint management enterprises, and stock­
sharing enterprises.
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1994, Beijing._____________________
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Attention should be given to the rise of a few new forms of ownership along 
with the increasing international flows of capital and services in the opening process. 
First, there arose a few enterprises funded directly by foreigners. The foreign direct 
investment (FDI) took different forms—foreign enterprises, joint ventures, 
cooperative operations, and cooperative development, and grew very rapidly. From 
1983 to 1993, as shown in Figure 28, the average annual growth rate of the actually 
used value of FDI was 15.8 per cent. From 1985 to 1993, the share of FDI in China’s 
investment in fixed assets rose from 3.6 per cent to 7.3 per cent, as shown in Figure 
29. From 1985 to 1993, the average annual growth rate of labourers employed in the 
FDI sector was 62.2 per cent.
Figure 28 Rapid growth of the foreign direct investment sector in China, 1983- 
1993 (average annual growth rate %)
Investment Employment
(used value)
Notes: (1) The growth rate of investment is calculated at current prices; (2) the 
annual growth rate of employment is calculated on data in the period between 1985 
and 1993.
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1994, Beijing._____________________
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Figure 29 Share of foreign direct investment in China’s total investment in fixed 
assets, 1985-1993 (%)
1985 1993
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1994, Beijing.
Secondly, there arose enterprises running their business abroad in cooperation 
with foreigners, which can be considered as a type of transnational companies. These 
transnational companies either invested in foreign countries or provided services for 
them, and grew very rapidly (Table 20 and Figure 30). Up to 1991, China had 
invested in 106 countries, with a total contracted value of US$ 3.2 billions, and the 
share of Chinese transnational companies in the total contracted value was 44.2 per 
cent (US$ 1.4 billions). From 1980 to 1993, the average annual growth rate of the 
fulfilled value of total international services provided by China’s transnational 
companies was 28.7 per cent, that of the fulfilled value of contracted projects 
provided by these companies was 29.9 per cent, and that of fulfilled value of labour 
services provided by these companies was 25.2 per cent.
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Table 20 China’s international investment up to 1991
R e g io n s N u m b e r  o f  
c o u n tr ie s
N u m b e r  o f  
e n te rp r ise s
T o ta l c o n tra c te d  
v a lu e
(U S $  m illio n )
C h in e se  
in v e s tm e n t 
(U S $  m illio n )
S h a re  o f  C h in e se  
in v e s tm e n t in to ta l 
c o n tra c te d  v a lu e  (% )
M id d le  E a s t 10 34 2 9 .9 13.8 4 6 .0 6
A fric a 32 106 9 2 .3 5 1 .8 5 6 .1 4
A s ia
e x c lu d in g  
M id d le  E a s t
17 3 58 4 4 1 .5 2 0 2 .7 4 5 .9 3
W e s t E u ro p e 15 78 86 .8 33.1 38.1
E a s t E u ro p e  
a n d  fo rm e r 
S o v ie t U n io n
4 105 114 .4 4 9 .3 4 3 .0 7
O c e a n ia 4 7 0 1 2 2 9 .0 3 2 3 .4 26 .31
N o rth
A m e ric a
2 182 105 9 .7 6 5 5 .6 6 1 .8 7
L a tin
A m e ric a
22 75 9 8 .3 6 4 .0 6 5 .0 8
T o ta l 106 1008 3 1 5 1 .8 1393 .7 4 4 .2 2
Source: Liu Xiangdong (ed.), 1993. A Guideline of Policies of China’s Foreign 
Trade and Economic Relations, Economic Management Press, Beijing.____________
Figure 30 Growth of the fulfilled value of China’s international services, 1979- 
1993 (average annual growth rate %)
29.9
Total Contracted Labor service
project
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1994, Beijing.
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Determinants of uneven sectoral growth
China’s uneven sectoral growth, both between industry sectors and between forms of 
ownership, should be examined in the context of re-linking with, or opening up to, 
market systems both domestically and internationally. The growth model presented in 
the previous chapter provides a framework to do so since the introduction of domestic 
and international market orientations into a growth model allows the scrutiny of the 
uneven sectoral growth within a competitive market context. Consequently, 
determinants of uneven sectoral growth can be explained in the light of the market 
forces released in the opening process.
Two explanations
It was shown in the growth model presented in the previous chapter that market 
orientations increase efficiency in developing countries undergoing a transition to 
market systems in at least two ways. The first is through demand-led efficiency gains. 
An increase in market demand and the corresponding outward shift of the demand 
curve lead an economy to make fuller use of its resources to meet the rising demand, 
and thereby the output growth of the economy is accelerated. The second is through 
productivity-related efficiency gains. Market competition reallocates resources from 
sectors with lower productivity to sectors with higher productivity, and thereby 
resources are more efficiently utilised and the output growth of the economy is 
accelerated. China achieved both of these forms of efficiency gains through opening 
up to market forces, and thereby two explanations can be proposed for uneven 
sectoral growth in post-1978 China: demand-led uneven sectoral growth and 
productivity-related uneven sectoral growth.
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Demand-led uneven sectoral growth. By demand-led uneven sectoral growth, it is 
meant that uneven sectoral growth results from uneven changes in market demand and 
the corresponding uneven resource allocation. As is well acknowledged, demand 
change differs from quantity demanded, and is determined by non-price determinants 
such as disposable incomes, consumers’ tastes and preferences, and the size of 
population. To illustrate the uneven change in market demand for goods produced in 
different industry sectors, commodities are usually classified into two main groups: 
normal goods and inferior goods. The former refer to goods that consumers tend to 
buy more of as their income increases. The latter refer to goods that consumers tend to 
buy less of as their income increases. The concepts of income elasticity of demand 
and Engel curve can be, therefore, applied to show the uneven change in market 
demand for different types of commodities produced in different industry sectors, and 
thereby to explain uneven industry growth in China.
As international markets are involved, a word about their special role in the 
demand-led uneven sectoral growth is needed. First, in international markets demand 
changes with opportunity costs. To illustrate this, trade between country A and 
country B can be taken as an example. Here only two kinds of goods—TV sets and 
cloth—are examined, with demand for all other goods held constant. As endowments 
differ in the two countries, they have different production possibility frontiers to 
produce TV sets and cloth, and they operate at different points on the frontiers. 
Operating at point o, as shown in Figure 31, country A produces and consumes 15 
billion metres of cloth and 8 million TV sets each year, and the opportunity cost of 1 
TV set is 9000 metres of cloth. Operating at point o ’, as shown in Figure 32, country 
B produces and consumes 18 billion metres of cloth and 4 million TV sets each year, 
and the opportunity cost of 1 TV set is 1000 metres of cloth. In terms of opportunity
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cost, therefore, country A has a comparative advantage in cloth production and
country B has a comparative advantage in TV production. When the two countries 
begin to trade with each other, the international market demand for cloth produced in 
country A will increase, and so does that for TV sets produced in country B. The 
sector producing cloth in country A and the sector producing TV sets in country B 
will grow faster than other sectors. When international trade is involved, therefore, the 
sectors representing a country‘s rich endowments and producing goods with 
comparatively low opportunity cost grow faster than those representing a country’s 
poor endowments and producing goods with comparatively high opportunity cost. In 
China’s case, its rich endowment of cheap labour has led, as shall be shown below, to 
the increase in exports of labour-intensive commodities, and thereby to the rapid 
development of labour-intensive manufactures, especially in rural China.
Figure 31 Opportunity cost in country A
Cloth
(Billions of metres per year)
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Country A ’ production 
possibility frontier
30
Opportunity cost of 1 
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Figure 32 Opportunity cost in country B
Cloth












Opportunity cost of 
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Secondly, international trade plays a crucial role in the changes in consumers’ 
tastes and preferences. This is especially true of China where foreign consumer goods 
were not available to ordinary people until 1978. As China opened up, foreign-made 
consumer goods such as TV sets, washing machines, electric fans, and refrigerators 
flowed into China, and the demand for them rose dramatically. To meet the rising 
demand, China adopted an import substitution policy, and the sectors producing these 
goods and related sectors developed very rapidly. As these sectors grew, moreover, 
China managed to change from import substitution to exporting some durable 
consumer goods to foreign countries, and the increasing exports of these goods further 
stimulated the growth of these sectors.
Productivity-related uneven sectoral growth. By productivity-related uneven 
sectoral growth, it is meant that uneven sectoral growth results from the functioning
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of market orientations in reallocating resources between sectors with different 
productivity levels. With regard to industry sectors, for instance, the productivity of 
primary industry differs from that of secondary industry, and that of tertiary industry. 
With regard to forms of ownership, the productivity of state-owned enterprises differs 
from that of non-state owned enterprises. The productivity gap implies that resources 
are more efficiently utilised in sectors with higher productivity than in sectors with 
lower productivity. In a competitive market context, higher productivity is associated 
with higher labour income and higher capital income (profit), and resources flow from 
sectors with lower productivity, lower labour income, and lower capital income to 
those with higher productivity, higher labour income, and higher capital income. 
Therefore, the latter sectors grow faster than the former. In fact, productivity-related 
uneven sectoral growth refers to the uneven sectoral growth introduced by market 
orientations via productivity gap, and it can occur both between industry sectors and 
between forms of ownership.2
It should be pointed out that labour income and capital income rather than 
marginal product of labour (MPL) and marginal product of capital (MPC) are used to 
explain resource reallocation between sectors with different productivity levels. The 
reason is that the concepts of MPL and MPC ignore the difference in capital 
composition between industry sectors, and are, therefore, not helpful in explaining 
resource flows from sectors with lower productivity to those with higher productivity. 
According to Chow (1993), for instance, the MPC is greater in China’s primary 
industry than in most of China’s non-primary industry. In that case, how could the 
reallocation of capital be in favour of the latter rather than the former? The puzzle lies 
in the fact that the MPC cannot measure capital income, since a much larger portion
2 Causes of productivity gaps in transition economies are rather involved, and are beyond the scope of 
the study.
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of the MPC has to be given to the labour force as labour income in more labour­
intensive primary industry than in less labour-intensive non-primary industry. A 
larger MPC in primary industry does not mean, therefore, a larger profit margin. In a 
competitive market context, capital flows to where it can reap the most capital income 
and the largest profit margin, just as labourers flow to where they can reap the most 
labour income.
Capital income or profit is the difference between total revenue and total cost, 
and profit margins are profits divided by total cost (Miller 1982). Capital income and 
profit margins can be expressed as in Equations 10 and 11, respectively:
where P stands for profit or capital income, Pm for profit margins, and Tr for total 
revenue. Tc stands for total cost which is all the cost (or capital in a broad sense) a 
capital-holder or a firm-owner spends on the production process, including wages 
paid to labour3. All a capital-holder is concerned about are profit margins and profit 
maximisation, rather than the MPC! The capital-holder will invest in industries with 
larger profit margins rather than those with smaller profit margins, no matter how 
large a MPC the latter have.
We should be aware that demand-led uneven sectoral growth and productivity- 
related uneven sectoral growth sometimes mingle with each other in the real world.
3 In this context, the conventional concept of capital as an input different from labour input could be 
considered as defining capital in a narrow sense, while the concept of capital as equal to total cost
P — Tr — Tc ( 10)
( 1 1 )Tc
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That is, uneven sectoral growth might arise from the functioning of market 
orientations in the form of differential demand changes only, or from the functioning 
of market orientations via differential productivity levels only, or from both. It is from 
the two explanations that a hypothesis is derived, and then tested in the next section.
Hypothesis test
Based upon these two explanations, it is hypothesised that uneven sectoral growth in 
transition or opening economies is a function of uneven resource allocation 
introduced by market orientations (either through uneven demand changes or through 
uneven productivity levels) to increase efficiency, and thereby increased market 
orientations must be the main determinant of uneven sectoral growth and ensuing 
structural changes in post-1978 China. There are many approaches to testing the 
hypothesis, but only three are applied. Moreover, due to data constraints, the tests 
focus upon uneven growth of two of the most important sectoral-pairs: primary versus 
non-primary industry, and state-owned versus non-state owned industry enterprises.
Approach 1. Here empirical data are examined to see whether there has occurred 
uneven output growth both between primary and non-primary industry and between 
state-owned and non-state owned industry enterprises, whether it has been associated 
with uneven resource allocation, and whether there has been a productivity gap or 
uneven changes in market demand between the sectors under comparison so that the 
‘invisible hand’ can function in reallocating resources between them.
Tables 21, 22, and 23, and figures 33, 34, and 35 provide a positive answer to 
the test. In the sector-pairs under study, the sector with higher productivity witnessed
could be considered as defining capital in a broad sense. The distinction is very important for
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a higher growth rate of both output and inputs whereas the sector with lower 
productivity witnessed a lower growth rate of both output and inputs. The 
productivity gap between primary and non-primary industry, for instance, widened 
over the period and reached a multiple of 4.8 in 1993. Meanwhile, the growth rate of 
output, labour input, and physical capital input of non-primary industry were 2.1 
times, 4 times, and 2.3 times as high as those of primary industry, respectively. The 
productivity gap between state-owned and non-state owned industry enterprises 
widened over the period, and reached at a multiple of 2.4 in 1993. Meanwhile, the 
growth rate of output, labour input, and physical capital input of non-state owned 
industry enterprises were 1.7 times, 3.5 times, and 1.3 times as high as those of state- 
owned industry enterprises, respectively. Productivity-related uneven growth 
occurred, therefore, both between industry sectors and between forms of ownership.
Table 21 Uneven growth and the productivity gap between primary and non- 
primary industry in China, 1978-1993____________________________________
Primary industry Non-primary industry
Growth rate of output (%) 5.20 10.70
Growth rate of labour input (%) 1.30 5.50
Growth rate of capital input (%) 10.10 23.40
Growth rate of productivity (%) 4.60 5.70
Productivity in 1993 {yuan) 1957.80 9419.50
Notes: (1) Due to limited availability of data, capital input here refers only to 
physical capital input which is proxied by total investment in fixed assets in the 
period between 1985 and 1993. Meanwhile, productivity is estimated upon output per 
labourer, and the growth rates of productivity were calculated on data in the period 
between 1985 and 1993. (2) Growth rates refer to average annual growth rates, and 
the output growth rates are calculated at 1978 constant prices.
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of China 1980-1994, Beijing; International Economic 
Databank, Australian National University.___________________________________
explaining resource flows between industries.
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Table 22 Uneven growth and the productivity gap between state-owned and non- 
state owned enterprises in China’s industry, 1978-1993______________________
State-owned enterprises
Growth rate of output (%) 7.80
Growth rate of labour input (%) 2.60
Growth rate of capital input (%) 17.50
Growth rate of productivity (%) 5.90








Notes: (1) Due to limited availability of data, capital input here refers only to 
physical capital input which is proxied by total investment in fixed assets. Moreover, 
productivity is estimated upon output per labourer, and the growth rates of 
productivity were calculated on data in the period between 1985 and 1993. (2) 
Growth rates refer to average annual growth rate, and the growth rates of output are 
calculated at 1978 constant prices.
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of China 1980-1994, Beijing; International Economic 
Databank, Australian National University.___________________________________
Table 23 Coefficients of income elasticity of demand for selected commodities in 
China, 1978-1992











Note: The income elasticities of demand for services provided by tertiary industry 
cannot be calculated due to data constraints.
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1984-1994, Beijing._____________________
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Figure 33 Engel curve for grain in China, 1978-1993








consumption of grain 
(kg)
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1984-1994, Beijing.
As far as uneven change in market demand is concerned, the coefficients of 
the income elasticity of demand for commodities produced in non-primary industry 
were much greater than those for commodities produced in primary industry. Grain, 
which is the main commodity produced in primary industry, underwent a change from 
a normal good to an inferior good around 1985. The uneven change in market demand 
has led, as shown in Table 21, to resource flows from primary to non-primary 
industry, and to the rise of the latter. Demand-related uneven sectoral growth 
occurred, therefore, between industry sectors.
Meanwhile, there was also increasing evidence for the special role of 
international trade in demand-led uneven sectoral growth. First, in the international 
market, there occurred a demand change following a pattern similar to that in China’s 
domestic markets. That is, the demand for commodities produced in non-primary 
industry increased rapidly in international markets, as shown in Figure 34. From 1978
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to 1993, the share of non-primary industry goods in the value of total world trade rose 
from 83 per cent to 88 per cent, whereas that of agricultural goods fell from 17 per 
cent to 12 per cent. Although China is a ‘small country’ in global terms, the changing 
market demand in international markets can still have an important impact upon 
uneven sectoral growth as China increasingly opened up to international markets. It 
has led, for instance, to China changing from import-substitution to export-oriented 
industrialisation, and China’s exports of non-primary industry goods increasing 
rapidly. The share of non-primary industry goods in China’s total exports rose from 
65 per cent in 1980 to 86 per cent in 1993. By 1995, the total value of China’s exports 
of refrigerators had reached US$ 90 millions, that of washing machines had reached 
US$ 60 millions, that of TV sets had reached US$ 10 millions, and that of bicycles 
had reached US$ 10 millions (China TV News 2 November 1996). The increased 
exports of these goods facilitated the rapid growth of non-primary industry in China.
Figure 34 Decreasing share of agricultural goods in the total value of world 
exports and imports, 1978-1993 (%)
1978 1993
Source: International Economic Databank, Australian National University, Canberra.
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Figure 35 Increasing share of labour-intensive goods in China’s total exports and 
imports, 1978-1993 (%)
1978 1993
Source: International Economic Databank, Australian National University, Canberra.
Secondly, international trade led China to make full use of its comparative 
advantage in labour endowments. As shown in Figure 35, the share of labour- 
intensive goods in China’s total exports increased from 31 per cent in 1978 to 56 per 
cent in 1993. The increasing demand for labour-intensive goods in international 
markets stimulated the rapid growth of labour-intensive manufacture industry, 
especially the township and village enterprises (TVEs) in rural China. In 1993, for 
instance, TVEs contributed to 46 per cent of China’s output value of industry, and 45 
per cent of China’s total exports. Therefore, uneven industry growth and industry 
structural changes have been, as shown previously, far more impressive in rural China 
than in other parts of the nation.
Approach 2. Here the effects of market orientations on output growth are compared 
to see whether they have been greater in faster-growing sectors than in more slowly 
growing ones. The assumption underlying the test is that given that uneven output 
growth in transition or opening economies results from the functioning of market
209
orientations, the effects of market orientations on output growth must be greater in 
faster-growing sectors than in more slowly growing ones. That is, faster-growing 
sectors must be more market-driven than more slowly growing ones. The test can be 
carried out for the two sectoral-pairs under study by running two regressions for each 
of them on Equations 12 and 13:
LnAYsit = a + ß , LnADmit + ß 2 LnA Im it + uit (12)
LnAYfit — a - ß ] LnADmit + ß 2 LnA Im jt + uit (13)
where Y stands for output, s for more slowly growing sector, /  for faster-growing 
sector. Dm and Im and their proxies are the same as those in Equation 2 in Chapter 4, 
and they stand for domestic and international market orientations respectively. 
i stands for the ith province, and t for the rth time period. The two equations are 
based upon equation 4 in Chapter 4, but variables representing various inputs are 
dropped due to unavailability of data on inputs in the individual industry sectors and 
forms of ownership under study.
As coefficients in the two regressions need to be compared to see whether the 
difference is statistically significant, observations in the two regressions are pooled 
together, and dummy variables are introduced to differentiate the two sectors under 
comparison. The test is, therefore, carried out by estimating the regression as 
expressed in Equation 14:
LnAYjt = a, + a2Dit + ß xLnADmü + ß 2DitLnADmjt
-I-ß 3 LnA Im it + ß 4 Djt LnA Im it + uit (14)
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where Dit = 1 for observations in more slowly growing sector and zero for
\ D - \  Y=Ys
observations in faster-growing sector. Therefore, Y = < . The
6 6 [D = 0 Y=Y f
regression is run on the same set of panel data as that used in Chapter 4 (the 
dependent variable, of course, varies from one sectoral-pair to another), and OLS 
estimation rather than the Kmenta model is also applied here for the same reason as 
given previously.
As shown in Table 24, as far as industry sectors are concerned, both the 
differential intercept and the differential slope coefficients are statistically significant, 
strongly indicating that the regressions for the two kinds of industry are different. The 
two regressions (see Equations 12 and 13) can be set down as follows:
Primary industry: LnAYsit = 0.55 + 0.50LnADmit + OALnA Imjr 
Non-primary industry. LnAYfjt = 0.97 + 0.69LnADmit +0.25LnAImir
The regression results support the assumption underlying the test: the effects (as 
indicated by the slope coefficients) of both the domestic and the international market 
orientations have been greater in the faster-growing non-primary industry than in the 
more slowly growing primary industry. To put it more concretely, the domestic 
market orientation has been 1.4 times more effective in non-primary industry than in 
primary industry, and the international market orientation has been 2.4 times more 
effective in non-primary industry than in primary industry.
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Table 24 Regression results on Equation 14 for industry sectoral-pair
(dependent variable: In net increase in output)
Variable Coefficient
C onstant 0  9 7 ***  
( 8 .8 ) 
[6 .9 1
L nA D m 0 .6 9 * * *
(1 4 .6 )
[1 1 .3 ]
LnAIm 0 .2 5 * * *
( 8 .6 )
[7 .4 ]
D -0 .4 2 * * *
(-2 .7 )
[ - 1 .8 ]
D L n A D m -0 .1 9 * * *
(- 2 .8 )
[ - 1 -8 ]




3 3 1 .7 * * *
_ 2
R 0 . 6 6
D eg rees o f  freed om 855
Note: Numbers in parentheses under the coefficient estimates are associated t-ratios. 
Coefficient estimates with *** are significant at the 0.03 significance level. White 
heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics are in square brackets[ ].________________
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Table 2 5  R egression results on E quation 14 for ow nership sectoral-pair
(dependent variable: In net increase in output)
Variable Coefficient


















F  statistic 413 .4***
R 0.85
D egrees o f  freedom 787
Note: Numbers in parentheses under the coefficient estimates are associated t-ratios. 
Coefficient estimates with *** are significant at the 0.03 significance level. White 
heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics are in square brackets[ ].
As shown in Table 25, as far as forms of ownership are concerned, the two 
regressions (also see Equations 12 and 13) for the two forms of ownership can be set 
down as follows:
State-owned: LnAYsit = 1.01 + 0.64LnADmjt + 0.25LnAImif 
Non-state owned: LnAYfit = -0.24 + 0.15LnADmit + 0.48L/iA Im/r
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It seems that the effects of both domestic and international market orientations (as 
indicated by the slope coefficients) have been greater for non-state owned industry 
enterprises than for state-owned industry enterprises, indicating that non-state owned 
industry enterprises have been more market-driven both domestically and 
internationally than state-owned industry enterprises. As the differential slope 
coefficient for the domestic market orientation is not statistically significant at the 
0.05 significance level, however, the two regressions are only partly different. That is, 
only the effects of the international market orientation has been greater in faster­
growing, non-state owned industry enterprises than in more slowly growing state- 
owned industry enterprises. That is to say, non-state owned industry enterprises have 
been driven more by the international market orientation than state-owned industry 
enterprises. To put it more concretely, the international market orientation has been 
1.9 times more effective in non-state owned enterprises than in state-owned 
enterprises. The result of the test points out, therefore, a key weakness of China’s 
state-owned enterprises in a competitive market context in post-1978 China: they 
have been less successful in the international market orientation than non-state owned 
enterprises.
Approach 3. Here it is tested whether the rising share of the faster-growing sector in 
the total output value of the sector-pair under comparison has been positively 
correlated with domestic and international market orientations. The assumption 
underlying the test is that if uneven sectoral growth in transition or opening 
economies results from the functioning of market orientations, the resulting structural 
change must be positively correlated with increasing market orientations. The test is
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carried out for the two sector-pairs under study by running regression either on
Equation 15 or on Equation 16:
Fpt = a + /3, ADmt + ß 2A lm t (15)
Fpt = a + ß ]LnADml + ß 2 Ln Aim t (16)
where Fp stands for the share of the faster-growing sector in the total output value of 
the sector-pair under comparison. ADm and Aim and their proxies are the same as 
those in Equation 2 in Chapter 4, and they stand for domestic and international market 
orientations respectively, t stands for the rth time period. The difference between the 
two equations is the functional form of the explanatory variables. The variant 
functional forms are necessary since the pattern of the effects of domestic and 
international market orientations on structural change varies from one sectoral pair to 
another. Time series data at the national level in the period between 1978 and 1993 
are used here. As the explanatory variables are already in first-differenced form, the 
problem of autocorrelation and nonstationarity associated with time series data can be 
assumed to be not serious, as indicated by the Durbin-Watson statistics in the 
regression outputs4. The regressions are, therefore, run on OLS.
Regression is first run on Equation 15 for the rising share of non-primary 
industry in GDP. As seen from Table 26, the rising share of non-primary industry in 
GDP has been positively correlated to increased domestic and international market 
orientations. The coefficients of explanatory variables show what percentage change
4 All the Durbin-Watson statistics in Tables 26 and 27 exceed the DL value at the 0.05 significance 
level, indicating no serious autocorrelation. All the Durbin-Watson statistics are also above the CRDW 
critical value at 1% significance level, indicating that variables in the regression are cointegrated 
(though they might be individually nonstationary), so we need not worry about nonstationarity 
problem. Moreover, as all the adjusted R2 are much smaller than the Durbin-Watson statistics, the 
problem of ‘spurious regression’ does not exist in the regressions (Gujarati 1995).
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in the share of non-primary industry in GDP could be introduced by the net increase 
of 100 million yuan in domestic or international trade. Holding other factors constant, 
the net increase of 100 million yuan in China’s international trade would lead to a 
0.0023 per cent change in the share of non-primary industry in GDP (that is, the share 
would rise by 0.0023 percentage points), so does the net increase of 100 million yuan 
in China’s domestic trade.
Table 26 Regression results on Equation 15 for non-primary industry
(dependent variable: share of non-primary industry in GDP)
Variable Coefficient
C onstant 6 7 .6 3 * * *
(8 9 .7 5 )
A D m 0 .0 0 2 3 * *
(1 -9 5 )
A im 0 .0 0 2 3 * *
(2 .0 7 )
F statistic 1 8 .4 2 * * *
_ 2
R 0 .7 0
D u rb in -W a tso n  statistic 1 .60
D eg rees o f  freedom 13
Note: Numbers in parentheses under the coefficient estimates are associated t-ratios. 
Coefficient estimates with *** are significant at 0.03 significance level, with ** are 
significant at 0.05 significance level. ___________________________________
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Table 27 Regression results on Equation 16 for non-state owned enterprises
(dependent variable: share of non-state owned enterprises in total industry output 
value)
Variable Coefficient
C o n sta n t -1 0 .8 9
( - 1 .7 8 )
L n A D m 2 .1 1 * *
(1 .8 6 )
L n A Im 4 .5 7 * * *
(4 .3 8 )
F  s ta tis t ic 4 2 .8 3 * * *
_ 2
R 0 .8 5
D u r b in -W a ts o n  s ta tis t ic 1 .41
D e g r e e s  o f  fr e e d o m 13
Note: Numbers in parentheses under the coefficient estimates are associated t-ratios. 
Coefficient estimates with *** are significant at 0.03 significance level, with ** are 
significant at 0.05 significance level.__________________ _____ ________ _
Then, regression is run on Equation 16 for the rising share of non-state owned 
enterprises in the total output value of industrial enterprises. As Table 27 shows, the 
rising share is positively correlated to increased domestic and international market 
orientations. As the regression model is in lin-log form and the regressants are all in 
ratio form, the ß  coefficients of explanatory variables show that a 1 per cent change in 
the net increase in explanatory variables would lead to a 0.01 ß  per cent change in the 
share of non-state owned enterprises in the total output value of industry enterprises. 
Other factors being held constant, the share of non-state owned enterprises in the total 
output value of industry enterprises would rise by 0.047 percentage points if there 
occurs a 1 per cent change in the net increase in China’s international trade, and it 
would rise by 0.028 percentage points if there occurs a 1 per cent change in the net
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increase in China’s domestic trade. Apparently, the rising share of non-state owned 
enterprises has been influenced by both domestic and international market 
orientations, but the influence of the international market orientation is stronger than 
that of the domestic market orientation. The importance of international markets in 
the test is consistent with what we found in the previous test: non-state owned 
enterprises have been more driven by the international market orientation than state- 
owned enterprises.
All the tests conducted so far support the hypothesis. Uneven sectoral growth 
in transition or opening eocnomies is a function of uneven resource allocation 
introduced by market orientations to improve efficiency, and increased market 
orientations have been the main determinant of uneven sectoral growth and the 
ensuing structural changes in post-1978 China. The finding provides a reasonable 
explanation for how uneven sectoral growth occurred in the re-linking or opening 
process, and has very important implications for China.
Significance of uneven sectoral growth
Uneven sectoral growth and the ensuing change in economic structure not only have 
contributed significantly to China’s accelerated economic growth and improvements 
in people’s livelihood, but also have had an increasing impact upon the change in 
China’s social structure, especially the accelerated urbanisation and polarisation. It is, 
therefore, a key to understanding many phenomena in China’s development 
performance in the re-linking or opening process.
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Contribution to economic growth and improvements in people’s livelihood
Non-primary industry grew faster than primary industry and non-state owned 
enterprises grew faster than state-owned enterprises, facts indicating that non-primary 
industry and non-state owned enterprises have been the ‘corner-stone’ of the fast­
growing Chinese economy. As the faster-growing industry sectors and forms of 
ownership have been more efficient in resource utilisation than their counterparts, 
their rise has contributed significantly to China’s rapid and sustained economic 
growth. In other words, China’s rapid growth was sustained partly because resources 
increasingly moved from less efficient primary industry and state-owned enterprises 
to more efficient non-primary industry and non-state owned enterprises, and the 
growth of non-primary industry and non-state owned enterprises was accelerated, so 
was that of the economy as a whole. That is, in a sense, China’s growth miracle was 
rooted in the faster-growing and more efficient non-primary industry and non-state 
owned enterprises.
In this regard, worthy of notice is the contribution by some new industry 
sectors and forms of ownership that emerged after 1978. For instance, tourism played 
an increasingly important role in the growth of tertiary industry. By 1995, tourism had 
accounted for 11 per cent of the output value of tertiary industry, and 8 per cent of the 
labourers employed in tertiary industry. As far as forms of ownership are concerned, 
FDI contributed significantly to China’s export-oriented industrialisation. By 1995, 
FDI had accounted for more than 30 per cent of China’s exports. Meanwhile, China’s 
transnational companies also played a distinctive role in expanding China’s 
international markets and promoting economic growth (China Economic Yearbook 
1994).
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Uneven sectoral growth also contributed significantly to the remarkable 
improvement in people’s livelihood. As far as industry sectors are concerned, it is 
self-evident that the increase in urban residents’ income has been associated with the 
growth of non-primary industry, so we only illustrate the contribution of rural non­
primary industry to the rapid increase in rural residents’ income. As shown in Figure 
36, from 1978 to 1993 the average annual growth rate of rural residents’ per capita 
real income from secondary industry was 19.3 per cent, that from tertiary industry 
was 39 per cent, whereas that from primary industry was only 11.6 per cent. As a 
result, an increasing share of rural residents’ income came, as shown in Figure 37, 
from non-primary industry. From 1978 to 1993, the share of income from non­
primary industry in rural residents’ total per capita net income increased from 8 per 
cent to 31 per cent, whereas that from primary industry declined from 85 per cent to 
64 per cent, and that from non-productive activities fell from 7 per cent to 5 per cent. 
Up to 1995, about 34 per cent of rural residents’ real income was from non-primary 
industry. The rapid increase in rural residents’ real income narrowed the income and 
consumption gaps between urban and rural residents. Calculated at 1978 constant 
prices, the relative urban-rural income gap (the ratio of urban residents’ per capita 
real income to rural residents’ per capita real income) decreased from 2.36 to 1.76, 
and the relative urban-rural consumption gap (the ratio of urban residents’ per capita 
real consumption to rural residents’ per capita real consumption) decreased from 2.9 
to 2.7.
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Figure 36 Average annual growth rate of rural residents’ per capita real income 













Note: Calculated at 1978 constant prices.
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1994, Beijing.
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Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1994, Beijing.
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Figure 38 Average annual growth rate of real wages of staff and workers in 
main forms of ownership of China’s urban non-primary industry, 1984-1993
(% )
Non-publicCollective
Note: Calculated at 1984 constant prices.
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1994, Beijing.
As far as forms of ownership are concerned, non-public ownership, especially 
non-state owned enterprises contributed the most to the rapid improvement in 
people’s livelihood. From 1984 to 1993, for instance, the average annual growth rate 
of real wages of staff and workers under non-public ownership was 6.2 per cent, 
whereas that under state ownership was 3 per cent, and that under urban collective 
ownership was 2.2 per cent (Figure 38). Within non-public ownership, staff and 
workers in enterprises with FDI usually enjoyed a greater increase in their real wages 
than others. A survey showed that in 1992, workers in enterprises with FDI earned 
1400 yuan more than those in state-owned enterprises, and 1903 yuan more than those 
in urban collectively-owned enterprises (Tianjin Daily 15 August 1995). Staff and 
workers sent to work abroad by China’s transnational companies also earned much 
more than those working at home. In China, there goes a saying: ‘one worker is sent
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abroad, a rich family emerges’ (Economic Daily 4 May 1994). As shown in the 
previous chapter, improvements in people’s livelihood can, in turn, lead to increased 
consumption and market demand, improved efficiency in resource allocation and 
utilisation, and, therefore, accelerated economic growth in labour-surplus developing 
countries in a transition or opening process.
Impact upon urbanisation and polarisation
Uneven growth between industry sectors and the ensuing industry structural change 
imply that China’s accelerated urbanisation in the post-1978 period was rooted in the 
rise of non-primary industry, especially the rise of TVEs in rural China. This can be 
easily seen from the strong correlation between industry structural change and 
urbanisation in both the pre-and post-1978 periods. In the period between 1960 and 
1977, for instance, the share of non-primary industry in GDP fell from 78 per cent to 
70 per cent while the share of urban residents in total population fell from 20 per cent 
to 18 per cent (International Economic Databank, ANU). From 1978 to 1993, by 
contrast, the share of non-primary industry rose from 69 per cent to 81 per cent while 
the share of urban residents in total population rose from 19 per cent to 29 per cent. 
The rise of non-primary industry contributed to urbanisation in at least two ways.
First, the rapid growth of non-primary industry increasingly drew labourers 
from the countryside to cities. In 1992, for instance, about 40 thousand farmers 
bought urban residence cards in 40 cities in Henan and Anhui provinces alone. Rural 
residents working in urban non-primary industry without an urban residence card 
numbered tens of millions. It was estimated that there were 41 million rural labourers 
working in urban non-primary industry in the 1990s, and that there will be more than
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one hundred million rural labourers moving into cities over the next 20 years (Liu 
1996; Huang 1996).
Secondly, the rise of TVEs increasingly transformed the structure of rural 
China. Labourers increasingly moved from primary industry to TVEs, and the rise of 
TVEs paved the way for the emergence of new towns and cities in rural areas. It was 
estimated that by 1994 more than 100 million rural labourers had moved from 
primary industry to TVEs (Liu 1996), and there had emerged 341 new cities in rural 
China, more than doubling the number of cities in China in 1980 (229).
On the other hand, uneven growth between forms of ownership and the 
ensuing change in ownership structure imply that the growing income gap and the 
increasing polarisation in Chinese society were rooted mainly in the rise of non-public 
ownership. Income and wealth gaps existed in public forms of ownership well before 
1978, especially the gaps between those working in enterprises or communes with 
good performance and those in enterprises or communes with poor performance. But 
these gaps were relatively small. The picture of relative equality in income and wealth 
has been changed dramatically owing to the rise of non-public ownership since 1978, 
especially owing to the rise of private and individual ownership.
According to the World Bank (1996), the Gini coefficient for per capita real 
income of China’s residents increased from 0.26 in 1977 to 0.38 in 1992. Chen (1997) 
estimated a Gini coefficient of 0.26 for 1981 and 0.37 for 1995. The Gini coefficient 
as a summary measure cannot, however, show the true extent of polarisation between 
the rich and the poor. Although detailed data on the income and wealth of those in 
non-public forms of ownership are not available, increasing evidence shows that there 
has arisen a number of ‘rich people’ who own large businesses, have accumulated an 
increasing amount of capital, and enjoy an income enormously higher than others.
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This is especially true of private enterprises, which distinguish themselves 
from individual ownership by employing more than 8 labourers. According to official 
data, per household capital of private enterprises grew 28.5 per cent annually in the 
period between 1988 and 1993 (as shown in Table 28). Up to 1993, per household 
capital of private enterprises reached 285840 yuan on average, and there were 4070 
private enterprises with capital amounting to more than a million yuan (Economic 
Daily 24 April 1994). Meanwhile, hundreds and thousands of small business owners 
(individual ownership in Chinese terms) also accumulated considerable amounts of 
capital, managers hired by FDI enterprises earned a salary much higher than their 
counterparts in other enterprises, and famous singers and artists are paid extremely 
high for their performances.
Table 28 Increase in wealth of private enterprise owners in China, 1988-1993
Year Number of household Total capital Per household capital
(10000) (100 million yuan) (10000 yuan)
1988 4.06 32.87 8.09
1989 9.06 84.48 9.33
1990 9.81 95.00 9.68
1991 10.8 123.20 11.41
1992 13.96 221.00 15.82
1993 23.80 680.30 28.58
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China’s Economy 1989-1994, Beijing.
As a result, Chinese society has been increasingly polarised since 1978. In 
1993, 3 per cent of the population owned 30 per cent of all the private savings held by 
banks. In 1994, about 20000 high income households lived in luxurious villas worth 
more than one million yuan, and about 30000 high income households had their own 
cars (Economic Daily 3 March 1994). Meanwhile, there were 100 million poor people
225
in rural areas with an annual income of only 200 yuanl In cities, an increasing number 
of state-owned enterprises went bankrupt due to the competition from non-state 
owned enterprises, and workers in the state-owned enterprises became unemployed. 
An increasing number of beggars appeared on the streets, and some very poor 
residents committed suicide. Although growth in income inequality and polarisation is 
probably inevitable in the beginning of the opening process (as suggested by the 
dependency/world system paradigm from the perspective of international opening up), 
it has to be controlled to some extent to ensure increases in people’s consumption and 
sustainability of economic growth on the one hand, and retain social stability and 
people’s support for the government on the other.
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Active participation and uneven regional 
development
China’s uneven regional development is a very controversial issue, and the debate has 
focused upon three questions. Have regional disparities been narrowing or widening 
since 1978? What factors have led to the uneven regional development? What 
significance does uneven regional development have for China (see, for instance, 
Martin, King and White 1986; Lyons 1991; Liu Guoguang 1994; Justin Yifu Lin 
1995; Li Ling 1996; Jian Chen 1996)? In this chapter, the first question is addressed 
in section 1, the second is addressed in section 2, and the third is addressed in section 
3. In addressing these questions, attention is focused upon how and why uneven 
regional development occurred in the process of active participation in the global 
market economy or opening up to market systems. The model present in Chapter 4 is 
used for hypothesis testing.
Convergence or divergence?
Regional convergence refers to a phenomenon that backward regions grow faster than 
advanced ones and, therefore, regional disparities decrease over time. Regional 
divergence refers to the opposite trend. What has been the case in China since 1978? 
The answer to that question depends, in part, on how regional differences are 
measured. To avoid one-sidedness, both summary and grouping measures are applied 
to examine both relative and absolute regional disparities in terms of both output and 
livelihood indicators of development. The output indicator used is per capita real
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GDP. Livelihood indicators include per capita real income and per capita real 
consumption of all residents, per capita real income and per capita real consumption 
of urban residents, and per capita real income and per capita real consumption of rural 
residents. 1
Regional disparities: summary measures
Summary measures take into account all regional units at a certain level (such as 
province, city, and county) to illustrate the ‘mean’ trend of disparities of all the 
regional units under examination. There are many summary measures of disparities, 
but the most commonly used are standard deviation (SD), coefficient of variation 
(CV), and the Gini coefficient. They can be divided into two categories: absolute 
summary measures and relative summary measures. 2
1 All data are deflated, i.e., calculated at 1978 constant prices. Output indicators may differ from 
livelihood indicators for at least two reasons in China’s case: government investment policy and 
government regional transfer policy. Income of urban residents refers to so-called ‘total income’ of 
urban residents in Chinese terms, and is the ‘total actual cash income, including regular or fixed income 
and one-off income. Circulating income such as withdrawal from bank deposits, loans borrowed from 
relatives or friends, repayment of loans received and various temporary collection of money is 
excluded’. Income of rural residents refers to so-called ‘net income’ of rural residents in Chinese terms, 
and is the ‘total income after the deduction of expenses, which can be spent for investments for 
production and non-production construction and for improvement of daily life, while loan income 
borrowed from banks or friends and relatives is not included’ (Statistical Yearbook of China 1994:291).
Ir Pr+ IrPu
Per capita income of all residents is calculated using the formula: la  = ------- —-------, where la stands
for average annual per capita income, Ir for annual per capita income of rural residents, Iu for annual 
per capita income of urban residents, P for population, Pr for rural population, and Pu for urban 
population. Both per capita income and per capita consumption are very important livelihood indicators 
of development in China.
2 Absolute measures show disparities in absolute values and, therefore, can estimate absolute 
disparities, eg., in terms of dollars. Relative measures show disparities in one or another ratio form and, 
therefore, should be used when changes in disparities is the main concern. Absolute disparities and 
relative disparities may change in different directions; in that case, the latter is usually considered a 
better measurement.
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Absolute summary measures. Absolute summary measures examine the ‘mean’ 
trend of disparities of all the regional units in absolute values. The best absolute 
summary measure is the standard deviation, which is calculated using Equation 17:
SD (Xi - n ) i (17)
where X stands for the development indicator, i for the region to be measured, where i 
= 1, 2, 3...N. ^  is the arithmetic mean of the development indicator in all the 
regional units. Figures 1 and 2 show the standard deviation for both output and 
livelihood indicators of development tor China’s 30 provinces and metropolitan cities 
in the period between 1978 and 1993. They all display a rising trend.
Figure 39 Absolute inter-provincial output disparity in China, 1978-1993
(measured by standard deviation)
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Note: Tibet and Hainan provinces are excluded from the calculation for the period 
between 1978 and 1985 due to unavailability of data. All data are calculated at 1978 
constant prices.
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1995, Beijing; Statistical Yearbooks of 
the 30 provinces and metropolitan cities in China 1983-1995, China.______________
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Note: Tibet and Hainan provinces are excluded from the calculation for the period between
1978 and 1985 due to unavailability of data. All data are calculated at 1978 constant prices. 
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1995, Beijing; Statistical Yearbooks of the 30 
provinces and metropolitan cities in China 1983-1995, China._________________________
Relative summary measures. Relative summary measures examine the ‘mean’ trend 
of disparities of all the regional units in relative terms, usually in ratio forms. Dividing
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SD by the arithmetic mean, we obtain a simple relative summary measure called the
coefficient of variation, which is defined symbolically as:
£(x, - m)2
(18)
Figures 41 and 42 present the coefficients of variation in both output and livelihood 
indicators of development for China’s 30 provinces and metropolitan cities in the 
period between 1978 and 1993. It is shown that the coefficients of variation in the 
output indicator of development fell while the coefficients of variation in all the 
livelihood indicators of development trended upwards.
Figure 41 Relative inter-provincial output disparity in China, 1978-1993
(measured by coefficient of variation)
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Note: Tibet and Hainan provinces are excluded from the calculation for the period
between 1978 and 1985 due to unavailability of data. All data are calculated at 1978 
constant prices.
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1995, Beijing; Statistical Yearbooks of 
the 30 provinces and metropolitan cities in China 1983-1995, China.______________
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Figure 42 Relative inter-provincial livelihood disparity in China, 1978-1993 (measured 
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Sources: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1995, Beijing; Statistical Yearbooks of the 30 
provinces and metropolitan cities in China 1983-1995, China._________________________
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The opposite directions in inter-provincial output and livelihood disparities in 
post-1978 China is an important finding which has been so far ignored in most studies 
on China’s uneven regional development. Due to its importance, another relative 
summary measure, the Gini coefficient, is applied to confirm the finding. There are 
many approaches to calculating the Gini coefficient, but the most popular is by 
regression based upon Equation 19:
where P stands for the accumulative share of a region in the total number of regions, 
and Y for the accumulative share of the region’s GDP (or other indicators) in the total 
GDP of all regions. Log-transforming Equation 19, we obtain Equation 20, and the 
Gini coefficient can be calculated from Equation 21:
Y. = APp (19)
LnYi = A + ßLnPi (20)
(21)
where A and ß are coefficients obtained from Equation 20.3






Figures 43 and 44 show the Gini coefficient of both output and livelihood 
indicators of development for China’s 30 provinces and metropolitan cities in the 
period between 1978 and 1993. The Gini coefficients further confirm the finding 
reached by calculation of the coefficients of variation.
Figure 43 Relative inter-provincial output disparity in China, 1978-1993
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Note: Tibet and Hainan provinces are excluded from the calculation for the period
between 1978 and 1985 due to unavailability of data. All data are calculated at 1978 
constant prices.
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1995, Beijing; Statistical Yearbooks of 
the 30 provinces and metropolitan cities in China 1983-1995, China.______________
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Figure 44 Relative inter-provincial livelihood disparity in China, 1978-1993 (measured 
by Gini coefficient)
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Regional disparities: grouping measures
Grouping measures divide regional units into different groups to examine the 
disparities between them. As China’s uneven regional development in the period was 
characterised, among other things, by the rise of coastal provinces, especially the 
southeast coastal Five Dragons (Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and 
Shandong), our grouping measures focus upon the disparities between coastal and 
interior provinces.4 Measured here are also both absolute and relative disparities, 
which are calculated using Equations 22 and 23, respectively:
Gs = Y a-  Yb (22)
Gr=Ya/  Yb (23)
where Gs stands for absolute disparity, and Gr for relative disparity. Y stands for 
development indicator, a and b for groups of regional units with a being the richer 
one (in our case, the coastal provinces or the Five Dragons). As shown in Figures 45, 
46, 47, and 48, both the absolute and the relative disparities between coastal and 
interior provinces have been increasing for both output and livelihood indicators of 
development.
4 Coastal provinces include Liaoning, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejing, 
Guangdong, Hainan (since 1988), Guangxi, Fujian plus Beijing. They are also called Eastern provinces 
in China. Interior provinces can be divided into two groups: Central and Western provinces. Central 
provinces include Heilongjiang, Jilin, Neimenggu, Shanxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Anhui, Jiangxi; 
Western provinces include Xinjiang, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Shanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, 
Xizang.
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Figure 45 Absolute output disparity between coastal and interior provinces in 
China, 1978-1993 (yuan)
Notes: (l)Absolute disparity is calculated by per capita GDP of coastal provinces 
minus that of interior provinces; (2)Tibet and Hainan provinces are excluded from the 
calculation for the period between 1978 and 1985 due to unavailability of data. All 
data are calculated at 1978 constant prices.
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1995, Beijing; Statistical Yearbooks of 
the 30 provinces and metropolitan cities in China 1983-1995, China.______________
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Notes: (l)Relative disparity is calculated by per capita GDP of coastal provinces 
divided by that of interior provinces; (2)Tibet and Hainan provinces are excluded 
from the calculation for the period between 1978 and 1985 due to unavailability of 
data. All data are calculated at 1978 constant prices.
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1995, Beijing; Statistical Yearbooks of 
the 30 provinces and metropolitan cities in China 1983-1995, China.______________
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Figure 47 Absolute livelihood disparity between coastal and interior provinces in China, 
1978-1993 {yuan)
Notes: (1) Absolute disparity is calculated by per capita GDP of coastal provinces minus that 
of interior provinces; (2)Tibet and Hainan provinces are excluded from the calculation for the 
period between 1978 and 1985 due to unavailability of data. All data are calculated at 1978 
constant prices.
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1995, Beijing; Statistical Yearbooks of the 30 
provinces and metropolitan cities in China 1983-1995, China._________________________
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Figure 48 Relative livelihood disparity between coastal and interior provinces in China, 
1978-1993 (% )
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Notes: (1) Relative disparity is calculated by per capita GDP of coastal provinces divided by 
that of interior provinces; (2)Tibet and Hainan provinces are excluded from the calculation 
for the period between 1978 and 1985 due to unavailability of data. All data are calculated at 
1978 constant prices.
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1995, Beijing; Statistical Yearbooks of the 30 
provinces and metropolitan cities in China 1983-1995, China._________________________
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The above summary and grouping measures reveal that both inter-provincial 
and coastal-interior disparities in both output and livelihood indicators are widening 
in absolute terms. Absolute disparities are, however, not very appropriate for 
comparison between different data sets in different periods, i.e., changes in disparities 
over time. Attention should be, therefore, given to relative disparities. Three 
significant phenomena can be identified in the change in relative regional disparities:
• a narrowing of inter-provincial output disparity;
• a widening of inter-provincial livelihood disparity;
• a widening of coastal-interior disparity in both output and livelihood 
indicators of development.
Therefore, regional convergence and regional divergence have co-existed in China 
since 1978, and sources of each of the tendencies need to be addressed in the light of 
China’s opening up to market systems.
Sources of uneven regional development
Both the tendency toward convergence and that toward divergence are, as mentioned 
previously, due to the fact that some regions developed faster than others. The former 
implies, however, that the faster-developing are relatively backward regions while the 
latter implies that the faster-developing are relatively advanced ones. No matter which 
kind of regions develops faster, a fundamental question remains: what leads some 
regions to develop faster than others? In other words, what are the sources of uneven 
regional development?
240
An answer to the puzzle
The answer to the question is country-specific and period-specific. Given that China 
has been re-linking with, or opening up to, market systems since 1978, three main 
sources—backwardness advantage, location advantage, and the functioning of market 
orientations—are identified to explain China’s uneven regional development, and an 
effort is made to illustrate the most important.5
Backwardness advantage. The narrowing inter-provincial output disparity indicates 
a tendency toward convergence: backward provinces grew faster than advanced ones. 
Convergence is usually attributed to backwardness advantage in the growth literature. 
Many explanations for backwardness advantage have been posed, and one of the most 
convincing is the so-called ‘technology catch-up’ argument (see, for instance, Olson 
1982; Baumöl 1986). That is, backward regions have an advantage in imitating and 
absorbing technology invented in advanced regions. It is less costly to imitate and 
absorb a technology than to invent it, so backward regions tend to catch up with 
advanced ones.
No matter what are the explanations, however, backwardness advantage is 
primarily influenced by macroeconomic environment (see, for instance, Abramovitz 
1986). Market systems facilitate ‘technology catch-up’ much better than self- 
sufficient and command systems, for markets promote the free flow of technology-
5 There are, of course, other factors that have influenced uneven regional development in post-1978 
China. For instance, population size and factor endowments might be such factors. They are, however, 
not characteristic of the period and, therefore, are not the main concerns of the study. As for population 
size, China has been pursuing tough population control policies since the early 1970s, so the difference 
in population growth between regions is not substantial. From 1978 to 1993, for instance, growth rates 
of population in China’s 30 provinces and metropolitan cities were around 1 or 2 per cent, and have no 
significant correlation with growth rates of GDP in the regions (not significant at 0.05 significance 
level). Here attention is focused on the most important sources of uneven regional development in the 
period. Besides, policy preference is an important factor that has influenced the functioning of market 
orientations, and is analysed in Chapter 7.
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intensive goods between advanced and backward regions. In consideration of this, it 
should not come as a surprise when it is found that inter-provincial convergence, as 
measured by output disparity, did not occur in pre-1978 China (Figure 49), and that 
inter-provincial convergence in post-1978 China was still quite weak as compared 
with that in the USA—the most marketised economy in the world (as suggested in 
Figure 50). Meanwhile, as shown by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), the experiences 
of other marketised economies such as Japan and European countries also showed a 
much stronger convergence tendency than China. The weak convergence tendency in 
China is consistent with the fact that China is still in a process of transition to a 
market system. The realisation of the potential backwardness advantage in post-1978 
China heavily depends, therefore, on the macroeconomic environment of re-linking 
with, or opening up to, market systems.
Figure 49 Inter-provincial convergence in post-1978 China as compared with 
inter-provincial divergence in pre-1978 China (measured by relative summary 
disparity: coefficient of variation)
c \ j i n o c > T - T i - i ^ o c o < o o } c v j i n o o T - T j -
i o L o m < o < £ > < o K r ' ~ i ' " - r ^ c o o o o o o 5 0 >
Note: Inter-provincial disparity is measured here by per capita national income 
(before 1978) and per capita GDP (after 1978) in real terms.
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1996, Beijing; Statistical Yearbooks 
of the 30 provinces and metropolitan cities in China, China.____________________
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Figure 50 Inter-provincial convergence in China as compared with inter-state 
convergence in the USA (as measured by the negative correlation between income 
growth rate and initial income level)
..USA..'.............. ................  ... ..... "........China
1900-1990 1978-1995
Logarithm of per capita income in 1900
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Logarithm of per capita income in 1978
Note: The vertical axis shows the average annual growth rate of per capita income in 
the period under study, and the horizontal axis shows the log of per capita income in 
the initial year of the period. The correlation coefficient between the two variables for 
the USA is -0.91, and that for China is -0.21.
Sources: Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995; Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1996, 
Beijing; Statistical Yearbooks of the 30 provinces and metropolitan cities in China, 
China.
Location advantage. The widening coastal-interior disparity indicates a tendency 
toward divergence: advanced coastal regions developed faster than backward interior 
ones. The location advantage enjoyed by coastal regions is partly responsible for this. 
After China opened up in 1978, its increasing economic contacts with foreign 
countries had to be carried out through coastal regions. Particularly as the center of 
gravity of the world economy shifted from the Atlantic to the Asia Pacific, coastal 
regions have been increasing in importance in China’s re-linking development 
strategy. This is reinforced by the close ties of coastal regions with overseas Chinese 
communities, especially with Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan (see, for instance, 
Sung 1991). The location advantage allowed coastal regions greater access to world 
markets than their interior counterparts, and has no doubt contributed to China’s
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uneven regional development, especially to the rise of the southeast coastal Five 
Dragons, and thereby to the widening coastal-interior disparity in the post-1978 
period.
Once again, however, the location advantage is primarily influenced by 
macroeconomic environment. In the pre-1978 period, for instance, the coastal location 
advantage was downplayed, and priority was given to interior regions, especially the 
Third Front’.6 That was consistent with the macroeconomic environment over that 
period: socialist regional equalitarianism and preparation for anti-imperialism wars 
(see, for instance, Liu Guoguang 1994). In the post-1978 period, the coastal location 
advantage was acknowledged only gradually along with the deepening of market- 
oriented reforms and China’s opening up to market systems both domestically and 
internationally. Any changes in the macroeconomic environment can, therefore, have 
an impact upon the effect or even the direction of the location advantage. In other 
words, the realisation of the potential location advantage depends, as in the case of the 
backwardness advantage, on the macroeconomic environment of re-linking with, or 
opening up to, market systems.
Functioning of market orientations. The functioning of market orientations 
indicates the changing macroenvironment of re-linking with, or opening up to, market 
systems and, therefore, can have an extremely important impact on regional 
development in post-1978 China. In labour-surplus developing countries undergoing a 
transition or opening process like China, the functioning of market orientations 
contributes to uneven regional development in many ways, but three are the most 
important.
6 The ‘Third Front’ includes ten interior provinces: Sichuan, Guizhou, Shanxi (in western China), 
Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Quangxi, Hubei, Hunan, Shanxi ( in central China).
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The first is the increase in market demand. As shown in previous chapters, 
increasing market demand can lead to improved efficiency in resource utilisation and, 
therefore, have an important impact upon economic growth in labour-surplus 
developing countries and transition economies where the long-run supply curve is not 
vertical. In a sense, therefore, regional growth heavily depends upon whether a region 
can increase market demand for the commodities it produces through increased 
market orientations.7
The second is uneven sectoral growth and the ensuing structural change 
introduced by market orientations through uneven resource allocation. As a labour- 
surplus developing country, China has enormous rural unemployment or 
underemployment, and thereby a significant productivity gap between primary and 
non-primary industry. As a transition or opening economy, China has a huge 
inefficient state-owned sector, and thereby an increasing productivity gap between 
state-owned and non-state owned enterprises. In other words, resources are more 
efficiently utilised in non-primary industry and non-state owned enterprises than in 
primary industry and state-owned enterprises. The introduction of market mechanisms 
in post-1978 China brought about increasingly free flows of resources between 
sectors. Market orientations have led, as shown in Chapter 5, to resource flows from 
less efficient primary industry and state-owned enterprises to more efficient non­
primary industry and non-state owned enterprises.8 The increase in efficiency in 
resource allocation and utilisation through market orientations has contributed 
significantly to China’s growth ‘miracle’, and must have a great impact on regional
7 It should be pointed out that owing to commodity flows between regions, increases in market demand 
in one region might lead to output growth in other regions. Nevertheless, given that a large portion of
regional demand is still met by regional supply in China, increasing market demand can improve 
efficiency in resource utilisation, and accelerate economic growth in the region concerned.
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economic growth. To an extent, the speed with which a regional economy grows 
depends heavily on the extent to which market orientations lead to uneven sectoral 
growth and the ensuing structural change through uneven resource allocation in the 
regional economy concerned.
The third is increasing regional autonomy and the corresponding relaxation of 
government intervention in regional income redistribution. Planned economic systems 
entail an extremely centralised state power, and the central government has tight 
control over individual regions in relation not only to regional development 
policymaking but also to regional income redistribution. In the pre-1978 period, the 
centralisation depressed incentives of individual regions although it did lead to 
extreme equalisation in regional living standards through regional income 
redistribution programs. Market orientations triggered increasing competition between 
regions, and thereby led to increasing regional autonomy and the corresponding 
relaxation of government intervention in regional income redistribution. Although the 
increasing regional autonomy and the relaxation of government intervention in 
regional income redistribution facilitated the economic growth of some regions, they 
inevitably hurt the poor regions which enjoyed subsidies from the central government 
and, therefore, led to widening regional disparities, especially livelihood disparities.
Hypothesis test
Based upon the above analysis, a hypothesis can be posed. Given that the realization 
of the backwardness advantage and the location advantage depends heavily on the 
macroeconomic environment of re-linking with, or opening up to, market systems, the
8 Resource flows between economic sectors actually underlie resource flows between geographical 
regions in the sense that resources flow to regions where efficient non-primary industry and efficient 
non-state owned enterprises grow the fastest, as shown below.
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functioning of market orientations must be the most important source of uneven 
regional development in post-1978 China. There are many approaches to testing the 
hypothesis, but we apply only three that can shed light on the three most significant 
phenomena in China’s uneven regional development in the period illustrated above: 
inter-provincial output convergence, inter-provincial livelihood divergence, and 
coastal-interior divergence in both output and livelihood indicators of development.
Approach 1. Here an econometric model is developed to see how increased domestic 
and international market orientations have influenced the play of both backwardness 
advantage and location advantage and, therefore, uneven regional output growth. The 
model is based upon the growth framework illustrated in Chapter 4, and can be 
expressed mathematically as
Ln/SYit = a + ß^LnYo^ + ß 2Dejt +)34LnADm(f + ß 5LnAIm(f + uit (24)
where a stands for LnA, and Y for per capita GDP. Yo stands for per capita GDP in 
the initial year of the period, designed to capture the effect of backwardness 
advantage. De is a dummy variable set equal to one for coastal provinces, designed 
to capture the effect of location advantage enjoyed by coastal provinces. Dm and 
1m and their proxies are the same as those in Equation 2 in Chapter 4, designed to 
capture the effect of domestic and international market orientations respectively. 
The explanatory variables are introduced successively to see how the inclusion of 
Dm and Im influences the value of the coefficient of Yo and that of De. If the 
realisation of both the backwardness advantage and the location advantage is 
influenced by market orientations, it is expected that after the inclusion of Dm and
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Im the value of the coefficient of Yo and that of De shall decrease or even become
statistically equal to zero (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992). The regressions are run 
on the same set of panel data as that used in Chapter 4, and OLS estimation rather 
than the Kmenta model is also applied here for the same reason as explained 
previously.
Table 29 Regression results on Equation 24 (dependent variable: Ln net increase 
in GDP)
Variable Regression with Regression with backwardness
backwardness variable variable, location dummy and
and location dummy market variables
C onstant 'j 3 2 * * * 3.15***
(10.5) (8.79)
[9.39] [7.55]












F statistic 36.78*** 577.96***
_ 2 0.13 0.84
R
D eg rees o f  freedom 475 420
Note: Numbers in parentheses under the coefficient estimates are associated t- 
ratios. Coefficient estimates with *** are significant at the 0.05 significance level. 
White heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics are in square brackets[ ].__________
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As shown in column 2 in Table 29, the coefficient of Yo is negative and 
statistically significant, indicating that backwardness advantage contributed to uneven 
regional development. It shows that on average a province with an initial per capita 
GDP 1 per cent lower would have a growth rate of GDP increase 0.76 per cent higher. 
The coefficient of De is positive and statistically significant, indicating that location 
advantage contributed to uneven regional development. It shows that on average the 
growth rate of GDP increase in coastal provinces was 213 per cent faster than that in 
interior provinces.9 As shown in column 3, however, the value of the coefficient of Yo 
decreases by more than a half, and that of De becomes statistically equal to zero after 
market variables Dm and Im are introduced. That is to say, if market orientations are 
controlled for, backwardness advantage and location advantage cannot develop to 
their potential or may even disappear. In other words, it is market orientations that 
have been mainly responsible for the fast growth of backward regions, and that has 
led coastal regions to grow faster than interior ones. The test suggests, therefore, that 
market orientations have been, therefore, the main determinant of uneven regional 
growth, and lay behind both the inter-provincial output convergence and the coastal- 
interior output divergence in post-1978 China.
Approach 2. Here under examination is the correlation between uneven sectoral 
growth and uneven regional growth to see if the efficient sectors grew fastest in the 
fastest-growing regions. The assumption underlying the test is that given market 
orientations lead to the rise of efficient sectors in transition or opening economies, the 
efficient sectors must grow fastest in the fastest-growing regions if the functioning of 
market orientations is an important determinant of uneven regional growth. Due to the
9 The antilog of 1.14 is 3.13. 3.13 sabstract 1 is equal 2.13, ie. 213% (Halvorsen and Ralmquist 1980).
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reason explained previously, the test is to see whether efficient non-primary industry 
and efficient non-state owned enterprises have been the leading sectors in the fastest- 
growing backward or coastal regions in post-1978 China.
Table 30 Uneven growth and initial national income level of China’s provinces, 
1952-1978
'der Region Per capita national Region Average annual growth
Income in 1952 (yuan) rate of per capita national
income, 1952-1978 (%)
1 S h a n g h a i 5 8 4 .1 5 B e ijin g 7 .3 0
2 T ia n jin 2 6 1 .9 6 S h a n g h a i 6 .0 0
3 B e ijin g 2 5 0 .8 0 T ia n jin 5 .3 0
4 H e ilo n g jia n g 2 0 7 .9 2 L ia o n in g 5 .0 0
5 L ia o n in g 193 .58 S h a n x i* 4 .5 0
6 X in jia n g 1 57 .20 O in g h a i 4  4 0
7 N e im e n g g u 149 .58 S h a n d o n g 4 .1 0
8 J ilin 142.87 J ia n g s u 3 .8 0
9 H ebei 109.47 H eb e i 3 .6 0
10 N in g x ia 104.23 Z h e jia n g 3 .6 0
11 J ian g x i 103 .26 H e n an 3 .5 0
12 Z h e jia n g 101.81 Y u n n a n 3 .5 0
13 J ia n g s u 9 5 .2 9 G a n su 3 .5 0
14 F u jia n 9 5 .0 6 H u n a n 3 .4 0
15 Q in g h a i 94 .41 S ic h u a n 3 .3 0
16 G a n su 9 3 .4 3 H u b e i 3 .1 0
17 S h a n x i 9 3 .2 5 G u a n g d o n g 3 .1 0
18 G u a n g d o n g 88 .1 3 S h a n x i 3 .0 0
19 S h a n d o n g 84 .7 3 G u a n g x i 2 .8 0
20 H u b e i 82 .7 3 J ilin 2 .7 0
21 H u n a n 7 7 .0 7 F u jia n 2 .6 0
22 A n h u i 7 6 .8 7 N in g x ia 2 .5 0
23 H en an 7 5 .9 6 G u iz h o u 2 .3 0
24 S h a n x i* 7 5 .4 6 H e ilo n g jia n g 2 .2 0
25 Y u n n a n 6 2 .4 2 N e im e n g g u 2 .0 0
26 G u a n g x i 6 1 .3 5 J ia n g x i 2 .0 0
27 S ic h u a n 57.31 X in jia n g 1.90
28 G u iz h o u 5 4 .7 7 A n h u i 1.70
29 H a in an . . H a in a n . .
30 X iz a n g .. X iz a n g ..
Notes: (1) Growth rates are calculated at 1978 constant prices; (2) Shanxi* is the province in 
western China; (3).. denotes that data are not available.
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1995, Beijing; Statistical Yearbooks of the 30
provinces and metropolitan cities in China, China.___________________________________________
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Table 31 Uneven growth and initial GDP level of China’s provinces, 1978-1993
Order Region Per capita GDP Region Average annual growth
in 1978 (yuan) rate of per capita GDP,
1978-1993 (%)
1 S h a n g h a i 2 4 8 3 .9 7 G u a n g d o n g 11 .26
2 B eijin g 1 2 80 .92 Z h e j ia n g 10 .80
3 T ia n jin 1 1 41 .57 J i a n g s u 9 .4 4
4 L ia o n in g 6 6 6 .4 7 F u j i a n 9.31
5 H e ilo n g jia n g 5 5 3 .5 9 S h a n d o n g 9.11
6 J i a n g s u 4 2 7 .2 2 X in jia n g 8 .9 0
7 Q in g h a i 4 2 5 .7 5 J ilin 8 .17
8 J ilin 3 8 1 .4 3 A n h u i 8 .1 6
9 G u a n g d o n g 3 6 4 .7 8 Y u n n a n 8 .13
10 S h a n x i 3 6 3 .0 5 H e n a n 8.11
11 H eb ei 3 6 1 .9 9 S ic h u a n 7 .7 4
12 N in g x ia 3 4 8 .8 8 B e ijin g 7 .6 0
13 G a n su 3 4 6 .1 5 S h a n x i* 7 .4 6
14 H u b e i 3 3 0 .0 6 J ian g x i 7 .4 4
15 Z h e j ia n g 3 2 6 .6 9 N e im e n g g u 7.41
16 S h a n d o n g 3 1 9 .9 7 G u iz h o u 7 .3 8
17 X in jia n g 3 1 2 .4 9 L ia o n in g 7 .3 3
18 N e im e n g g u 3 0 7 .4 6 G a n su 7 .3 3
19 S h a n x i* 2 9 2 .5 5 H eb e i 7 .2 8
20 H u n a n 2 8 4 .5 4 H u b e i 7 .2 4
21 J ia n g x i 2 7 3 .3 3 N in g x ia 7 .0 6
22 F u j i a n 2 7 0 .5 9 S h a n g h a i 6 .6 4
23 A n h u i 2 3 9 .5 7 H u n a n 6 .5 3
2 4 S ic h u a n 237 .21 G u a n g x i 6 .1 6
25 H e n an 2 3 0 .5 4 S h a n x i 6 .0 4
26 Y u n n a n 2 2 3 .3 9 T ia n jin 5.61
27 G u a n g x i 2 2 3 .2 5 H e ilo n g jia n g 5.01
28 G u iz h o u 173 .57 Q in g h a i 4 .5 4
29 H a in an .. H a in an ..
3 0 X iz a n g .. X iz a n g ..
Notes: (1) Provinces in bold are the five fastest-growing in the period; (2) Shanxi* is the province 
in western China; (3) Growth rates are calculated at 1978 constant prices; (4) .. denotes that data are 
not available.
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1995, Beijing; Statistical Yearbooks of the 30
provinces and metropolitan cities in China, China.______________________________________________
Tables 30 and 31 provide important information for the test. First, one of the 
most significant differences between the pre-1978 and the post-1978 periods is that 
the former period witnessed the fastest growth of the most advanced regions while the 
latter period witnessed the fastest growth of relatively backward regions.10 
Apparently, backwardness advantage played a role in uneven regional development in
10 Data on GDP before 1978 are not available, so data on national income are used here for that period. 
Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, and Heilongjiang were the most advanced regions throughout the 
pre-1978 period, so all other regions can be considered as initially backward regions in the post-1978 
period. One exception is Heilongjiang which ranked twenty-fourth in growth of per capita national
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post-1978 China. However, the fact that not all backward regions (such as Guangxi, 
Shanxi, and Qinghai) grew faster than advanced ones indicates that there must have 
been other factors which have contributed to the fast growth of initially backward 
regions over the period. Second, both the pre-1978 and the post-1978 periods 
witnessed the fastest growth of some coastal regions, although the fastest-growing 
coastal regions in the latter period are different from those in the former period. 
Apparently, location advantage played a role in uneven regional development in 
China. However, the fact that not all coastal regions (such as Shanghai, Tianjin, and 
Liaoning) grew faster than interior regions in post-1978 China suggests that there 
must have been other factors which have contributed to China’s uneven regional 
growth.
Then it is shown that the ten fastest-growing provinces are those which have 
made the best use of market mechanisms to accelerate the growth of efficient non­
primary industry and efficient non-state owned enterprises, for they took the lead 
either in the growth of secondary industry, tertiary industry, or non-state owned 
enterprises. Few of them took the lead in the growth of primary industry or in the 
growth of state-owned enterprises (Tables 32 and 33). Special attention should be 
given to the fastest-growing Five Dragons in southeast coastal China (Guangdong, 
Jiangsu, Zhijiang, Fujian, and Shandong), which took the lead in both the growth of 
non-primary industry (especially secondary industry) and the growth of non-state 
owned enterprises. Within the Five Dragons, special attention should be given to the 
Four Tigers, that is, the four Special Economic Zones (SEZs)—Shenzhen, Zhuhai, 
Shantou, and Xiamen. The four tigers as a group also witnessed, as shown in Table 
34, fast growth of non-primary industry and non-state owned enterprises.
income in the period between 1952 and 1978, though it ranked fourth in per capita national income in 
the initial year (1952) of the period.
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Table 32 Average annual growth rate of per capita GDP in industry sectors in China’s 
provinces, 1978-1993 (%)
Order Region Primary Region Secondary Region Tertiary Region All non­
primary 
industry
1 X in j ia n g 8.02 Z h e jia n g 14.52 X in j ia n g 13.12 Z h e jia n g 13.80
2 N e im e n g g u 6 .46 G u a n g d o n g 13.34 H e n a n 12.83 G u a n g d o n g 13.04
3 G a n su 6.23 F u jia n 12.58 Y u n n a n 12.60 A n h u i 11.85
4 T ia n jin 5.86 J ia n g s u 11.64 J ilin 12.42 F u jia n 11.62
5 J ilin 5.57 S h a n d o n g 11.63 A n h u i 12.39 J ia n g s u 11.43
6 B e ijin g 4.96 A n h u i 11.62 G u a n g d o n g 12.38 S h a n d o n g 11.02
7 G u a n g d o n g 4.91 S ic h u a n 10.37 B eijin g 11.65 Y u n n a n 10.54
8 S h a n d o n g 4.90 Y u n n a n 9.38 Z h e jia n g 11.59 H e n a n 10.42
9 N in g x ia 4.87 H u b e i 9 .32 G a n su 11.59 S ic h u a n 9.98
t o L ia o n in g 4.57 S h a n x i* 9.25 L ia o n in g 11.44 S h a n x i* 9.72
11 F u jia n 4.35 J ian g x i 9.09 G u iz h o u 10.97 J ian g x i 9.63
12 Y u n n a n 4.31 H e n an 9.02 J ia n g s u 10.87 X in j ia n g 9 .40
13 G u iz h o u 4 .14 G u a n g x i 8.98 S h a n x i* 10.81 H u b e i 9.36
14 J ia n g x i 4.03 G u iz h o u 8.28 J ian g x i 10.56 G u iz h o u 9.21
15 S ic h u a n 3.93 H u n a n 8.08 S h a n d o n g 10.52 J ilin 9.17
16 H e n a n 3.83 J ilin 7.62 H u n a n 10.02 H u n a n 8.73
17 G u a n g x i 3.48 H ebei 7.52 N e im e n g g u 9.86 B eijin g 8.39
18 H u b e i 3.30 N in g x ia 7.25 H eb ei 9.82 H ebei 8.29
19 S h a n x i* 3.28 X in jia n g 7.08 H e ilo n g jia n g 9.50 G u a n g x i 8.12
20 J ia n g s u 3.18 S h an x i 6.99 H u b e i 9.49 N in g x ia 7.82
21 H e ilo n g jia n g 3.13 B e ijin g 6.79 F u jia n 9.34 G a n su 7.74
22 H ebei 3.11 L ia o n in g 6.69 S ic h u a n 9.21 N e im e n g g u 7.73
23 H u n a n 2.95 N e im e n g g u 6.51 N in g x ia 9.06 L ia o n in g 7.66
24 Z h e jia n g 2.87 S h a n g h a i 6.14 S h a n g h a i 8.94 S h a n x i 7 .10
25 Q in g h a i 2.69 G a n su 5.65 S h a n x i 7 .39 S h a n g h a i 6.78
26 A n h u i 2.25 T ia n jin 4.88 G u a n g x i 6.86 T ia n jin 5.26
27 S h a n x i 1.66 Q in g h a i 4.72 T ia n jin 6.30 Q in g h a i 5.19
28 S h a n g h a i 0.64 H e ilo n g jia n g 3.92 Q in g h a i 5.95 H e ilo n g jia n g 5.17
29 H a in a n .. X iz an g .. X iz an g .. H a in an ..
30 X iz a n g .. H a in a n .. H a in an .. X iz an g ..
Notes: (1) Provinces in bold are the ten fastest-growing in the period; (2) Shanxi* is the province in western 
China; (3) Growth rates are calculated at 1978 constant prices; (4).. denotes that data are not available. 
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1995, Beijing; Statistical Yearbooks of the 30 provinces and 
metropolitan cities in China, China.____________________________________________________________________
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Table 33 Average annual growth rate of state-owned and non-state owned 
enterprises in industry in China’s provinces, 1978-1993 (%)
Order Region Industry Region Non-state owned Region State-owned
l Z h e j ia n g 20 .3 3 G u a n g d o n g 3 8 .0 9 G u a n g d o n g 14 .02
2 G u a n g d o n g 19.81 S h a n d o n g 3 7 .1 0 X in jia n g 13 .99
3 F u j i a n 18.27 F u j i a n 2 4 .4 6 Z h e j ia n g 13 .15
4 J i a n g s u 17.87 Z h e j ia n g 2 4 .1 2 Y u n n a n 13 .05
5 S h a n d o n g 17 .68 J i a n g s u 2 2 .2 4 N e im e n g g u 12 .45
6 A n h u i 15.63 A n h u i 2 2 .0 8 G u a n g x i 12 .22
7 X in jia n g 15 .09 G a n su 2 1 .7 3 G u iz h o u 12 .16
8 H e n an 15.03 S h a n g h a i 2 0 .8 5 S h a n d o n g 12 .10
9 J ia n g x i 14 .59 X in jia n g 2 0 .2 7 J ia n g x i 12.07
10 S ic h u a n 14 .52 G u iz h o u 2 0 .0 0 F u j i a n 11 .99
11 H e b e i 14 .27 H eb e i 18 .80 J ilin 11 .84
12 H u b e i 13.97 H e n an 18 .62 H u b e i 11 .80
13 N e im e n g g u 13.87 T ia n jin 18 .58 Q in g h a i 11 .73
14 G u a n g x i 13 .80 B e ijin g 18 .54 A n h u i 11 .72
15 Y u n n a n 13 .76 S ic h u a n 18 .38 S ic h u a n 11.66
16 J ilin 13 .10 J ian g x i 18 .18 J i a n g s u 11.55
17 G u iz h o u 13 .02 L ia o n in g 17 .83 N in g x ia 11.37
18 H u n a n 12.91 N e im e n g g u 17.77 H e n an 11 .34
19 S h a n x i 12.65 H u b e i 17 .67 H u n a n 10 .69
20 S h a n x i* 12 .64 S h a n x i* 16 .89 H e ilo n g jia n g 10 .54
21 L ia o n in g 12.35 G u a n g x i 15 .29 S h a n x i* 10 .49
22 N in g x ia 12.25 Y u n n a n 15 .28 S h a n x i 10.15
23 B e ijin g 11 .82 S h a n x i 15 .24 H ebei 10.01
24 Q in g h a i 11.53 H u n a n 15 .18 G a n su 9.31
25 H e ilo n g jia n g 11 .22 J ilin 14 .42 L ia o n in g 9 .3 0
26 T ia n jin 11.21 N in g x ia 14 .20 B e ijin g 8 .8 9
27 G a n su 10 .90 H e ilo n g jia n g 13 .74 T ia n jin 7 .4 5
28 S h a n g h a i 10 .00 Q in g h a i 9 .0 9 S h a n g h a i 6 .5 2
29 H a in a n .. H a in an .. H a in an . .
30 X iz a n g .. X iz an g .. X iz an g ..
Notes: (1) Provinces in bold are the five fastest-growing in the period; (2) Shanxi* is the province in 
western China; (3) Growth rates are calculated at 1978 constant prices; (4) .. denotes that data are not 
available.
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1995, Beijing; Statistical Yearbooks of the 30
provinces and metropolitan cities in China, China._______________________________________________
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Table 34 Uneven sectoral grow th in the Four T igers, 1980-1993 (%)
Sectoral output (per capita) Growth rate
GDP 18.10
Primary industry GDP 2.93
Secondary industry GDP 22.23
Tertiary industry GDP 16.15
Output value of industry 26.25
Output value of state-owned industry enterprises 16.20
Output value of non-state owned industry enterprises 35.17
Note: (1) Growth rates are calculated at 1980 constant prices; (2) Data for the period 
between 1978 and 1990 exclude Xiamen.
Sources: Statistical Yearbooks of the Four SEZs, China.
Given that uneven sectoral growth in transition or opening economies is 
introduced by market orientations through uneven resource allocation, as explained 
previously, it should not come as a surprise when it is found that resources have been 
increasingly moving into the Five Dragons and the Four Tigers, as shown in Table 35 
and Figure 51.11 Most previous studies explained the capital flows to these regions as 
caused by the change in government investment policy in favour of these regions and, 
therefore, concluded that increasing inputs were an extremely important source of the 
rapid economic growth of southeast coastal regions (see, for instance, Liu Guoguang 
1994; Li Ling 1996). Actually, the functioning of market orientations in the transition 
or opening process lay behind the capital flows between regions, and non-primary 
industry and non-state owned enterprises played a crucial role in the rise of the Five 
Dragons.
11 Labour flows between regions are still under government control, and data on the true volume of the 
flow are not available, nor are data on human capital flows. Therefore, only physical capital flows 
between regions are shown here.
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Table 35 Uneven growth of investment in fixed assets between China’s main 
regional groups, 1985-1993 (%)
Regional group Average annual growth rate
Investment State investment Non-state investment
Coastal provinces 18.89 17.76 20.24
Five Dragons 20.38 19.15 21.70
Four Tigers 30.11 •• ••
Inland provinces 14.19 15.68 10.99
Central 13.41 15.39 9.55
Western 15.57 16.13 13.84
Notes: (1) Data for the period between 1978 and 1990 exclude Xiamen; (2) Calculated at current 
prices; (3).. denotes that data are not available.
Sources: Statistical Yearbook o f China 1983-1995, Beijing; Statistical Yearbooks of individual 
regions in China, China.__________________________________________________________________








Sources: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1995, Beijing; Statistical Yearbooks of 
the 30 provinces and metropolitan cities in China._____________________________
Three points need to be made here. First, with regard to uneven industry 
growth, an interesting phenomenon is that the five fastest-growing provinces were all 
coastal regions (the Five Dragons) and they took the lead in the growth of secondary 
industry; whereas the next five fastest-growing were all interior regions (Xianjiang,
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Henan, Yunnan, Jilin, and Anhui) and they took the lead in the growth of tertiary 
industry. This seems to suggest that secondary industry outweighs tertiary industry in 
determining regional growth, and that secondary industry played an overwhelming 
role in determining the economic growth of coastal regions while tertiary industry 
played such a role in determining the economic growth of interior regions.
The factors behind this phenomenon appear to be very complicated, and an 
understanding of them is beyond the scope of the thesis. We can only speculate about 
some possible reasons. Does it have something to do with industry type or with 
linkages between industries? Does it have something to do with differences in initial 
conditions? Does it have something to do with difference in opportunities for 
marketization or with differences in location? Speculation about the possibilities 
point to directions for future research.
Given China is a special case, however, one possible explanation deserves 
particular attention. Under its outward-looking industrialization strategy, coastal 
regions had a policy advantage given by the central government in industry 
development with regard to access to foreign capital and foreign technology and, 
therefore, could take the lead in the development of secondary industry. Without this 
policy advantage, interior regions found it difficult to compete with coastal regions in 
industrialization and, therefore, had to pay more attention to the development of 
labor-intensive tertiary industry. After all, retail sales, or tourism can be developed 
without much assistance from foreign capital and technology.
Secondly, the rise of the Five Dragons in southeast coastal China sheds light 
on why a narrowing inter-provincial output disparity was accompanied by a widening 
coastal-interior disparity. The reason is quite simple from Table 31. The Five Dragons 
were all relatively backward regions in the initial year of the period, so their rise
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narrowed the inter-provincial output disparity. Meanwhile, they are all coastal 
regions, so their rise widened the coastal-interior output disparity. Given the 
important role of the rise of efficient sectors in the Five Dragon, the test indicates that 
the functioning of market orientations has influenced the play of both backwardness 
advantage and location advantage, and lay behind both the inter-provincial output 
convergence and the coastal-interior output divergence in post-1978 China.
Thirdly, the special policy treatment that Chinese government gave to coastal 
regions facilitated market orientations in these regions, especially the Five Dragons. 
The Chinese government began to give priority to coastal regions from the very 
beginning of opening up. In 1980, the government decided to establish four Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs) in Guangdong and Fujian provinces, and gave them special 
policy treatment in relation to terms of foreign investment, arrangements of foreign 
trade, exemption from tax, and so on. In 1984, similar policy treatment was extended 
to 14 coastal cities (Dalian, Tianjin, Qinhuangdao, Yantai, Qingdao, Shanghai, 
Wenzhou, Lianyungang, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Haikou, Nantong, Ningpo, and 
Zhanjiang), and a number of ‘Economic and Technological Development Districts’ 
(ETDD) were established. Between 1985 and 1988, these policies were extended to 
other coastal cities and counties, and the ‘Hainan Special Economic Zone’ took shape. 
Not until 1992 were the policies extended to some of the interior regions. This has 
important policy implications for China to help backward regions to catch up, which 
will be discussed in Chapter 7.
Approach 3. Here, attention is focused on the divergence tendency in livelihood 
indicators of development. There is no doubt that improvements in livelihood in a 
region depend on the output growth in the region concerned, which, as shown above,
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is determined mainly by the functioning of market orientations in the growth process 
in transition or opening economies.12 However, the fact that inter-provincial livelihood 
disparities did not change in the same direction as inter-provincial output disparities 
suggests that there must have been other factors that influenced the improvement in 
people’s livelihood in individual regions. In China’s case, one of such factors was 
government intervention in the form of regional income redistribution. In examining 
determinants of the change in regional livelihood disparities, therefore, it is crucial to 
see how the extent to which government intervenes in regional income redistribution 
changed owing to increasing market orientations in the transition or opening process. 
A pioneer work on this topic can be found in Zhang (1993), and here we draw heavily 
on his methodology.
12 The fact that coastal-interior output and livelihood disparities widened simultaneously suggests that 
the improved livelihood of the residents in coastal regions can be partly attributed to the rapid output 
growth of these regions, especially the Five Dragons.
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Table 36 Redistribution of regional income in China, 1952-1978 (100 million
yuan)
Region Inflow Outflow Net inflow (+) and
net outflow (-)
Beijing 58.90 164.30 -105.40
Tianjin 0.00 381.00 -381.00
Hebei 44.00 119.20 -75.20
Shanxi 16.40 50.60 -34.20
Neimenggu 61.30 58.80 2.50
Liaoning 0.00 737.80 -737.80
Jilin 22.70 47.00 -24.30
Heilongjiang 0.00 301.30 -301.30
Shanghai 0.00 1757.40 -1757.40
Jiangsu 0.00 321.70 -321.70
Zhejiang 0.00 89.90 -89.90
Anhui 9.60 39.80 -30.20
Fujian 72.70 1.60 71.10
Jiangxi 65.10 13.30 51.80
Shandong 1.20 190.40 -189.20
Henan 67.30 26.80 40.50
Hubei 65.60 95.20 -29.60
Hunan 0.00 132.20 -132.20
Guangdong 11.60 94.20 -82.60
Guangxi 86.30 0.20 86.10
Hainan 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sichuan 191.60 10.50 181.10
Guizhou 161.70 1.90 159.80
Yunnan 138.70 1.40 137.30
Xizang 0.00 0.00 0.00
Shanxi* 103.40 0.60 102.80
Gansu 74.40 23.60 50.80
Qinghai 11.40 0.00 11.40
Ningxia 30.00 0.00 30.00
Xinjiang 129.50 0.10 129.40
Note: National income in a region minus national income actually utilised in the region, the
positive is outflow and the negative is inflow.
Sources: Statistical Yearbook o f China 1983-1995, Beijing; Statistical Yearbooks of the 30 
provinces and metropolitan cities in China, China._________________________________________
As we all know, China’s government insisted on communist equalitarianism in 
the pre-1978 period. According to communist equalitarianism, residents in all regions 
should enjoy a living standard as equal as possible. To this end, the Chinese 
government requisitioned a large portion of income from the richer and faster­
growing regions (especially Shanghai) to subsidise residents in more backward and 
more slowly-growing regions (especially western provinces). As shown in Tables 30,
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31 and 36, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Liaoning were among the richest and the fastest- 
growing regions, and contributed the most to the requisition program in the pre-1978 
period. They together contributed 62 per cent of the total requisitioned regional 
income in the period between 1952 and 1978, and most of backward interior 
provinces were net recipients of it. An exception was Beijing, the capital city with all 
the central government institutions, which did not contribute very much to the 
requisition program though it was the fastest-growing region over that period.
Figure 52 Lorenz curves for provincial output and livelihood indicators in China 
in 1978
Per capita real GDP Per capita real consumption
Note: Calculated at 1978 constant prices.
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1995, Beijing; Statistical Yearbooks of 
the 30 provinces and metropolitan cities in China, China._________________________
Owing to the government intervention in the form of regional income 
redistribution, therefore, residents in backward regions enjoyed, as shown in Table 38, 
a relatively high living standard as compared with their output level. To encourage 
urban residents to stay in backward interior regions (especially Tibet and Qinghai), 
the central government actually even offered them a wage level higher than that in
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most other regions.13 As a result, the inter-provincial livelihood disparity narrowed
remarkably despite a widening of the inter-provincial output disparity over that
period. In 1978, as shown in Figures 52, the inter-provincial livelihood inequality was
much narrower than the inter-provincial output inequality.
Table 37 Redistribution of regional income in China, 1978-1992 (100 million
yuan)
Region Inflow Outflow Net inflow (+) and net 
outflow (-)
Beijing 297.46 119.06 178.40
Tianjin 18.56 258.89 -240.33
Hebei 0.00 429.20 -429.20
Shanxi 144.19 27.61 116.58
Neimenggu 438.38 0.00 438.38
Liaoning 0.00 707.85 -707.85
Jilin 202.76 0.00 202.76
Heilongjiang 0.00 249.38 -249.38
Shanghai 0.00 1619.62 -1619.62
Jiangsu 0.00 924.23 -924.23
Zhejiang 0.00 361.00 -361.00
Anhui 44.72 42.00 2.72
Fujian 123.99 1.78 122.21
Jiangxi 153.85 1.20 152.65
Shandong 0.00 569.16 -569.16
Henan 0.00 188.85 -188.85
Hubei 0.00 329.80 -329.80
Hunan 35.04 96.80 -61.76
Guangdong 63.50 374.94 -311.44
Guangxi 190.57 0.00 190.57
Hainan 73.11 0.00 73.11
Sichuan 197.38 9.48 187.90
Guizhou 161.72 0.00 161.72
Yunnan 274.69 0.00 274.69
Xizang 89.67 0.00 89.67
Shanxi* 504.98 0.00 504.98
Gansu 205.82 12.30 193.52
Qinghai 198.53 0.00 198.53
Ningxia 122.09 0.00 122.09
Xinjiang 548.81 0.00 548.81
Note: National income in a region minus national income actually utilised in the region, the 
positive is outflow and the negative is inflow.
Sources: Statistical Yearbook o f China 1983-1995, Beijing; Statistical Yearbooks of the 30 
provinces and metropolitan cities in China, China._________________________________________
13 In 1978, for instance, the average wages in Tibet were higher than those in most provinces in China.
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After 1978, the re-linking with market systems led to increasing competition 
among provinces. As a result, regional autonomy strengthened, and government 
intervention in regional income redistribution weakened. In the period between 1952 
and 1978, for instance, about 11 per cent of provincial income was requisitioned by 
the central government for regional income redistribution. In the period between 1979 
and 1992, however, the share fell to about 5 per cent. In the meantime, government 
subsidies for daily living necessities (mainly for residents in backward regions) 
decreased enormously along with the decrease in government revenues. From 1978 to 
1995, for instance, the ratio of government revenues to GDP fell from 35 per cent to 
11 per cent, while the ratio of government subsidies for daily living necessities to 
GDP fell from about 3.5 per cent to 0.7 per cent. The widening of regional livelihood 
disparities was, therefore, closed related to the weakening of government intervention 
in the form of regional income redistribution in the re-linking process, as observed by 
the World Bank (1997:27):
There will always be a revenue gap between China’s poorer and richer 
provinces. Without an effective system for transferring revenues, 
underlying inequalities will be reinforced by unequal spending... The 
current system permits few fiscal transfers from richer to poorer 
provinces or counties. Each region is required to be more or less 
fiscally independent, tailoring its public expenditures to the revenues in 
can collect. As a result per capita expenditures vary widely across 
provinces.
In consideration of this, the widening of regional livelihood disparities over 
the period can be taken as caused directly by two regional forces. On the one hand, it 
was a result of the strengthening autonomy of the most advanced ‘old industrial’ 
regions such as Shanghai, Tianjin, and Liaoning. Although these regions were still 
among the main contributors to the requisitioned regional income in the post-1978
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period, the share of their contribution fell remarkably.14 The most obvious case is 
Shanghai, as shown in Tables 36 and 37. In the period between 1952 and 1978, 
Shanghai contributed 38 per cent of all the requisitioned regional income. In the 
period between 1979 and 1992, its share fell to about 26 per cent. On the other hand, 
it was a result of the strengthening autonomy of the fastest-growing regions 
(especially Guangdong and other southeast coastal provinces) in the post-1978 period. 
Although these regions contributed an increasing share of the requisitioned regional 
income in the post-1978 period, the amount of the requisitioned income was still 
rather small in consideration of their rapid economic growth. In the post-1978 period, 
for instance, Guangdong ranked first in per capita GDP growth, but its contribution to 
the requisitioned regional income was even less than Hebei and Hubei which were 
much poorer and grew much more slowly than Guangdong!
The two regional forces explain why there was a widening of regional 
disparities in livelihood indicators of development in the period, and also suggest that 
residents in interior regions are the main losers from the relaxation of government 
intervention in regional income redistribution. Relative to the richest region Shanghai, 
as shown in Table 38, residents in most interior regions witnessed a declining living 
standard while those in most coastal regions witnessed a rising living standard in the 
post-1978 period. In a word, the increasing regional autonomy and the corresponding 
relaxation of government intervention in regional income redistribution introduced by 
market orientations in the transition or opening process contributed significantly to 
the widening of inter-provincial livelihood disparity and the widening of coastal- 
interior livelihood disparity.
14 Their share fell from 62 per cent in the pre-1978 period to 41 per cent in the post-1978 period. 
Beijing, one of the richest regions, became a net recipient of the requisitioned regional income in the
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Table 38 Main development indicators for China’s provinces in 1978 and 1994
(Shanghai=100)
Region Per capita real GDP Per capita real income 
of rural residents
Per capita real income of 
urban residents
1978 1994 1978 1994 1978 1994
Beijing 51.57 55.19 80.09 71.29 74.62 86.75
Tianjin 45.96 41.34 54.51 66.04 ' 73.72 82.73
Hebei 14.57 15.40 40.61 47.97 56.36 62.83
Shanxi 14.62 12.61 36.20 36.06 58.46 47.57
Neimenggu 12.38 12.49 46.31 40.21 55.88 51.16
Liaoning 26.83 26.78 65.91 61.09 70.04 55.11
Jilin 15.36 17.34 64.72 54.05 56.44 45.97
Heilongjiang 22.29 15.78 61.15 52.59 69.00 44.49
Shanghai 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Jiangsu 17.20 27.80 40.97 66.97 58.81 68.10
Zhejiang 13.15 26.89 58.78 77.98 76.48 81.06
Anhui 9.64 12.25 40.38 37.40 66.45 59.97
Fujian 10.89 18.57 49.00 59.59 69.32 58.41
Jiangxi 1 1 . 0 0 12.96 50.13 47.81 66.28 51.90
Shandong 12.88 18.91 40.81 60.12 73.76 76.24
Henan 9.28 11.35 37.41 41.92 73.29 58.72
Hubei 13.29 14.54 39.37 46.39 67.35 60.42
Hunan 11.45 10.77 50.79 36.16 66.14 58.75
Guangdong 14.69 29.67 62.85 72.18 68.39 100.18
Guangxi 8.99 9.14 42.75 37.63 59.02 60.65
Hainan .. 26.49 .. 33.15 .. 56.74
Sichuan 9.55 10.86 45.28 35.61 66.58 56.85
Guizhou 6.99 7.03 38.83 31.58 52.48 57.00
Yunnan 8.99 9.99 46.67 30.24 64.33 69.43
Xizang .. 14.34 .. 41.12 .. 83.51
Shanxi 11.78 11.66 47.74 30.58 59.22 49.41
Gansu 13.94 12.70 35.96 28.49 70.49 53.08
Qinghai 17.14 11.73 42.40 36.60 67.18 52.37
Ningxia 14.05 12.07 41.33 34.40 65.43 54.95
Xinjiang 12.58 15.94 42.40 36.45 85.56 57.42
Notes: (1) Calculated at 1978 constant prices; (2).. denotes that data are not available.
Sources: Statistical Yearbook o f China 1983-1995, Beijing; Statistical Yearbooks of the 30 provinces and 
metropolitan cities in China, China._____________________________________________________________
post-1978 period.
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The above tests support the hypothesis that although backwardness advantage 
and location advantage played a role in uneven regional development, the functioning 
of market orientations has been the most important source of uneven regional 
development in post-1978 China. The functioning of market orientations can explain 
very convincingly the three most remarkable phenomena in the period: inter­
provincial output convergence, inter-provincial livelihood divergence, and coastal- 
interior divergence in both output and livelihood indicators of development.
Significance of uneven regional development
Uneven regional development has increasing significance for China in the re-linking 
or opening process. On the one hand, it has contributed significantly to China’s rapid 
economic growth and remarkable improvements in people’s livelihood. On the other 
hand, it has led to realignments of regional economies and changes in the structure of 
the national economy.
Contribution to economic growth and improvement in people’s life
In a sense, China’s economic growth and improvements in people’s livelihood in the 
post-1978 period were rooted in the rise of the fastest-growing regions, especially the 
Five Dragons and the Four Tigers. The contribution of uneven regional development 
to China’s extraordinary economic performance finds expressions in many aspects, 
but only the most important are highlighted.
Contribution to rapid economic growth. The fastest-growing regions, especially the 
Five Dragons and Four Tigers in southeast coastal China, contributed significantly to
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China’s rapid economic growth. In 1978, as shown in Figure 53, the contribution of 
the Five Dragons to China’s GDP, China’s non-primary industry GDP, China’s output 
value of industry, and China’s output value of non-state owned industry were 23.74 
per cent, 22.64 per cent, 24.30 per cent, and 36.60 per cent, respectively. By 1993, 
their contribution to China’ GDP had increased 1.62 times, their contribution to 
China’s non-primary industry GDP had increased 1.75 times, their contribution to 
China’s output value of industry had increased 1.86 times, and their contribution to 
China’s output value of non-state owned industry had increased 1.63 times.
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Note: Five Dragons are the five fastest-growing provinces in post-1978 China:
Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Fujian, and Shandong.
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1997, Beijing; Statistical Yearbooks of 
the 30 provinces and metropolitan cities in China, China.________________________
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Figure 54 Contribution of Four Tigers to China’s main output indicators of 
development, 1980-1993 (%)
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Note: Four Tigers are the four Special Economic Zones in Guangdong and Fujian 
provinces: Shenzhen, Shantou, Zhuhai, and Xiamen.
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1997, Beijing; Statistical Yearbooks of 
the four Special Economic Zones, China._____________________________________
The Four Tigers increased their contribution even more remarkably. In 1980, 
as shown in Figure 54, the Four Tigers contributed only 0.29 per cent of China’s 
GDP, 0.30 per cent of China’s non-primary industry GDP, 0.21 per cent of China’s 
output value of industry, and 0.2 per cent of China’s output value of non-state owned 
industry. By 1993, however, their contribution to China’s GDP had increased 7.9 
times, their contribution to China’ non-primary industry GDP had increased 9 times, 
their contribution to China’s output value of industry had increased 12.8 times, and 
their contribution to China’s output value of non-state owned industry had increased
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16 times. By 1993, as shown in Table 39, the Four Tigers had surpassed 13 provinces 
in their contribution to China’s GDP, 15 provinces in their contribution to China’s 
non-primary industry GDP, 17 provinces in their contribution to China’s output value 
of industry, and 21 provinces in their contribution to China’s output value of non-state 
owned industry.
Table 39 Share of 30 provinces and the Four Tigers in China’s main output 
indicators of development in 1993 (%)
Region GDP Non-primary Output value Output valu
industry GDP of industry state owned
Beijing 2.75 3.28 2.87 2.39
Tianjin 1.71 2.02 2.67 2.59
Hebei 5.39 5.62 4.98 5.27
Shanxi 2.25 2.46 2.08 1.86
Neimenggu 1.70 1.55 0.99 0.48
Liaoning 6.41 7.08 6.66 5.55
Jilin 2.29 2.27 1.96 1.19
Heilongjiang 3.83 4.04 2.65 1.12
Shanghai 4.82 5.96 6.32 5.67
Jiangsu 6.08 10.14 13.47 18.17
Zhejiang 3.41 6.44 7.54 10.53
Anhui 9.55 3.18 2.96 2.87
Fujian 3.61 3.53 2.94 3.86
Jiangxi 2.30 2.01 1.78 1.59
Shandong 8.86 8.83 11.33 14.32
Henan 5.30 5.06 4.64 4.72
Hubei 4.54 4.36 3.76 2.80
Hunan 4.07 3.62 2.73 2.38
Guangdong 10.28 10.78 9.94 12.65
Guangxi 2.85 2.54 1.72 1.35
Hainan 0.82 0.73 0.24 0.18
Sichuan 6.68 6.17 5.36 5.02
Guizhou 1.33 1.14 0.72 0.35
Yunnan 2.48 2.38 1.31 0.58
Xizang 0.12 0.08 0.01 0.00
Shanxi 2.14 2.11 1.54 1.05
Gansu 1.19 1.15 0.95 0.43
Qinghai 0.34 0.34 0.18 0.05
Ningxia 0.33 0.34 0.23 0.09
Xinjiang 1.61 1.53 0.85 0.32
Four Tigers 2.29 2.79 2.68 4.00
Note: Four Tigers are the four Special Economic Zones in Guangdong and Fujian provinces: 
Shenzhen, Shantou, Zhuhai, and Xiamen.
Sources: Statistical Yearbook o f China 1983-1997, Beijing; Statistical Yearbooks of the four Special 
Economic Zones, China. ____ ____________________________
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Contribution to a remarkable improvements in people’s livelihood. As illustrated 
in Chapter 4, The number of people living in absolute poverty in China declined from 
199 million in 1981 to 98 million in 1990, and to 60 million in 1995.15 On average, as 
shown above, the fastest-growing regions in the post-1978 period have been what 
were the initially backward regions. The rapid economic development of initially 
backward regions played an important role in improving people’s livelihood in China. 
Although regional living standards tended to diverge owing to the relaxation of 
government intervention in regional income distribution, the widening regional 
livelihood disparity cannot deny the overall remarkable improvement in people’s 
livelihood, especially the remarkable improvement in people’s livelihood in the 
relatively backward but fastest-growing regions.
Uneven regional development also contributed to the improvement in people’s 
livelihood through redistribution of regional income. Although the central government 
has played a less important role in regional income redistribution since 1978, it still 
requisitioned about 5 per cent of regional income for redistribution, and the fastest- 
growing regions, especially the Five Dragons, have become increasingly important 
contributors to the regional income redistribution program. As shown in Figure 55, 
the Five Dragons contributed only 15 per cent of the regional income redistribution in 
the period between 1952 and 1978, but their contribution rose to 35 per cent in the 
post-1978 period. As the contribution to regional income redistribution by the 
previous four fastest-growing regions (Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing, and Liaoning) 
decreased, the Five Dragons began to play an increasingly important role in the
15 International Economic Databank, ANU; China TV News 12 August 1996, Beijing.
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regional income redistribution program, and contributed significantly to the relief of 
poverty in the most backward regions in China, especially in the western provinces. 
Improved people’s livelihood can, as shown in Chapter 4, lead to increased demand 
and improved efficiency in resource utilisation and, therefore, accelerated economic 
growth in labour-surplus developing countries, especially those in a transition or 
opening process.
Figure 55 Increasing contribution of Five Dragons to China’s regional income 




Note: Five Dragons are the five fastest-growing provinces in post-1978 China:
Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Fujian, and Shandong.
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of China 1983-1997, Beijing; Statistical Yearbooks of 
the 30 provinces and metropolitan cities in China, China._______________________
The above show only the ‘direct’ contributions of uneven regional 
development to China’s economic miracle. There are some ‘indirect’ contributions 
which should be taken into consideration as well. Only some of them are highlighted 
here.
First, the fastest-growing regions, especially the Five Dragons and the Four 
Tigers, played an important role in attracting foreign capital and technology, and in 
facilitating China’s trade with foreign countries. Although we do not have accurate
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data, it has been acknowledged that foreign capital has increasingly moved into these 
regions, and that these regions have become an increasingly important channel for 
China’s trade with other parts of the world. Along with the inflow of foreign capital 
and technology-intensive goods, advanced technology was increasingly introduced 
into China from the West, and contributed significantly to the rapid transformation 
and upgrading of technology in China.
Secondly, the fastest-growing regions, especially the Five Dragons and Four 
Tigers, became important models for other regions in China. When the Chinese 
leaders decided to establish the SEZs and other open areas in the coastal provinces in 
the early 1980s, they wanted to test their new policies. The extraordinary economic 
performance of these regions not only assured the policymakers of the success of their 
policy reforms, but also set an example for other regions. As China increasingly 
opened up to market forces, other regions began to make use of the successful 
experience of the fastest-growing Five Dragons and Four Tigers to accelerate 
economic development. The model role of the Five Dragons and the Four Tigers 
cannot be overestimated, though it cannot be assessed accurately by figures.
Impact upon realignment of regional economies
Uneven regional development, especially the rapid growth of the southeast Five 
Dragons and Four Tigers as well as other open areas, led to a marked change in the 
pattern of China’s regional development and, therefore, had an increasing impact 
upon the realignment of China’s regional economies. There are many characteristics 
of the regional realignment, but attention is given to two of them.
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The rise of coastal provinces as an increasingly distinguished regional group.
From 1978 onward, coastal provinces increasingly distinguished themselves as an 
advanced regional group, and left interior provinces far behind in both the output and 
the livelihood indicators of development. This signifies that the center of gravity of 
China’s economic development has shifted from the Third Front’ to coastal China.16 
Starting from the ‘Sixth Five Year Plan’ (1981-85) and the ‘Seventh Five Year Plan’ 
(1986-90), the Chinese government increasingly acknowledged the reality of the 
regional realignment, and replaced the division of ‘Three Fronts’ with that of ‘Three 
Regional Groups’ (Li Jingwen and Fan Mingtai 1994:63).17
The rise of coastal provinces as the richest regional group was mainly a result 
of the rapid growth of the newly industrialised regions in southeast coastal China, 
especially the Five Dragons and Hainan provinces. As shown in Table 40, in 1978 
we could find both coastal and interior provinces in the top ten most developed 
provinces in terms of output and livelihood indicators, while most of the southeast 
coastal provinces lagged behind. In 1993 (see Table 41), all the Five Dragons joined 
the ‘group of ten’ which now consisted exclusively of coastal provinces. Given that 
Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin and Liaoning, the most developed regions in 1978, grew 
more slowly in the post-1978 period as compared with the previous period, the rise of 
coastal provinces as a regional group can be obviously attributed to the rapid growth 
of the Five Dragons.
16 The Third Front’ included Sichuan, Guizhou, Shanxi (western China), Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, 
Quangxi, Hubei, Hunan, Shanxi (inland China), and formed the center of China’s economic 
construction and industrialisation. The share of the Third Front in China’s output value of industry 
increased, due to the inland-oriented regional development in the pre-1978 period, from 30 per cent in 
1953 to 40 per cent in 1978 (Liu Guoguang 1994). ‘First and Second Fronts’ included the rest of the 
provinces located in coastal and border areas.
17 Three Regional Groups’ were the group of coastal provinces, of inland provinces, and of 
underdeveloped/minority provinces in the ‘Sixth Five Year Plan’. They were the group of Eastern 
provinces, of Central provinces, and of Western provinces in the ‘Seventh Five Year Plan’.
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Table 40 Main output and livelihood indicators of development in China’s 
provinces in 1978 (yuan at current prices)
Order Region Per capita GDP Region Per capita income
1 Shanghai 2483.97 Shanghai 397.73
2 Beijing 1280.92 Beijing 315.31
3 Tianjin 1141.57 Tianjin 254.99
4 Liaoning 666.47 Liaoning 242.82
5 Heilongjiang 553.59 Heilongjiang 231.30
6 Jiangsu 427.22 Guangdong 219.93
7 Qinghai 425.75 Jilin 215.77
8 Jilin 381.43 Hainan 204.04
9 Guangdong 364.78 Xinjiang 197.10
10 Shanxi 363.05 Zhejiang 194.43
11 Hebei 361.99 Fujian 176.06
12 Ningxia 348.88 Jiangxi 171.49
13 Gansu 346.15 Hunan 163.40
14 Hubei 330.06 Neimenggu 161.28
15 Zhejiang 326.69 Xizang 159.75
16 Shandong 319.97 Shanxi* 159.48
17 Xinjiang 312.49 Qinghai 158.03
18 Neimenggu 307.46 Ningxia 157.91
19 Shanxi* 292.55 Yunnan 153.38
20 Hunan 284.54 Shandong 144.73
21 Jiangxi 273.33 Hubei 144.23
22 Fujian 270.59 Sichuan 143.99
23 Anhui 239.57 Anhui 139.48
24 Sichuan 237.21 Jiangsu 138.75
25 Henan 230.54 Guangxi 137.93
26 Yunnan 223.39 Shanxi 137.03
27 Guangxi 223.25 Gansu 136.20
28 Guizhou 173.57 Hebei 133.41
29 Hainan . . Henan 132.95
30 Xizang .. Guizhou 126.85
Notes: (1) Provinces in bold are the Five Dragons in southeast coastal China. Shanxi* is the 
province in western China, as distinguished from Shanxi in central China; (2) .. denotes that 
data are not available.
Sources: Statistical Yearbook o f China 1983-1995, Beijing; Statistical Yearbooks of the 30 
provinces and metropolitan cities in China, China._______________________________________
18 Hainan was separated from Guangdong provinces from 1988 onward.
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Table 41 Main output and livelihood indicators of development in China’s 
provinces in 1993 (yuan at 1978 constant prices)
Order Region Per capita GDP Region Per capita income
1 Shanghai 7048.06 Guangdong 1177.22
2 Beijing 3969.38 Shanghai 1171.08
3 Tianjin 2932.56 Beijing 926.78
4 Guangdong 2034.01 Zhejiang 923.12
5 Liaoning 1945.84 Tianjin 820.18
6 Jiangsu 1878.79 Shandong 787.50
7 Hainan 1874.97 Jiangsu 727.72
8 Zhejiang 1811.16 Hainan 710.66
9 Shandong 1307.69 Fujian 666.30
10 Fujian 1228.06 Liaoning 660.09
11 Jilin 1216.41 Hubei 625.18
12 Heilongjiang 1171.02 Anhui 605.05
13 Xinjiang 1154.48 Hebei 581.20
14 Hebei 1081.90 Sichuan 563.08
15 Hubei 1025.74 Guangxi 562.64
16 Xizang 995.82 Jilin 554.49
17 Gansu 927.09 Xinjiang 528.06
18 Shanxi 918.91 Heilongjiang 519.82
19 Ningxia 912.24 Guizhou 517.77
20 Neimenggu 905.39 Yunnan 501.62
21 Jiangxi 873.44 Shanxi 495.22
22 Shanxi* 852.87 Henan 487.00
23 Qinghai 841.20 Neimenggu 485.88
24 Anhui 820.64 Jiangxi 483.09
25 Henan 806.21 Hunan 481.39
26 Sichuan 783.35 Xizang 458.91
27 Hunan 778.83 Shanxi* 450.59
28 Yunnan 710.21 Ningxia 442.36
29 Guangxi 635.96 Qinghai 422.44
30 Guizhou 516.20 Gansu 413.24
Note: Provinces in bold are the Five Dragons in southeast coastal China. Shanxi* is the
province in western China, as distinguished from Shanxi in central China.
Sources: Statistical Yearbook o f China 1983-1995, Beijing; Statistical Yearbooks of the 30 
provinces and metropolitan cities in China, China._______________________________________
The rise of various open areas as an increasingly distinguished cross-region 
group. From the very beginning of China’s opening up, the Communist leaders have 
been cautious of western capital forces. They wanted to link China’s version of 
socialism with the world market system, but they did not want to see China taken over 
by Western capitalism. They allowed only a very limited number of regional units in
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some provinces to open up to foreign capital, and to enjoy special policy treatment in 
dealing with foreign investment and foreign trade. There arose, therefore, two cross­
region groups in China: the group of open areas and the group of non-open areas.
Open areas are scattered, under different names, in individual provinces, and 
their numbers have been increasing over time. In 1980, there were only four open 
areas called ‘Special Economic Zones’ in Guangdong and Fujian provinces. By 1994, 
open areas had been too numerous to enumerate, and had been scattered not only in 
all the 12 coastal provinces but also in all the interior provinces except for Tibet and 
Xinjiang.
The open areas had more opportunities for making use of international 
markets in their economic development and, therefore, normally recorded better 
economic performance than the non-open areas. As a result, they increasingly 
distinguished themselves from non-open areas as the most developed individual areas 
at the provincial level, and as the most developed cross-region group at the national 
level. Although detailed data on all the open areas are not available, we have a hint of 
the development performance of the cross-region group from data on some of the 
open areas. In 1993, for instance, the open area of Zhujinag Delta in Guangdong 
province surpassed the non-open mountain area in that province by 2.7 times in terms 
of per capita GDP, and by 70 per cent in terms of per capita income of rural residents. 
In 1994, open areas in southern Jiangsu province surpassed the non-open area in the 
northern part of the province by 3.4 times in terms of per capita GDP, and by 1.5 
times in terms of per capita income of rural residents. In that year, moreover, per 
capita GDP in Zhuhai Special Economic Zone reached 28056.2 yuan, ten times as 
high as that in most inland provinces!19
19 Statistical Yearbook of China 1995\ Statistical Yearbook of Zhuhai 1995.
276
The above two characteristics of regional realignment in the period have had 
an increasing impact upon China’ economic, social and political development, and 
have drawn increasing attention from China’s policymakers. The rise of coastal 
provinces as a regional group and the rise of open areas as a cross-region group 
contributed significantly to China’s rapid economic development, but they have led to 
a widening of the regional gap between the rich and the poor, and thereby pose 
problems with the equalitarianism in orthodox Communist ideology and China’s 
conventional mentalite. Although the widening regional gap is probably inevitable in 
the opening process (as suggested by the dependency/world-system paradigm from 
the perspective of international opening up), it has to be controlled to ensure 




Since China opened up to market systems both domestically and internationally in 
1978, China has undergone an extraordinary development experience in terms of 
rapid economic growth, a remarkable improvement in people’s livelihood, the rise of 
efficient economic sectors, uneven regional development, and accelerated 
urbanisation and polarisation. In search of an understanding of the dynamics of 
China’s development in the opening process, the study has dealt with a wide range of 
important issues, such as how to understand debates in the field of development 
studies over participation in the global market economy (Chapter 2), how to define 
China’s radical change in development strategy since 1978 in the light of the debates 
(Chapter 3), how to estimate the contribution of the strategic change to China’s 
growth ‘miracle’ (Chapter 4), how to estimate the impact of the strategic change upon 
uneven sectoral growth and the ensuing structural changes (Chapter 5), and how to 
estimate the impact of the strategic change upon uneven regional development 
(Chapter 6). In this concluding chapter, the main findings of the study are 
summarised. In the light of the findings, the main challenges that China faces are 
analysed, and appropriate policies are suggested. Lastly, implications of the study for 
other developing countries are discussed.
Main findings
There are several significant findings, but two are most important.
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The first relates to the nature of the radical change in China’s development 
strategy since 1978: from socialist de-linking to socialist re-linking with market 
systems both domestically and internationally, or, in other words, from passive to 
active participation in the global market economy. It was said that the finding ‘offered 
unique insights’ into the nature of China’s strategic change, and can help to clarify a 
controversy over the issue.1
Since the strategic change occurred in 1978, the dominant official position in 
China has been that the new domestic policy is to reform and revitalise the economy 
and the new foreign policy is to open up to the outside world. Thus ‘internal 
revitalisation and external opening up’ or ‘reform and opening up’ have been 
repeatedly pronounced by the Chinese authorities to be at the core of the new 
development strategy. In initiating this new development strategy, however, Chinese 
policymakers did not give a theoretical explanation nor provide a logical rationale for 
the connection between the two cornerstones of the new development strategy. They 
learnt from past experience that the two were essential to China’s rational 
development in a new era. In this theoretical vacuum, China pursued the strategy 
through ‘trial and error’. As Deng Xiaoping stated, it was like ‘groping for stones to 
cross the river’. Many questions arose from such ambiguity about the nature and exact 
meaning of China’s emerging new development strategy.
In addressing the issue, some scholars have argued that ‘reform’ is the key to 
the new development strategy. They differed, however, on whether the reform mainly 
implies ‘a strategy of development that maximises the autonomy of producing units 
and individuals and uses their initiative to replace centrally directed physical capital 
formation as the prime motive force of development’ (Lippit 1987:212), or a shift
1 This is quoted from a comment by an anonymous referee of the author’s paper ‘China’s Open-Door 
Policy in Development Perspective’, Canadian Journal of Development Studies, Vol. XVII, No. 1,
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from a ‘speed-centred development’ to an ‘efficiency and benefit-centred 
development’ (Liu Guoguang 1987:154), or ‘a thoroughgoing structural reform of the 
system of economic planning and management’ (White 1993:43). Others stressed the 
multidimensional nature of the new development strategy, with ‘opening up’ being 
one of four equally important parts—the other three being: (1) its primary objective is 
to satisfy people’s needs; (2) it is balanced and coordinated; (3) it focuses on 
increasing economic benefits and promoting intensive growth (Dong Fureng 
1986:67). Still others agreed upon the multidimensional nature of the new 
development strategy, but they identified, in its various dimensions, intensive growth 
as the essence of the strategy and, therefore, argued that ‘the open-door policy must 
also be seen as an integral part of the intensive growth strategy and is best understood 
in the context of that strategy’ (Watson and Xin 1986:94-7). The divergence of 
opinions among China analysts about the strategic changes is understandable, given 
the experimental nature of the new development strategy and the insufficient 
theorising about it in the last decade or so.
This study makes an innovative effort to address the controversial issue in the 
light of debates in the field of development studies. It finds that, from a development 
perspective, although China’s new development strategy since 1978 covered all areas 
in domestic and foreign policies, its essence was to combine socialism with market 
mechanisms in order to increase efficiency and achieve socialist modernisations. As 
such, it signified a shift from socialist de-linking to socialist re-linking with market 
systems, both domestically and internationally. Although socialism was still 
maintained, market mechanisms were no longer considered to be incompatible with it. 
Such a sharp shift underlay, as well as found expressions in, all changes in China’s
1996.
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domestic and foreign policies. As China underwent a fundamental change from a 
socialist de-linking to a socialist re-linking strategy, China actually opened up to 
market systems both domestically and internationally, and changed from a passive to 
an active participant in the global market economy. The finding is important in the 
sense that it links changes in domestic policies with those in foreign policies in a 
logical way so that we can clearly understand China’s radical change in development 
strategy since 1978 and its significance for China as well as for international 
Communist movements.
When Communist movements started in the nineteenth century, the founders 
of the movements, Marx and Engels, saw all the miseries of the working class as 
resulting from simple commodity relations in a capitalist society where capitalists 
exploited workers by means of various forms of commodity exchange. They thought, 
therefore, that commodity relations should be abolished completely to establish an 
ideal society with equality and justice where people work for the society and get what 
they need from it. In such a society, the principle of distribution is ‘from each 
according to his ability, to each according to his needs’, and, therefore, there are no 
commodity exchanges and exploitation relations. The ideal Communist society 
offered hope for the poor and the oppressed, and Communist movements gained 
momentum in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first three quarters or 
so of the twentieth century. Communist parties succeeded not only in ‘Second World’ 
countries such as the former Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries, but 
also in ‘Third World’ countries such as China, Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba. All 
the Communist parties set out to de-link from market systems both domestically and 
internationally immediately after they took power. In consideration of the immature 
‘material basis’ for an ideal Communist society, the Communist regimes established
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socialist societies as the first stage toward Communism. In this stage, the principle of 
distribution is ‘from each according to his ability, to each according to his work’. 
Salary and money as means of commodity exchange were tolerated, and domestic and 
international trade was allowed. However, all the commodity relations were supposed 
to be increasingly limited in scope, and gradually replaced by economic planning. 
Socialist societies were actually designed as a process of de-linking from market 
systems in a gradual way.
The adoption of reform and open-door policies in 1978 announced the failure 
of the orthodox socialist de-linking strategy in China. As most other socialist 
countries soon followed in China’s footsteps, they also declared the failure of the 
strategy in other parts of the world. It is interesting to note that former socialist de­
linking countries were basically divided into three camps in the wake of the failure of 
the strategy. The first includes the former Soviet Union and other Eastern European 
countries in the ‘Second World’ where Communist regimes collapsed one after 
another, and socialist de-linking was replaced by various versions of a comprehensive 
‘capitalist’ westernisation program. The second is represented by China and Vietnam 
in the ‘Third World’ where Communist regimes remain in power, and the de-linking 
strategy was replaced by re-linking different versions of socialism with market 
systems both domestically and internationally. The third is represented by North 
Korea where the Communist regime not only remains in power but is also leading the 
country towards disaster due to sticking to the orthodox socialist de-linking strategy.
Increasing evidence shows that the second camp has experienced the best 
development performance so far. In the 1990s, for instance, China and Vietnam 
witnessed rapid economic growth, whereas most former socialist countries in Eastern 
Europe witnessed low growth rates and North Korea is suffering from economic
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recession and famine. If development performance is the touchstone of development 
strategies, it seems that the strategy of re-linking socialism with market mechanisms 
has worked comparatively well in former socialist de-linking societies, especially 
those in the ‘Third World’. An explanation might be found in the large size of the 
poor rural population and the past colonial or semi-colonial experience, which make 
socialist equalitarianism very appealing to the majority of the population, and which 
enable the Communist regimes to maintain power even under circumstances of 
opening up to market systems. Whether the comprehensive ‘capitalist’ westernisation 
program will work in Eastern European countries remains to be seen, but the failure 
of the socialist de-linking strategy in North Korea appears confirmed. All events 
indicate that market systems still have great vitality and should not be replaced by 
planning, and that former socialist de-linking countries should try one way or another 
to open up to market systems. It can be expected that China will continue to carry on 
the socialist re-linking strategy since the experience of the past 20 years shows that 
the strategy has been quite successful as compared with other alternatives, as 
illustrated by the experiences of other former socialist de-linking countries. Therefore, 
reform and open-door policies should remain the main theme in China in the 
foreseeable future.
The second important finding relates to the dynamics of development in the 
re-linking or opening process. The study presents an innovative growth framework 
named the ‘two-way net-increase effect’ model for transition or opening economies, 
and suggests that the main dynamics of development in an opening economy should 
be found in the interaction between the increase in various inputs on the one hand and 
the increase in efficiency in input allocation and utilisation through market 
orientations on the other, especially in the market forces released in the re-linking or
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opening process. Compared with the conventional neoclassical growth paradigm, the 
novelty of the model lies in three areas.
• The model divides inputs into human capital input and physical inputs. 
Along with the advance of science and technology, human capital plays an 
increasingly important role in economic growth in the contemporary world. 
Educational and cultural endowments have an increasingly significant 
impact not only upon scientific innovations and technological 
dissemination, but also upon administration of economic development. This 
is true of developed and developing countries alike. The importance of 
human capital in economic growth has been highlighted by the new growth 
theories; the model draws heavily on these developments and provides 
further empirical evidence for the argument.
• The model explains growth in terms of net increase effects. There are 
basically three approaches to effect estimation in conventional growth 
modelling: the aggregate effect (or stock effect), the growth rate effect, and 
the mixed effect. The aggregate production function of a neoclassical type 
(Equation 1 in Chapter 4) can only show how GDP increases from zero to a 
certain level. It can be used to estimate aggregate economic performance, 
but not economic growth per se. That is, it cannot explain how GDP 
increases from a previous level to a new level. The growth rate effect 
approach (Equation 2 in Chapter 4) is one way of measuring economic 
growth, but it has been mistaken as the only way to the point that the net 
increase effect has been completely forgotten. The advantage of net 
increase effect estimation over growth rate effect estimation is that the 
former gets rid of accumulative effects and, therefore, can avoid the trap of
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having to arbitrarily estimate or proxy the capital stock. The mixed effect 
estimation was invented to avoid arbitrarily estimating the capital stock in 
conventional growth modelling, but it cannot provide consistent and 
reliable estimation since the estimated effects are mixed. Given the 
limitations of the conventional approaches, the study recommends the net 
increase effect estimation approach under which growth models can 
therefore be tested using reliable data.
• The model introduces two market variables to capture the increase in 
efficiency in resource allocation and utilisation introduced by market 
orientations in the light of the particular circumstance of the Chinese 
economy over the period: a labour-surplus developing country undergoing 
a re-linking or opening process. The idea that markets imply efficiency has 
become a commonsense in the everyday life of managers of firms. When a 
macroeconomic growth process is under consideration, however, this idea 
is not as easily understood as it appears to be. The study shows that the 
long-run supply curve is not vertical in labour-surplus developing countries 
in a transition or opening process, and market orientations can increase 
efficiency in resource allocation and utilisation in these countries at least in 
two ways: demand-led efficiency and productivity-related efficiency. It is 
here that lies the key to understanding the main contribution to China’s 
economic growth made by the market forces released in the re-linking or 
opening process.
Thanks to the three innovations, the two-way net-increase effect model proves 
to be quite convincing in explaining the main dynamics of China’s development 
performance in the post-1978 period. Using the model, the study focuses upon three
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aspects of China’s development performance: rapid economic growth, uneven sectoral 
growth, and uneven regional development.
It is found that non-physical factors, especially the increasing efficiency 
introduced by market orientations, contributed significantly to China’s rapid 
economic growth. The finding is consistent with the fact that China began to open up 
to market systems, and helps to clarify a puzzle in the growth literature concerning the 
sustainability of China’s economic growth since 1978. If China’s growth was mainly 
driven by massive physical inputs, as estimated by neoclassical TFP accounting 
(Economic Daily 20 Oct 1995; Borensztein and Jonathan 1996), then China would 
follow in the former Soviet Union’s footsteps, and would not be able to maintain its 
growth momentum for long. This is obviously not consistent with the strong growth 
momentum that China has demonstrated in recent years. The main problem with the 
neoclassical growth wisdom lies in that it ignores a fundamental difference between 
post-1978 China and the former Soviet Union; that is, the former is market-oriented 
and the latter was not. The empirical test of the two-way net-increase effect model 
shows that China can maintain growth momentum as long as it continues to carry out 
market-oriented reforms to improve efficiency in resource allocation and utilisation 
while increasing human capital as well as physical capital inputs.
It is found that the interaction between increased inputs and improved 
efficiency in input allocation and utilisation through market orientations also provides 
an explanation for China’s uneven sectoral growth and the ensuing structural changes. 
Using the two-way net-increase effect model, the study shows that uneven changes in 
market demand and increasing competition led to resource flows from sectors with 
weaker market demand and lower productivity to sectors with stronger market 
demand and higher productivity and, therefore, led to uneven sectoral growth and the
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ensuing structural changes. Market forces released in the re-linking or opening 
process, therefore, lay behind the rise of efficient sectors such as non-primary industry 
and non-state owned enterprises, and behind the increased efficiency and accelerated 
economic growth in post-1978 China.
It is found that market forces released in the re-linking or opening process also 
lay behind China’s uneven regional development. China’s inter-provincial output 
convergence and coastal-interior output divergence was mainly due to the rise of the 
relatively backward southeast coastal Five Dragons which made better use of market 
mechanisms in economic growth, especially in the growth of efficient non-primary 
industry and non-state owned enterprises, than other parts of the nation. Meanwhile, 
market orientations led to increasing regional autonomy and the relaxation of 
government intervention in regional income redistribution, and thereby to the 
increasing inter-provincial and coastal-interior divergence in livelihoods.
All the findings point to the fact that the key dynamics of China’s 
development, whether in terms of its rapid growth, its uneven sectoral growth, or its 
uneven regional development, should be found in the interaction between inputs and 
the efficiency in input allocation and utilisation introduced by market orientations, 
especially in market forces released in the re-linking or opening process.
287
Main challenges and policy suggestions
In the light of the nature of China’s strategic change and the key dynamics of 
China’s development in the re-linking or opening process, it is possible to analyse the 
challenges that China faces and, therefore, to make some policy suggestions. There 
are many challenges, but attention is given to the most important.
The first are ideological conflicts. As analysed previously, the socialist re­
linking strategy is a reaction to the socialist de-linking strategy based upon orthodox 
Marxism-Leninism. In combining socialism with market systems in the re-linking or 
opening process, Communist ideology in the orthodox Marxist-Leninist tradition is 
challenged. Communist ideology stresses collectivism and selflessness, for instance, 
but market systems carry within them the seeds of individualism and self interest. 
Communist ideology stresses equality, but market competition may result in 
increasing inequality. Communist ideology denies exploitation of the poor by the rich, 
but market forces lead to the rise of private ownership and may lead to various kinds 
of exploitative relationships. Communist ideology proposes proletarian dictatorship 
and a one-party system at the socialist stage, but diversification of ownership and the 
principle of fair competition arising in the re-linking process pushes an economy 
toward Western-style democracy and multi-party systems. Communist ideology 
demands that government officials be honest in performing their duties, but the 
principle of free exchange can lead toward the exchange of money for power and 
corruption in politics.
To meet the challenge of ideological conflicts, there are basically three 
options. The first is to give up the re-linking strategy and shift back to the previous 
de-linking strategy. The second is to give up Communist ideology, as occurred in the 
former Soviet Union. The third is to combine the two to accommodate one another.
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The first is actually an impasse as shown by China’s past experience and the current 
situation in North Korea. The second does not look very promising either since most 
states in the former Soviet Union have not performed well. The third seems, therefore, 
to be the only promising alternative for China, and has been the option adopted by the 
Chinese Communist Party so far. That is to say that China has to modify its 
Communist ideology to accommodate it to the re-linking or opening process on the 
one hand, and modify market systems to accommodate them to Communist ideology 
on the other. As can be imagined, this is not an easy task, especially in a nation with a 
population of 1.2 billion. The approach will inevitably lead to considerable confusion 
and uncertainty in the minds of both the Party members and the ordinary people, and 
efforts will have to be made to find reasonable explanations for all the conflicting 
phenomena arising from re-linking China’s version of socialism with market systems.
The second set of challenges are growth constraints. It was estimated that if 
China maintains an average annual GDP growth rate of 7 per cent between 1994 and 
2010, the Chinese economy will grow from 40 per cent to 82 per cent the size of the 
USA economy (The Economist 9 December 1995:25). Actually, the Chinese economy 
grew at a higher rate than 7 per cent in the 1990s, and will certainly surpass the USA 
in economic size in the first quarter of the 21st century if it can maintain its growth 
momentum. However, there are some growth constraints which China has to 
overcome.
• Population. China adopted tough policies of family planning, eg, the so- 
called one-child policy. As the increase in labour inputs has no significant 
contribution to GDP growth in a labour-surplus developing country like 
China, as shown in the empirical test of the two-way net-increase model, a 
low population growth rate is essential for China to catch up with
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developed countries in per capita terms. However, the tough policies work 
only in cities, not in rural areas. As a result, rural fertility rates are much 
higher than urban fertility rates, and problems will ensue.2 On the one hand, 
given the huge gap between rural and urban areas in China, the high 
fertility rates of less educated rural residents will slow the improvement in 
the quality, especially the educational and cultural endowment, of total 
population. On the other hands, the low fertility rates of urban residents will 
lead to increasing age-dependency ratios, lower saving rates, higher 
medical costs, and increased social security needs in cities. All these 
problems have to be addressed properly to maintain long-run growth 
momentum, and appropriate approaches to more balanced population 
growth need to be found to this end.
• Physical and human capital inputs. In terms of physical capital inputs, 
China did quite well in mobilising domestic and international resources, 
and was among the biggest recipients of foreign investment in the 1990s. 
As long as China can maintain political stability and adopt investor-friendly 
economic policies, the necessary increase in physical capital inputs will not 
present a problem. As far as human capital input is concerned, however, 
China seems to have quite a few problems. For instance, an increasing 
number of children in rural China drop out of school to earn income for the 
household, and the educational and cultural endowment of the next 
generation is thereby threatened. Compared with people in other 
professions such as businessmen, singers, and managers in foreign firms, 
intellectuals at schools, universities, and research institutes are underpaid.
2 It was estimated that about 80 per cent of families in China have more than one child, and these
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An increasing number of them have abandoned their professions to go into 
business, and the development of elementary education and basic science is 
being jeopardised. Such problems are potential threats to sustainable 
economic growth, and efforts should be made to guarantee the education of 
children in rural areas, and improve the living conditions of intellectuals.
• Domestic and international markets. As far as domestic markets are 
concerned, China’s commodity markets have been undergoing a change 
from demand exceeding supply to supply exceeding demand since 1978, 
especially in the 1990s (Press Digest 22 June 1997). It was estimated that 
up to 1996 commodity stocks reached 1327.6 billion yuan (Economic Daily 
3 July 1997). Major efforts should be made to adjust the relationship 
between demand and supply in order to find new growth points from time 
to time.* 3 As far as international markets are concerned, China faces 
increasing competition from other newly industrialised economies in 
Southeast Asia, such as Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, not to mention 
South Korea and Taiwan. Efforts should be made to make full use of 
China’s comparative advantage and accommodate the Chinese economy to 
the changing demand in international markets in order to expand foreign 
trade. Only once domestic and international markets are developing can 
China continue to improve efficiency in resource allocation and utilisation 
and, therefore, maintain its growth momentum.
The third set of challenges are in the form of structural adjustments. Rapid and 
uneven economic development in the re-linking process inevitably leads to radical
families are mainly in rural areas.
3 The accumulation of stocks of commodities indicates that measures should be taken to discourage the 
development of economic sectors where there is limited demand for their products, and encourage the
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changes in economic and social structures, and China has to face the challenging task 
of major structural adjustments. To begin with, the rise of non-primary industry 
indicates that China is moving from an agricultural to a non-agricultural economy, 
and from a rural to an urban society. China, therefore, has to deal with problems 
accompanying the resource flows from primary to non-primary industry, from rural to 
urban areas. An increasing number of surplus rural labourers will move into TVEs or 
urban non-primary industry, and this will exert considerable pressure on urban 
infrastructure including transportation, housing, and electricity. As the resource flows 
are a welcome phenomenon in labour-surplus developing countries, efforts should be 
made to develop the urban infrastructure to ensure the smooth progress of the process. 
Meanwhile, appropriate approaches have to be found to continue the reform of 
agricultural production systems in order to ensure the development of agriculture in 
the process of the industry structural adjustments.
Meanwhile, the rise of non-state owned enterprises and the decline of state- 
owned enterprises indicates that China is undergoing a process of de facto 
denationalisation, and has to deal with problems such as the unemployment of 
workers in former state-owned enterprises, increasing polarisation between the rich 
and the poor, and the decreasing financial resources of the state. Combined efforts 
will have to be made to deal with the problems. On the one hand, appropriate 
approaches have to be found to the reform of state-owned enterprises in order to 
improve efficiency. The theoretical analysis and empirical tests about determinants of 
uneven sectoral growth in Chapter 5 suggest that the reform of state-owned 
enterprises should be in three directions: adaptation to market demand; productivity 
improvement; and outward-looking enterprise development. Only in this way can
development of the sectors where there is a rising demand for their products. This is very important in a 
re-linking or opening economy like China where market forces are combined with state planning.
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state-owned enterprises become more competitive in both domestic and international 
markets, and achieve development in the opening process. On the other hand, 
appropriate approaches should be found to help the unemployed workers in former 
state-owned enterprises settle into new businesses, to control polarisation by adjusting 
income distribution policies, and to increase the government’s financial resources by 
means such as taxation reforms. As the complete collapse of state-owned enterprises 
would threaten social and political stability in the re-linking or opening process, and 
was proven to be harmful to economic development in the experience of some of the 
independent states of the former Soviet Union, the above combined efforts might be a 
good alternative.
Furthermore, the rise of coastal and open regions indicates that China is 
undergoing a radical structural adjustment in terms of the realignment of regional 
economies. The rise of these regions contributed to China’s economic miracle, but the 
increasing disparities both between coastal and interior regions and between open and 
non-open regions in terms of development levels and economic structures will 
threaten the stability and unity of the nation. To deal with the problem, as suggested 
by the theoretical analysis and empirical tests about sources of uneven regional 
development in Chapter 6, efforts should be made to help backward interior and non­
open regions achieve increasing market orientations and the ensuing efficiency gains. 
To this end, the special policy treatment that the Chinese government gave to coastal 
and open regions should be extended to interior and non-open regions as soon as 
possible. Only in this way can backward interior and non-open regions catch up with
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coastal and open regions, and, in the meantime, can the widening of inter-provincial 
livelihood disparities be reduced or reversed.4
The fourth challenge is in the area of development administration. All the 
above point to the importance of development administration. The role of government 
must not be weakened in the process of re-linking with, or opening up to, market 
systems. On the contrary, it becomes more important and should be strengthened. 
This is because socialist re-linking involves radical economic, social, and political 
transformations, and in the process the government has to face many unprecedented 
challenges. Problems such as ideological conflicts, growth constraints, industry and 
ownership structural changes, polarisation, urbanisation, and uneven regional 
development all should be handled with great caution, and good governance is 
extremely necessary. As quite a few of the officials in China were trained in the de­
linking period, they do not have the kind of understanding of governance needed in 
the macro-administration and micro-administration of development in the re-linking 
or opening process. This might become a potential threat to China’s sustained 
development.
To meet the challenge, good governance developed in advanced market 
economies should be introduced into China. Given that Western countries are the 
most advanced market economies and have accumulated rich experiences in macro­
administration and micro-administration of development in a competitive market 
context, China should learn from their experience in the process of opening up to 
market systems. China has increased its contacts with Western countries in many 
fields such as trade, investment, science and technology cooperation, and education 
since 1978, but governance seems to remain a ‘forbidden zone’. An explanation for
4 As shown in Chapter 6, the backwardness of the interior (and non-open) regions lay behind the 
widening of inter-provincial livelihood disparities. The more rapid growth of these regions can,
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this might be found in the conventional way of thinking—China’s socialist 
governance is fundamentally different from capitalist governance in Western 
countries. As global market integration strengthens, good governance needed for 
administration in a competitive market context should transcend ideological 
boundaries. Therefore, the conventional way of thinking should be abandoned to 
ensure the introduction of good governance from advanced market economies.
Good governance, as pointed out by Larmour (1990, 1997, and 1998), is not 
just valued in itself. It is believed to lead to development. There seem to be three 
senses in which ‘governance’ is linked to development: democratic governance, 
effective governance, and coordination governance. In a sense, therefore, good 
governance can be defined as ‘open, transparent, accountable, equitable and 
responsive to people’s needs’ (Downer 1997:1). Given China is in a process of 
transition to a market system, all the dimensions of good governance are needed, but 
attention should be focused on the following.
• Political system reforms in the direction of democratisation. Conventional 
political systems center power on an appointed Party secretary or a few 
appointed Party committee members, and the real policymaking process is 
beyond the knowledge of ordinary people and the media. Policies made 
under this process are liable to be inappropriate, and policymakers are 
liable to be bribed without surveillance by the masses and the media. 
Particularly as the principle of commodity exchange is gradually 
permeating politics in the process of opening up to market systems, the 
policymaking process has to be increasingly democratised to ensure good 
governance. An increasing number of administrators at high levels of the
therefore, narrow the inter-provincial livelihood disparities.
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government should be elected directly by a constituency, and 
policymaking should be open to the constituency and the media alike. In 
that case, more and more non-party personages or people from parties 
other than the Communist party will participate in the process of 
policymaking, and the current political system will need to be modified in 
one way or another.
• Rules for effective competition. Successes in economic development 
depend heavily on economies following the rules that govern competition 
in domestic and international markets.5 The economies that follow these 
rules are effective in the competition, and those that do not are punished 
sooner or later. The current Asia financial crisis is a good example in 
point. Although there are different opinions on the direct causes of the 
crisis, such as excess investment, excess foreign loans and debts, excess 
trade deficit, excess budget deficit, and corruption, the fundamental 
problem behind all these direct causes lies in the area of governance, 
especially the lack of rules for effective competition in the field of finance. 
This has drawn attention from the new Chinese Cabinet headed by Premier 
Zhu Rongji, who is trying to introduce a complete set of governance skills 
in the field of finance from Britain—a country with rich experience in 
financial management. As China increasingly opens up to market systems, 
rules for effective competition in other fields also should be introduced 
and followed.
To ensure the introduction of good governance from advanced Western 
countries, training of government officials is necessary. Administrators and
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professionals from various disciplines should attend the training, and gradually 
replace those without such training at various levels of the government. Meanwhile, 
as China is a labour-surplus developing country just opening up to market systems, 
governance skills introduced from the West should be accommodated to the needs of 
China, and those unsuitable to China’s reality should be modified or transformed. In 
accommodating Western governance to China’s reality, China’s version of good 
governance will take shape to meet the challenge in the area of development 
administration.
Implications of the study for developing countries
China is the largest, and also the most important, developing country in the world. 
Insofar as China faces development problems similar to, or even the same as, those 
faced by other developing countries, China’s experience can shed light on some key 
development issues. The study of China’s development drive in the re-linking or 
opening process has two most important implications for developing countries.
First, China’s experience suggests that developing countries should actively 
participate in the global market economy by opening up to market systems both 
domestically and internationally. Global market integration is an inevitable process, a 
reality that all developing countries have to face. The process can benefit all 
participating nations in one way or another, though the benefits are shared unevenly 
between them. The uneven distribution of benefits implies that global market 
integration may widen inequalities, but yet provide opportunities for the poor. The 
result depends heavily upon what development strategies the participating nations
For example, budget balance, trade balance, foreign debt, and investment, etc. are all subject to 
certain rules in a competitive market context, and these rules are lacking in a transition economy like 
China.
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adopt. It is useless for a developing country to keep blaming global market integration 
for their poor performance and, therefore, either adopt an inward-looking trade and 
development pattern as suggested by structuralism or pursue a strategy of de-linking 
from the market system as suggested by the dependency/world-system paradigm. 
Such passive participation in the global market economy or socialist de-linking 
strategy denies the advantages of global market integration, and cannot lead to 
sustained development. Only once developing countries open up to market systems 
will there be the opportunities for their catching-up and, therefore, the opportunities 
for the narrowing of inequalities between the rich and the poor.
China has had both positive and negative experiences in this regard. In 
pursuing a socialist de-linking strategy, including an import-substitution trade and 
development pattern, China achieved a high rate of economic growth by mobilising 
the ‘socialist consciousness’ of the masses in the years immediately after 1949. The 
rapid economic growth could not, however, be sustained and China suffered from one 
crisis after another owing to massive problems caused by socialist de-linking and 
passive participation—absolute poverty and depressed consumption, lack of 
efficiency in resource allocation and utilisation, political turmoil, and international 
isolation. As a result, China lagged far behind its East Asia neighbours in 
development performance, not to mention the advanced Western countries. In 
pursuing a socialist re-linking strategy, by contrast, China witnessed sustained rapid 
economic growth and a remarkable improvement in people’s livelihood, and China’s 
modernisation process including economic structure changes and urbanisation was 
accelerated. Although the re-linking strategy and active participation also brought 
about some problems such as increasing social inequality, a widening of regional 
disparities, ideological conflicts, and corruption, China’s overall development
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performance over the period has been quite impressive. Since 1978, China has 
surpassed all its East Asian neighbours in terms of economic growth, and has made 
considerable progress in narrowing the income gap with developed countries.
It is encouraging to see that an increasing number of developing countries 
have realised the undesirable consequences of the socialist de-linking strategy and 
passive participation in the global market economy, and most of these countries have 
begun to open up to market systems. We should be aware, however, that the de­
linking strategy and passive participation may take different forms, not only the one 
determined by the pursuit of orthodox socialism, including an import-substitution 
trade and development pattern, as was the case of China in the pre-1978 period. Some 
developing countries may maintain a religiously hostile attitude towards the existing 
worldwide market system, and try to de-link from the global market economy in one 
way or another. Others cannot bear to part with traditional self-sufficient economic 
systems and the corresponding social and political systems, and are reluctant to open 
up to market systems. All these forms of de-linking and passive participation are 
obstacles to development, and have to be replaced by various versions of active 
participation to ensure sustainable economic and social development. Each 
developing country has to find its own approaches to active participation in the global 
market economy or opening up to market systems both domestically and 
internationally. However, the approaches have to fit in well with the national 
conditions including past experience, ideology, culture and religion of the country 
concerned, and complete westernisation as suggested by the modemisation/diffusion 
paradigm is not a good option. In China’s case, market mechanisms are combined 
with Chinese socialism, and the approach has been quite successful so far.
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Secondly, China’s experience points to the importance of policy reforms and, 
therefore, the vital role of the government in developing countries. Market systems 
are mature in developed countries where they have taken centuries to develop. 
Developing countries are, by contrast, in an inferior position in the process of 
increasing global market integration since they have to replace various versions of 
self-sufficient systems or command systems with market systems. Obstacles to 
domestic and international marketisation have to be overcome, and ‘market failures’ 
in the re-linking or opening process have to be corrected. In such countries, 
government intervention is not necessarily against ‘free’ markets, as suggested by 
some neoclassical economists; it can well be a necessary condition for market forces 
to be released or ‘freed’. As long as a government gives top priority to development, 
it has to carry out market-oriented policy reforms to ensure active participation in the 
global market economy.
Without a series of radical reform measures initiated by the realist tendency 
headed by De Xiaoping from 1978 onwards, socialist de-linking could not possibly 
have given way to socialist re-linking with market systems, market forces released in 
the re-linking process could not have functioned well, and China’s extraordinary 
development performance could not be imagined. This study has not gone into the 
details of all of the reform measures, but sufficient to say that they involved all fields 
of economic and social life, such as reforms in pricing systems, reforms in finance, 
reforms in land distribution and utilisation, reforms in enterprise management, 
reforms in taxation, reforms in both domestic and foreign trade, reforms in wage 
systems, and reforms in welfare and social security. All these reforms were necessary 
conditions for establishing market-oriented systems, and the Chinese government was 
quite successful in carrying them out. Although some reform measures have also been
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taken in political fields, they have been very limited so far. As the re-linking or 
opening process goes on, it can be expected that an increasing number of political 
reform measures will have to be taken, and policymaking will become more and more 
democratic and effective.6
It should be pointed out that owing to different national conditions including 
past experience, ideology, culture, and religion, the policy reform package can differ 
widely from one developing country to another. In China’s case, the policy reform 
package focused on correcting the previous comprehensive socialist de-linking 
strategy and, therefore, covered almost all fields in economic, social, cultural, and 
political life. In other countries which have not pursued a comprehensive socialist de­
linking strategy, the focus of policy reforms may only be to overcome religiously 
hostile attitudes toward the existing world market system, abandon the inward­
looking trade and development pattern, or destroy the patriarchal land tenure system, 
and so on. Nevertheless, appropriate policy reform packages have to be found to 
ensure active participation in the global market economy and sustained development 
in the process of increasing global market integration.
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that the dynamics of development in an 
opening economy like China are very complicated, and there are many approaches to 
addressing the issue. The study can only shed light on some aspects of the issue, and 
the innovative modelling practice applied in the study is subject to shortcomings. The 
study focuses on the importance of market forces released by radical policy reforms, 
and does not explore deeply other variables that may have influenced the course of 
development in the opening Chinese economy. Especially, it does not give much 
attention to the weaknesses in China’s policy reforms and opening process. The
6 The new Cabinet headed by Premier Zhu Rongji has taken initiatives in political reforms, and China’s 
future depends heavily on the success of the reforms.
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current Asian financial crisis indicates that all weaknesses have to be identified and
overcome in a timely way to ensure sustainability of development. It is suggested that 
efforts be made in these directions in future studies.
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